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T h e  idea o f  this repo r t  was mot ivated by two ideas. First, an  impor tan t  element o f  the World Bank‘s 
2003 Water  Resources Strategy was to translate the general principles govern ing B a n k  engagement in 
the water sector into “Country Water  Resource Assistance Strategies” w h i c h  were tai lored to the 
requirements of specific countries. Second, the 2004 World B a n k  Country Assistance Strategy for 
I n d i a  signaled a ma jo r  increase in B a n k  lendmg for water ( including water resources, irrigation, water 
a n d  sanitation a n d  hydropower). 
In discussions with the M i n i s t r y  of Water  Resources a n d  the Planning Commission o f  the Governmen t  
of I n d i a  i t  was agreed that  the B a n k  would undertake a study of the strategic challenges facing the 
water sector in India, a n d  p rov ide  m o r e  specificity than the CAS on w h a t  the [‘trademark‘’ ideas would 
b e  for the Bank‘s lending and  non- lending activities in India. 
T h e  B a n k  commiss ioned the following background papers by p r o m i n e n t  I n d i a n  practit ioners and  
pol icy  analysts: 
m 
m 
m 
T h e  evo lu t i on  of nat ional  policies and  programs (Mr. A.D. Mohile, f o rmer  Chair, Central Wate r  
Commission) 
T h e  evo lu t i on  o f  water development a n d  management: the perspective of the Planning Commission 
(Mr. A Sekhar, Adviser, P lanning Commission) 
T h e  evo lu t i on  a n d  per formance of World B a n k  work on water in I n d i a  
(Dr. R.P.S. Malik, D e l h i  University) 
Water  a n d  growth (Prof. Ramesh Bhatia, Inst i tu te  o f  E c o n o m i c  Growth, D e l h i  University) 
Wate r  a n d  pove r t y  (Dr R.P.S. Malik, D e l h i  University) 
Water  a n d  env i ronmenta l  sustainabhty (George Varughese, Deve lopmen t  Alternatives) 
Water  a n d  energy (Prof. Ramesh Bhatia, Inst i tu te  o f  E c o n o m i c  Growth, D e l h i  University) 
P r i c ing  a n d  f inancing (Prof. Sebas t ian Morris, I n d i a n  Inst i tu te  o f  Management, Ahmedabad) 
Water  rights and  entit lements (Dr. Mar ia  Saleth, In ternat ional  Wate r  Management Institute, 
Colombo) 
Accountable institutions (Dr. Tushaar Shah, In ternat ional  Inst i tu te  of Wate r  Management, Anand) 
Moving to scale (Ni rmal  Mohanty,  Infrastructure Deve lopmen t  Finance Corporation) 
T h e  pol i t ica l  economy of change (Prof. V.S. Vyas, Inst i tu te  of Deve lopmen t  Studies, Jaipur) 
T h e  process inc luded a n u m b e r  of consultations. In a Bank-hosted multi-stakeholder consultat ion in 
August 2004, the idea o f  the study was presented, a n d  inputs on substance a n d  process were made by 
about  50 individuals from the Union Government ,  P lann ing  Commission, State Governments, the 
private sector, f inancial institutions, u r b a n  water supply utilities, NGOs, academics, professional 
associations, chambers o f  industry, bilateral a n d  multt lateral a id  agencies, a n d  UN agencies. T h e  same 
individuals were i n v i t e d  to a f ina l  consultat ion on the draf t  report, h e l d  in N e w  D e l h i  in Oc tober  2005. 
Drafts of the main ideas of the report were also discussed at seminars held by the Confederation of In& 
Industries, th-e Federation of In& Chambers of Commerce and Industry, the World Wildhfe Fund, the 
International Water Management Institute 0, and the Planrung Commission of the Government of In&. 
In January o f  2005 the M i n i s t r y  of Water  Resources hosted a m a j o r  consultat ion on “Challenges for 
Water  Deve lopmen t  a n d  Management in I n d i a  a n d  Fu tu re  Strategies,” w h i c h  was addressed by the 
Ministers and  Secretaries of Finance and  Wate r  Resources, the M e m b e r  for Water  and  P o w e r  o f  the 
Planning Commission, a n d  the World B a n k  Country D i r e c t o r  for India. T h e  focus of the consultat ion 
was on the emerging themes from the Bank’s study, the views of the Union and  State governments, 
and  the implications for World B a n k  invo lvemen t  in water  in India.  

I n d i a  faces a turbulent water future. T h e  current water development and  management system i s  not 
sustainable: unless dramatic changes are made - and  made soon -- in the way  in w h i c h  government  
manages water, I n d i a  will have neither the cash to mainta in  and  build n e w  infrastructure, nor the water 
requi red for the  economy and  for people. 
This R e p o r t  examines the evolut ion of the management o f  India’s waters, describes the achievements 
of the past, a n d  the looming set o f  challenges. T h e  Repor t  suggests w h a t  changes should b e  
considered a n d  how to manage the transit ion from “the ways o f  the past” to “the ways o f  the future’’ 
in a p r inc ip led  but pragmatic manner. T h e  Repor t  draws heavily on a set o f  twelve background 
documents by eminent  I n d i a n  practi t ioners a n d  pol icy  analysts, and  addresses two basic questions: 
W h a t  are the m a j o r  water development and  management challenges facing Ind ia? 
W h a t  are the cri t ical measures to b e  taken to address these? 
. 
I n d i a  has a highly seasonal pat tern of rainfall, with 50% o f  
precipitat ion f a l h g  in j u s t  15 days and  over  90% of r iver  flows in j u s t  
four months. Throughout history people have adapted to this 
variabdity by either living along r iver  banks or by careful husbandmg 
a n d  management o f  water. Untd the 19th century, most o f  t h s  
management was at  the commun i t y  level, re ly ing on a p le thora of 
imaginative a n d  then-effective methods for harvesting rainwater in 
tanks a n d  small  underground storages. 
O v e r  the past 150 years I n d i a  has made  large investments in large- 
scale water  infrastructure, m u c h  o f  w h i c h  brings water to previously 
water-scarce areas. This has resulted in a dramatic economic shift, 
with once-arid areas becoming  the centers of economic growth, whi le  
the historical ly well-watered areas have seen m u c h  slower progress. 
For the most pa r t  the results of this “hydraulic infrastructure 
p la t fo rm”  have been spectacular both national ly (through the 
p r o d u c t i o n  of foodgrains and  electricity, for example) and  regionally (where such projects have 
generated large direct and  equally large ind i rect  economic benefits). T h e  poor have benef i ted hugely 
from such investments. T h e  incidence o f  pove r t y  in irr igated districts i s  one  third of tha t  in unirr igated 
dlstricts. 
___-.-- 
There  are regions in I n d l a  that can benefi t  greatly from increased 
investment  in water infrastructure, o f  al l  scales. I n d i a  can s u l l  store 
only relatively small quantit ies o f  i t s  f ickle rainfall. K’hereas ar id  r i c h  
countries (such as the U n i t e d  States and  --lustraha) have b d t  over  
India needs a lot  more 
water infrastructure 
5000 cubic meters o f  water storage p e r  capita, and  middle- income countries l ike South Africa, Mexico, 
M o r o c c o  a n d  China can store about  1000 cubic meters p e r  capita, India’s dams can store only 200 
cubic meters p e r  person. I n d i a  can store only about  30 days of rainfall, compared to 900 days in m a j o r  
r i ve r  basins in a r id  areas of developed countries. A compound ing  factor i s  that  there i s  every 
ind icat ion that the need for storage wdl grow because g lobal  climate change i s  going to have m a j o r  
impacts in I n d i a  - there i s  l ikely to b e  r a p i d  glacial me l t i ng  in c o m i n g  decades in the western 
Himalayas, a n d  increased va r iabh ty  o f  rainfal l  in large parts o f  the subcontinent. 
A rev iew o f  India’s hyd ropower  infrastructure reveals a s d a r  picture: whereas industr ial ized 
countries harness over  80% o f  their economically-viable hyd ropower  potential, in I n d i a  the figure i s  
only 20%, despite the fact that the I n d i a n  electricity system i s  in desperate need o f  p e a h n g  power  a n d  
despite the fact that Himalayan hydropower sites are, from social a n d  environmental perspectives, 
a m o n g  the most benign in the world. Especially in the water-r ich northeast of the country, water can 
b e  t ransformed from a curse to a blessing only if ma jo r  investments are made  in water infrastructure 
(in conjunct ion with “soft” adaptive measures for living m o r e  in tehgent ly  with floods). Recognizing 
this, the P r i m e  Min is ter  has recently called for the establishment o f  “a TVA (Tennessee Valley 
Authority) for the Brahmaputra” w h i c h  would combine ma jo r  water infrastructure with m o d e r n  
management approaches to make  water a s t i m u l u s  for growth. In m a n y  parts o f  the country  there are 
also substantial returns from investments in smaller-scale, communi ty- leve l  water storage infrastructure 
(such as tanks, check dams a n d  local  water recharge systems). And there are massive needs for 
investment  in water supply systems for growing cities and  for underserved ru ra l  populat ions. 
T h e  problems of a developing I n d a ,  however, are not h t e d  to providing adequate quantities o f  
water. Growing populations, cities and  industries are putting great stress on the aquatic environment. 
M a n y  r ivers - even very large ones - have turned into fet id  sewers. India’s cities and  industries need to 
use water m o r e  effectively, a n d  there will have to b e  massive investments in sewers a n d  wastewater 
treatment plants. 
“ ._C_-- -- .,,-. -- - . - - . - _ _ _ _ 1 - - - ~ “ ” - - -  
G l o b a l  experience shows that the returns to investments in water 
infrastructure and management follow the b road  o u h n e s  shown in 
Figure 1. During the first, development stage, the challenges were 
predominant ly  engineering in nature. I n  I n d a  Si r  -4rthur Cor ron  and  
other  pioneering engmeers were worshipped as saints, and dams 
became “the temples of m o d e r n  I n d a . ”  T h e  very success o f  this 
entcrprise, as in other societies and for orher issues, carried the seeds 
o f  i t s  own downfal l .  -4s an infrastructure p l a t f o r m  was built, the 
‘ T y p e  2” and  “Type 3” challenges o f  maintenance, operation and  
improvement in governance 
of water resources and 
water services 
management started to emerge. T h e  uni - funct ional  ((‘bdd”) and  uni -dsc ip l inary  ((‘engineering’’) 
bureaucracy adopted the command-and-contro l  philosophy of the early decades of Independence, 
seeing users as subjects rather than partners or clients. T h e  I n d i a n  state water apparatus s u l l  shows 
l i t t le  interest in the key issues of the management stage - participation, incentives, water entitlements, 
transparency, entry o f  the pr ivate sector, competit ion, accountabhty, f inancing a n d  environmental 
Figure 1: Rates o f  return on investment on 
infrastructure and management o f  water resources 
Returns an Investment 
Infrastructure 
Evidence abounds o f  the inabdtty o f  the state water machinery to address 
even the problems o f  the provision o f  publ ic  irr igation a n d  water supply 
services. User  charges are negl igble, result ing in lack o f  accountabhty  and  
insuff icient generation o f  revenue even for operations and  maintenance. T h e  
gap between ta r i f f  a n d  value o f  i r r igat ion a n d  water supply services has fueled 
endemic corruption. Staff ing levels are ten times international norms, and  
most pub l i c  funds are now spent feedmg the administrative machinery, not mainta in ing the stock of 
infrastructure or providmg services. There  i s  an  enormous back log of deferred maintenance. T h e  
imp l i c i t  philosophy has been aptly described1 as Bui ld-Neglect -Rebdd.  This p r o b l e m  i s  serious in i t s  
own right, but i t  also means that publ ic  f inancing i s  not available for the v i ta l  tasks o f  providing n e w  
irrigation, water supply and  wastewater infrastructure to serve growing populat ions and  the unserved 
poor. Most recent i r r igat ion and  water supply projects assisted by the World Bank, for example, have 
not f inanced n e w  infrastructure, but the rehabdttation of poorly mainta ined systems. 
------- 
T h e  sector i s  facing a ma jo r  f inanc ing gap. T h e  real f inancial needs o f  the 
sector are growing - to meet  the costs o f  rehabdttating the exist ing stock of 
infrastructure a n d  to build n e w  infrastructure. These needs are ampl i f ied by 
the fact that large proportions of recurrent budgets are spent on personnel, 
not on real maintenance, a n d  on electricity, i r r igat ion and  water supply 
subsidies. On ‘the “supply side” there are ult imately only two sources o f  
f inanc ing - tax revenues a n d  user charges. T h e  budgetary  allocations to the water sector i s  fahng, as 
are payments by users. T h e  n e t  result i s  a large and  growing “financial gap”, w h i c h  can only b e  m e t  by 
a comb ina t ion  of methods w h i c h  inc lude greater allocations o f  budgetary resources, m o r e  eff icient use 
o f  those resources, a n d  greater contr ibutions from water users. 
This decline in the quality o f  pub l i c  i r r igat ion and  water supply services would 
norma l l y  b e  expected to produce social unrest a n d  pol i t ical pressure. But to 
the (temporary) rescue o f  I n d a n  society came a simple and  remarkable 
transformational technology - the  tubewell. With large areas of I n d i a  hav ing 
substantial a n d  easily-accessible aquifers, people were able to ignore the 
inconvenience o f  poorly func t i on ing  publ ic  systems and  become self-reliant 
using groundwater. In m a n y  ways this “era of the ind iv idual  cop ing  
strategies” has been remarkably successful. 
Irr igators have either drdled ind iv idual  tubewells or rel ied on others’ tubewells (gving rise to 
elaborate i n f o r m a l  water markets). This has happened on a massive scale, with 20 d o n  
tubewells now installed, and  groundwater now accounting for over  50% of irr igated area. 
T h e  u r b a n  m i d d l e  class have learned to make  do with irregular, unpredictable and  o f t e n  
po l l u ted  pub l i c  water  services. T h e y  have developed cop ing  strategies w h i c h  inc lude 
investments in household storage, purchasing of bo t t l ed  water  for drinking, instal lat ion o f  
household water  pur i f icat ion systems, purchase of water from vendors and, l ike their ru ra l  
counterparts, pr ivate wells to tap the groundwater. Although the costs are high - six times 
h igher  than the average payment  to the uuttty in D e h ,  for example - this works for the 
m idd le  class. Eighty percent o f  domestic water supply in In&a now comes from groundwater. 
T h e  situation o f  the  poor in u r b a n  areas i s  far worse. T h e y  are powerless and  therefore at  the 
e n d  of the l i ne  w h e n  the inevitable ra t ion ing takes place, and  they cannot  a f f o r d  to make  the 
same cop ing  investments as the m idd le  class. T h e y  depend heavi ly on water vendors, most of 
w h i c h  are, again, supplied by groundwater, a n d  p rov ide  water o f  ve ry  high cost. 
Industry, too, has coped by sel f -prov idmg mostly from groundwater. Where  aquifers are 
either unavailable or exhausted, industries resor t  to very high-cost “captive” alternatives 
( includmg reverse osmosis treatment of wastewater a n d  desalination) to keep their factories 
running. 
. 
Complacency - “we can 
muddle through” -- is a 
In m a n y  ways this private, self-provision strategy has been a 
success, a n d  has underp inned spectacular gains in agricultural 
p r o d u c t i o n  a n d  the rise o f  thousands o f  towns a n d  cities. This has 
b r e d  a n  attitude a m o n g  m a n y  - pol i t ica l  leaders, industrialists, 
irr igators and  c o m m o n  people - that “we have m u d d l e d  through 
okay, a n d  w e  wdl continue to mudd le  through”. This i s  a 
dangerous complacency, because i t  i s  based on three erroneous 
assumptions: 
c 
- -- 
I 
’ 
’ 
that  there i s  h u t l e s s  groundwater; 
that  the env i ronmenta l  debts ( including vanishing wetlands a n d  po l l u ted  r ivers a n d  aquifers) 
do not seriously constrain h u m a n  activity, a n d  
tha t  the financial l iabht ies inherent  in these systems can continue growing indefinitely. 
dangerous illusion, in light of 
scarcity, groundwater 
depletion and environmental 
degradation 
In already-large and  rapidly-growing segments of the economy and  in m a n y  o f  the most product ive 
regions of the Ind ian  economy, this self-provision m o d e l  i s  no longer sustainable. T h e  N a t i o n a l  
Commission on Water  of 1999 has shown that overal l  water balances are precarious, that crisis 
situations already exist in a n u m b e r  of basins and  that by 2050, demands wdl exceed al l  available 
sources of supply. Already about  15% of  a l l  aquifers are in crit ical condit ion, a n u m b e r  w h c h  d 
grow to 60% in the nex t  25 years unless there i s  change. About 15% of India’s food i s  be ing  p roduced  
using non-renewable, “mined”, groundwater. Since aquifer deplet ion i s  concentrated in m a n y  o f  the 
most populated a n d  economical ly p roduc t i ve  areas, the potent ia l  social and  economic consequences of 
“continued muddhng through” are huge. 
At the same time, I n d i a n  society i s  changing in m a n y  profound 
ways. Industr ies and  cities (which both require water  and  produce 
wastes) are growing rapidly. Rura l  l i f e  i s  changing, with m o r e  
than  h a l f  o f  people in rura l  Pun jab  a n d  Haryana no longer  
engaged in agriculture. And agriculture i tse l f  i s  evolving. In a 
growing n u m b e r  of areas, high-value crops are now displacing 
low-value foodgrains, farmers are investing heavi ly in drip 
irrigauon, and  there are even travel agencies specializing in “agro-tourism”, so that farmers can see 
how their contemporaries manage wth less water in Israel and  other places. As incomes rise - 100,000 
people are joining the m idd le  class every day! -- people are b e c o m g  m o r e  concerned with 
envi ronmenta l  quality. T h e  n e t  effect i s  that  the demands for and  on water resources are changing 
substantially, with the effects especially acute in the high-growth regions, most o f  w h i c h  are water 
scarce. 
- 
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Conf ron ted  with this reality of k n i t e d  supplies a n d  growing and  changing demands, the need i s  
obviously for a management framework w h i c h  stimulates efficiency a n d  w h i c h  facihtates vo luntary  
transfer of water as societal needs change. T h e  tradit ional command-and-control a n d  const ruct ion 
instruments of the Union and  State water  bureaucracies address neither of these imperatives. T h e  
economic a n d  social costs of rigidity are large - a World B a n k  study of T a d  Nadu,  for example, 
shows that i f  a flexible water al location system were adopted, the State economy in 2020 would b e  
20% larger than under  the current, rigid, al location procedures, A central element of a n e w  approach 
must b e  that users have well-defined enti t lements to water. T h e  broader messages are that the 
economic ideas o f  the 1991 economic re fo rms  must b e  drd led down from the regulatory a n d  f inancial 
sectors into the real sectors ( includmg the water sector) i f  I n d i a  i s  to have sustainable economic 
growth, a n d  that the ro le  of the I n d i a n  water  state must change from that  of bui lder a n d  contro l ler  to 
creator of an  enabling environment, a n d  fach ta to r  o f  the actions o f  water users large a n d  small. 
-in impor tan t  manifestat ion of the break-down on the current 
system i s  rhe grouing incidence and  severity of water con f i c t s  - 
becoming endemic at all benveen States, between cities and  farmers, benveen industry and  
levels villagers, between farmers and  the environment, and w i t h  
irr igated areas. T h e  state has generally responded by proposing 
~ n e w  supply schemes (a n e w  dam, a desalination p lan t  or a rainwater 
harvesting scheme) w h i c h  adl ‘‘solve the supply problem”. W h a t  i s  becoming increasingly apparent i s  
that in the growing number  o f  areas where water i s  already scarce, it i s  a zero sum game. These 
schemes increasingly solve one person’s p r o b l e m  at the expense o f  someone “downstream”. On the 
m o r e  thorny issues where u-adeoffs cannot  b e  avoided, the usual response o f  the state water apparatus 
has been to h o p e  i t  rains and, f a h g  that play for time. (“Passing i t  to the Supreme Court” has 
become a standard modus o p e r a n d  for water matters where the admmistrat ion cannot  muster the 
necessary imagmation or pol i t ical ad to act.) Where  inter-state T r ibuna l  awards have been made, they 
have not helped much.  They  have taken years to complete, have not fo l lowed g lobal  good practice, 
and  have stimulated States to focus their attention on “getting m o r e  water next  time”, rather than on 
effective use o f  what  they have. T h e  results have been serious economic and  fiscal damage. (For 
example 18’/’0 o f  Maharashtra’s fiscal defici t  i s  to pay for the construction of dams whose p r i m q  
purpose was to lay claims for water from the IG ishna  in the next  T r ibuna l  -4iward.) In add t ion ,  there 
are no effective mechanisms for enforc ing awards or preventing u d a t e r a l  act ion or even exit by 
dssatisf ied states. T h e  lack of modern, fair and  enforceable inter-state water compacts has also 
stymied sensible inter-state “win-win” water cooperation. 
Water conflicts are 
As in a l l  o ther  Federal countries these issues are complex and  polit ical. I n d i a  has some good models  
for proceedmg - in i t s  own treaties with Pahs tan  on the I n d u s  and  Bangladesh on the Ganga; and  in 
the experience of other  a r i d  federal countries. D e a h g  with these issues i s  the single m o s t  impor tan t  
task facing the Union M i n i s t r y  o f  Wate r  Resources. Recent statements by nat ional  po l i t ica l  leaders 
s h o w  growing awareness o f  the p rob lem.  T h e  Finance Min is ter  has warned  about  “a growing set of 
l i t t le  c i v i l  wars over  water” and  the M m s t e r  of Wate r  Resources notes wryly tha t  h e  i s  really ‘the 
M in i s te r  of Wate r  Conflicts”. 
Towards a “new water 
state” at the Union and 4 State levels I n d a  needs a re-invigorated set of pub l i c  water institutions, w h i c h  are built on the following imperatives: focus ing on developing a set of instruments ( including water entitlements, contracts between providers a n d  users, a n d  pricing) a n d  incentives w h c h  govern the use of water; 
st imulat ing compe t i t i on  in and  for the marke t  for i r r igat ion a n d  
water a n d  sanitation services; 
empower ing users by giving t h e m  clear, enforceable water entitlements; 
ending the culture of secrecy a n d  m a h n g  transparency the rule; 
i n t roduc ing  incentive-based, part icipatory regulat ion o f  services and  water resources; 
putting the sector on a sound financial footing; 
invest ing heavily in development  of a n e w  generation of mult i-discipl inary water  resource 
professionals; 
m a h n g  the env i ronment  a lugh priority; 
m a k m g  local  people the f irst beneficiaries of m a j o r  water projects. 
In&a i s  rap id ly  approaching the e n d  o f  a n  era in which society c o u l d  “get by” despite the fact t ha t  
government  (a) has p e r f o r m e d  poorly where  i t  has engaged (in service delivery) a n d  @) has abandoned 
m a j o r  areas where government  engagement i s  cr i t ical (such as groundwater management, con f l i c t  
There  are two m a i n  corollaries to this diagnosis. First, that a ma jo r  push i s  needed - by government  
a n d  by users working together - to bring abstractions from groundwater in l ine with recharge. W h i l e  
tradit ional technologies such as rainwater harvesting and  tanks can p lay a n  impor tan t  loca l  role, they 
also create n e w  and  addit ional demands w h i c h  o f ten  clash with exist ing uses, a n d  they sustain the 
wishful thinhng that supply-side options (both large and  small  scale) are wha t  wdl “solve the 
problem”. T h e  simple fact i s  that in m a n y  parts of I n d i a  demand wdl have to b e  brought down to 
m a t c h  sustainable supply. G l o b a l  experience shows that this di f f icu l t  a n d  essential task wdl require a 
pa r tne rshp  between users and  government  - to form empowered aquifer user associations; to 
formalize water  entit lements w h i c h  are consistent with the sustainable y ie ld  of the aquifer; to develop 
transparent i n f o r m a t i o n  a n d  decision support systems. So far the approach of the water apparatus has 
been to promulgate laws a n d  policies, most of w h i c h  are not implemented. H e r e  an  approach w h i c h  
begins with acknowledgement o f  a n d  respect for the private interests o f  indmidual  farmers will b e  far 
m o r e  successful t han  approaches w h i c h  resort to c o m m a n d  and  control,  or ones w h i c h  are based on a 
communi tar ian ideal. T h e  longer this adjustment takes place, the m o r e  costly and  d i f f icu l t  i t  becomes. 
Second, the e n d  of the era of massive expansion in groundwater use i s  going to demand greater 
reliance on surface water supply systems. This i s  going to require recuperation of the large stock of 
ddapidated infrastructure a n d  large-scale investment in pub l i c  i n f r a s m c t u r e  o f  a l l  scales (for provision 
and  distribution o f  surface water supplies, but also for treatment of wastewater). And it i s  going to 
require a dramatic t ransformat ion in the  way in w h i c h  pub l i c  water services are p r o v i d e d  to farmers, 
households a n d  industries, in w h i c h  the watchwords are water entitlements, f inancial sustainabllity, 
accountabhty, competit ion, regulat ion and  entry o f  alternatives to government  provision, inc lud ing 
cooperatives a n d  the pr ivate sector. 
I n d i a  faces this challenge with m a n y  assets and  some liabllities. T h e  assets inc lude citizens, 
communit ies and  a private sector who have shown immense ingenui ty  a n d  creativity, attributes w h i c h  
are cri t ical for the n e w  era o f  water management. T h e  m a j o r  l iabl l i ty i s  a pub l i c  water sector w h i c h  
rests on the laurels o f  a n  adrmrable past, but i s  not equipped to deal with the central tasks w h i c h  only 
the government  can to - developing a n  enabling legal a n d  regulatory framework; putting into place 
enti t lement and  p r i c ing  practices w h i c h  wdl p rov ide  incentives for efficient, sustainable a n d  flexible use 
of water; forming partnerships with communit ies for part icipatory management of r ivers and  aquifers; 
providing transparent i n f o r m a t i o n  for use in managing a n d  monitoring the resource a n d  services; 
st imulat ing compe t i t i on  a m o n g  prov iders though b e n c h m a r h n g  a n d  the entry o f  pr ivate sector and  
cooperative providers; regulat ing both the resource a n d  services; a n d  f inanc ing t rue pub l i c  goods, such 
as flood con t ro l  a n d  wastewater treatment. Figure 2 provides a schematic sense o f  the necessary “next 
stage” in the evolut ion o f  water management in India. 
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here t o  there -- the 
political economy o f  
In the eyes of many- inc lud ing several o f  the very experienced 
Ind ians who wro te  background papers for this Repor t  - the idea o f  
such a modern, accountable “Indian water system” i s  a fantasy, g iven 
the d s m a l  per formance of the I n d i a n  state on water matters in recent 
decades a n d  the broader  challenges of governance. Others point to 
“the hollowing out of the  I n d i a n  state ... the growing middle-class 
exit  from pub l i c  services.. and  the inabihty  to grapple with the m a n y  
long - te rm challenges facing the countryyy2. T h e  glass is, of course, always h a l f  empty. But it i s  h a l f  full 
too. T h e r e  are some impor tan t  s i g n s  that  the need  for change i s  be ing  understood, there are pol i t ica l  
leaders who are start ing to grapple with these realities, and  there are a f e w  states w h c h  are t a h n g  the 
i m p o r t a n t  f i r s t  steps down t h i s  long a n d  windmg road. 
I n d i a  i s  fortunate, too, in that i t  i s  not the f i r s t  c o u n t r y  in the world to face this (daunting) set o f  
challenges. T h e  experiences o f  other  countries suggest that there are a set o f  “rules for reformers” in 
under takmg such a transition. These rules include: . . . 
Ini t ia te  r e f o r m  where there i s  a p o w e r f u l  need  a n d  demonstrated demand for change. 
I n v o l v e  those affected, a n d  address their concerns with effective, understandable in format ion.  
I f  everything i s  a priority, nothing i s  a priority -- develop a priorit ized, sequenced l i s t  of 
reforms. 
P i c k  the low-hangmg fruit f i r s t  - nothing succeeds l i ke  success. 
K e e p  your eye on the bal l  - don’t le t  the best become the enemy o f  the good. 
B e  aware tha t  there are no silver bullets. 
. . . 
. . . . . 
Don’t throw the baby  out with the bathwater. 
T rea t  r e f o r m  as a dialectic, not mechanical, process. 
Understand that a l l  water i s  loca l  and  each place i s  dif ferent - one size d not fit all. 
B e  patient, persistent and  pragmatic. 
Ensure  that re fo rms  p rov ide  returns to polit icians who are d n g  to make  changes. 
.-__. -.- ---_^-- 1 -. . -. ~.. I_..”””.”-.--- ----.-I .- In a national workshop to discuss this Report, the l l inistq o f  Finance 
n.arer sector. T h e  \Yorld B a n k  i s  expected to finance projects w h i c h  couple 
h igh-return investment with r e f o r m  processes, and  w h i c h  bring knowledge 
Ind ia.  With t h i s  guidance, wha t  i s  i t  that the \Yorld B a n k  can do to be a 
better partner to Ind ia  on water? 
described what  the Governmen t  o f  Ind ia  expects o f  the \Yorld Bank  in the 
about  international good practice to bear on the water challenges facing 
might be a more 
T h e  In&a Country Assistance Strategy (CAS) of 2004 outhnes the b r o a d  features o f  B a n k  involvement  
with I n d i a  over  the nex t  four years. This includes: . . L e n d i n g  w h i c h  d simultaneously address investments, re forms a n d  knowledge transfer; A large increase - see Figure 3 -- in lendmg for water-related sectors ( includmg water 
resources management, irrigation, hyd ropower  and  water supply a n d  sanitation), with 
aggregate l endmg for these sectors set to rise from $200 d o n  to $800 d o n  a year; 
A d n g n e s s  to consider f inancing h igh-return infrastructure that can b e  built to reasonable 
social and  env i ronmenta l  standards; 
Clear “guidelines” for engagement with each water-related sector. 
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Figure 3: The changing composition and level of World 
Bank lending for Water in India 
T h e  CAS i s  a living document, with elaborations a n d  adjustments emerging as needs a n d  perceptions 
evolve. Consistent with the guidance from the M i n i s t r y  o f  Finance, the B a n k  w d  focus m o r e  sharply 
on the inst i tut ional r e f o r m  and  g lobal  best practice content  o f  Bank-f inanced activities. This d m e a n  
greater emphasis on ‘‘instruments” that stimulate efficiency, accountabil ity a n d  f l e x i b h t y  (such as water 
entitlements, information, regulation, compe t i t i on  a n d  pricing). I t  d also m e a n  greater a t tent ion to 
the “hidden groundwater  economy”. 
sector. 
earlier. 
I t  d mean m o r e  attention on building capacity in the publ ic  
I t  will mean  be ing  “principled and  pragmatic”, following the “rules for reformers” outhned 
In i t s  in ternal  workmgs, the B a n k  d also give m o r e  explicit attention to ensuring better cross-sectoral 
col laboration within the B a n k  on water resources and  to better integration o f  the Bank‘s lending and  
knowledge services - so that there i s  m o r e  explicit learning from projects, and  that analytic work feeds 
back into the design of Bank- f inanced projects. And the B a n k  d recru i t  staff  and  consultants who 
have hands-on knowledge in translating r e f o r m  principles into results on the ground. 

I n d a  has a highly seasonal pattern o f  rainfall, with 50% o f  precipitat ion fall ing in j u s t  15 days a n d  over  
90% of r i ve r  flows occurr ing in j u s t  four months. Throughout history people have adapted to this 
va r iabh ty  by either living along r iver  banks or by careful husbandmg and  management o f  water. 
Thousands of minor i r r igat ion tanks were constructed in the 5th century AD by the Cheras, Cholas a n d  
Pandyans3. Most o f  t h i s  management was at  the commun i t y  level, re ly ing on a p le thora o f  imaginative 
a n d  then-effective methods for harvesting rainwater in tanks a n d  small  underground storages. But 
even in ancient times, I n d i a  h a d  constructed some m a j o r  water infrastructure. Small  storage reservoirs 
were constructed be fo re  the Mauryan  era around 300 BC4 a n d  the G r a n d  A n i c u t  across the Cauvery 
R ive r  was built in the 2”d century AD. T h e  Western Yamuna  Canal was built in the 14th century AD’. 
During the M u g h a l  era (lOh through 19th centuries) large-scale run-of - the r iver  schemes a n d  
inunda t ion  canals were constructed. 
With British ru le came the systematic a n d  large-scale development o f  water infrastructure m India. As 
analyzed in Deepak  Lal’s economic history of In&aG, the British understood that the marg ina l  returns 
to water development were higher in regions o f  relatively low ra infa l l  t han  in the higher rainfal l  areas 
a n d  thus emphasized hydraul ic works w h i c h  would “make the deserts bloom”7. T h e  results were 
spectacular. T h e  Godavar i  Barrage, b d t  in the m d  19th century, t ransformed the famine-wracked 
hs t r i c t s  o f  the Godavar i  D e l t a  into a granary (and the bui lder  of the Barrage, SLT Arthur Cotton, into a 
saint whose image i s  revered throughout coastal A n d h r a  Pradesh - Figure 4). And the Periyar D a m ,  a 
m a j o r  turn-of-the-century inter-basin transfer scheme w h i c h  sus ta ins  agricultural product iv i ty  in the 
Vaigai Basin in T a m i l  N a d u  to this day, brought similar fame to another Britlsh engmeer, the equally- 
evocatively named  Co lone l  John Pennyqmck” (Figure 4, too.) “In recent years, portraits and  statues 
featuring Pennyquick‘s r a m r o d  posture.. . have rap id ly  pro l i ferated throughout the region, l e n c h g  a 
rather surprising ttnt to a T a d  monumenta l  landscape peopled othenvlse by film stars a n d  pol i t ica l  
leaders.. . Pennyquick (is venerated) as the very symbol o f  attentme a n d  effective government”8 
Statue of Sir Arthur Catton in 
the tadavari Delta, Andhra 
Pradesh 
Statue of Col, John Pennyquick 
in Madurw. Tamil Nadu 
I Figure 4. British water engineers who are revered as soints in Southern India 
A f t e r  Independence, the Governmen t  o f  I n d i a  gave high priority to the construction of ma jo r  water 
infrastructure. Today  I n d i a  has a capacity to store about  200 bdhon cubic meters of water, a gross 
i r r igated area of about 90 d o n  hectares, and  an  installed hydropower capacity o f  about  30,000 
megawattsg. 
These investments t ransformed the economic and  social development of I n d i a  (as documented in 
detad in the background papers on ‘ W a t e r  a n d  Growth” by Ramesh Bhat ia  and  ‘ W a t e r  and  Pover ty  
Reduct ion”  by R.P.S. Malik). Most obviously and  duectly, assured supplies o f  water meant  that c rop  
yields on irr igated l and  were consistently m u c h  higher than  yields from rainfed agriculture (Figure 5), 
providing the basis for the achievement of national food security a n d  associated affordabll t ty o f  food. 
M a n y  of the large dams also p rov ided  the  underpinnings for Ind ian  industr ial growth a n d  groundwater 
irr igation, with hydropower  accounting for over  h a l f  of India’s installed generation capacity in the 
19610s. 
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Figure 5: 
Output on irrigated and unirrigated farmland 
Source. Bhatia, 2005 
I m p o r t a n t  as these drrect effects are, they tel l  only p a r t  of the story of the impac t  o f  m a j o r  
infrastructure. T h e  i r r igat ion and  hyd ropower  are the “duect benefits”, w h i c h  in turn generate both 
inter- industry l inkage impacts a n d  consumpt ion- induced impacts on the r e g o n a l  a n d  nat ional  
economy. Water  released from a mul t ipurpose d a m  provides i r r igat ion that results in the increased 
output of agricultural commodit ies. Changes in the output o f  these commodi t ies require inputs from 
other  sectors such as seeds, fertrlizers, pumpsets, diesel engines, electric motors, tractors, fuels a n d  
electricity. Furthermore, increased output of some agricultural commodit ies encourages setting up of 
food processing (sugar factories, oil d s ,  r ice d s ,  bakeries) a n d  other  industr ial units. S d a r l y ,  
hyd ropower  produced from a mul t ipurpose d a m  prov ides electricity for households in u r b a n  a n d  ru ra l  
areas a n d  for increased output of indust r ia l  products  ( including fertrlizers, chemicals, machinery). 
Changes in the output of these indust r ia l  commodi t ies require inputs from other  sectors such as steel, 
energy, a n d  chemicals. Thus, both increased output of electricity and  i r r igat ion from a d a m  result in 
significant backward linkages &e., demand  for h igher  input supplies) and  f o r w a r d  linkages (ix., 
providing inputs for fur ther  processing). In addition, as incomes rise, there i s  a fur ther  feedback loop 
der iv ing from increased demands for goods a n d  services. 
There  have been two m a j o r  studtes in I n d a  w h i c h  have examined these induec t  impacts. A study by 
the In ternat ional  Food Pol icy  Research Inst i tute o f  the impac t  of the green revolut ion in the North 
A r c o t  reg ion o f  T a d  Nadu’o showed that: 
T h e  mul t ip l ier  was large -- each rupee increase in value added in agriculture stimulated an  addit ional 
rupee of value added in the region’s n o n f a r m  economy; 
About h a l f  of the i nduec t  i ncome gain was due to agriculture’s demands for inputs and  
market ing a n d  processing services, and  the rest due to increased consumer demands as a 
consequence o f  h igher  incomes; 
T h e  mult ipl iers for basic product ive infrastructure were m u c h  higher than for social spending 
a n d  other  sectors. 
A recent, m a j o r  study” by Ramesh Bhatia and  Ravinder M a l i k  has used a n  input-output m o d e l  
comb ined  with a social accounting m a t r i x  for Punjab a n d  Haryana to make  a s d a r  assessment of the 
impac t  o f  the Bhakra D a m ,  w h i c h  was conceived o f  as a cornerstone o f  the development of 
N o r t h w e s t  In&a a n d  w h i c h  irrigates 7 &on hectares and  provides 2800 mw o f  hydropower. T h e  
study found that  the duec t  benefits were higher than anticipated w h e n  the d a m  was built and  that the 
d a m  dtd, indeed, serve to t ransform this region o f  India. For every 100 rupees of duect  benefits, 
Bhakra generated 90 rupees o f  i nduec t  benefits for the regional economy a n d  ripples w e l l  beyond  the 
region. 
Several i m p o r t a n t  studtes have examined the deeper, transforming, r o l e  o f  the provision of water 
infrastructure in Indta. In a classic study in the 1970s the eminent  economist  I<.N. Raj  examined the 
interaction o f  “infrastructural”, “human” and  “financial” capital, by compar ing the fate of Punjabi  a n d  
G u r k h a  d t a r y  retirees. Both groups h a d  similar “human” and  “financial” capital, but returned to 
radtcally d f f e r e n t  settings in terms of “infrastructural capital”. Whereas the G u r k h a  veterans invested 
in jewelry (with l i t t le effect on their society), the Punjabis invested in pumps and  seeds, w h i c h  p rov ided  
the fue l  for rap id  economic growth. 
M o r e  recently Pritchett12 has examined the circumstances under  w h i c h  investments in education 
p rov ide  economic returns. In In&a  the  results were striking - in chstricts where there was agmul tura l  
transformation (viz. irr igated districts) the returns to f ive years of education were 32%, whereas in 
unirr igated ru ra l  districts there were no economic returns to p r imary  education. 
How then, do such investments stack up in a n e w  era, in w h i c h  at tent ion to pover t y  reduct ion i s  m u c h  
m o r e  ove r t  and  explicit? As n o t e d  by in the background paper by M a &  13, “such investments have 
generally been just i f ied for real izing broad-based growth, for increasing agricultural p roduc t i on  a n d  
achieving food security, for increased hyd ropower  generation, for m a k i n g  drinking water  available to 
ru ra l  and  u r b a n  areas.. . not as poverty-reducing strategies per .re.. . ” Such investments in ma jo r  water 
infrastructure, have been cri t icized ( including by the Operations Eva lua t i on  Depar tmen t  of the World 
Bank14) on equity considerations: “the benefits of development are reaped by relatively bet ter -of f  
landowning households a n d  non- land-holdmg a n d  poor households are l e f t  out”. Fortunately there i s  
a large l iterature in In&a  on the d is t r ibut ional  aspects of such projects, a l i terature w h i c h  reveals a quite 
d i f ferent  reality. 
T h e  fust impor tan t  fact i s  that  (as shown in Figure 6) i r r igat ion in I n d t a  i s  not dominated by “big 
landlords”. 
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I Figure 6: % of irrigated area by farm size Maiik 2005 
M o r e  importantly, the central factor i s  not who gets the water, but how that water transforms the 
demand  for inputs, m o s t  strikingly labo r  (which i s  p rov ided  pr imar i ly  by the landless and  marg ina l  
farmers). T h e  fundamental driver i s  that  the demand  for agricultural labor  i s  50% to 100% higher on 
irr igated land's. As R o b e r t  Chambers16 has shown through vdlage-level work (Figure 7), i r r igat ion has 
mean t  h igher  a n d  m u c h  m o r e  stable employment, with the poor the  m a j o r  beneficiaries. 
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Figure 7: Average number of days of employment for 
adult casual laborers each month 
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There  have also been  numerous analyses at  the pro ject  level, showing s d a r  results. F igure 8, for 
example, compares the actual si tuation o f  farmers a n d  agricultural laborers within the massive 
Nagarjunasagar Pro ject  on the IG ishna  R ive r  with tha t  o f  s d a r  groups who &d not get water from 
the scheme. I t  shows that  "the poor" - small and  margmal  farmers a n d  agricultural laborers, benef i ted 
propor t ionate ly  abou t  as m u c h  as dtd large farmers. 
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Figure 8 
The effect of Nagarlunasagar irrigation on per capita income 
Source Malik 2005 
Two recent, m u c h  m o r e  sophisticated analyses (which used input-output matrices a n d  using Social 
Accoun t ing  M a t r i x  methods) have shown s d a r  results. T h e  study by the In ternat ional  Food Pol icy  
Research Inst i tu te  o f  the impac t  of the green revolut ion in the North A r c o t  reg ion  o f  T a d  Nadu17 
showed (Figure 9) that the biggest winners from the Green  Revo lu t i on  were the  landless whose 
incomes increased by 125 percent as a result of the large increase in demand  for the i r  labor. 
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Figure 9: The Effect  of irrigation and green revolution on 
income in Tamil Nadu 
And the ma jo r  study by Bhatia a n d  colleagues of the effect o f  Bhakrala, again (Figure 10) shows that 
the ru ra l  poor have benefi ted hugely from the project. (And this analysis, be ing  con f ined  to the 
regional economy, does not inc lude the benefits for the very poor d o n  seasonal migrants from 
Bihar, or the u r b a n  poor who benef i ted from lower  food prices.) F igure 11, from the same study, 
shows that  i t  was the ind i rect  effects w h i c h  h a d  the ma jo r  impac t  on u r b a n  areas (and therefore on 
u r b a n  pove r t y  reduction). 
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Figure 10: The ef fect  of Bhakra on different social groups 
Source Bhatia, 2005 
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Finally, a l l  o f  these effects show up strongly at the national level. Figure shows the results o f  a n  
analysis o f  the association between pover ty  a n d  levels of i r r igat ion in 54 national sample survey 
regions. In irr igated districts the prevalence o f  pover ty  i s  about  one- th i rd  o f  that in unirrigated rura l  
districts. 
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Figure 12: How irrigation reduces poverty in India 
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S d a r l y  the relat ionship between electricity availability (much o f  w h i c h  came from hydropower) and  
p o v e r t y  i s  strong (Figure 13). 
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Figure 13. Electrification and rural poverty by state 
Overa l l  g lobal  analyses show a very close relat ionship between economic growth and  pove r t y  
reduc t i on  (Figure 14). In the specific case o f  India, growth did not generate m o r e  inequality20. And it 
i s  abundantly clear that m a j o r  water infrastructure, designed to p rov ide  a p l a t f o r m  for regional a n d  
nat ional  economic growth, has been an  impor tan t  p l a t f o r m  for the remarkable reductions in pover ty  in 
I n d i a  (Figure 15) 
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So at  the e n d  of the day i t  i s  less material (a) whether  such projects are just i f ied in terms o f  pove r t y  
reduc t i on  or (b) whether  the p r imary  recipients of the “first-round benefits” are those with land. 
Because the reco rd  i s  o v e n v h e h n g l y  clear - investments in water infrastructure in I n d i a  have resulted 
in massive reductions in poverty, a n d  i t  i s  actually the poor and  landless who have been the biggest 
beneficiaries. T h e  appropriate metaphor  i s  not “trickle-down” but a rising tide l i f t s  (almost) a l l  
boats”. 
T h e  1960s was a turning point in India’s agricultural development. T h e  G r e e n  Revo lu t i on  p r o v i d e d  
great benefits to those who c o u l d  adop t  n e w  seeds and  ferthzers - for w h i c h  water  con t ro l  was an  
essential pre-condit ion. 
Large investments in surface water  projects were undertaken to p rov ide  an  assured water supply to 
larger numbers o f  farmers. Start ing in the 1960s, however, a couple of cri t ical changes took place. 
First, electricity supply expanded in ru ra l  areas (itself o f t e n  l i nked  to water, since hyd ropower  p rov ided  
over  50% o f  installed capacity unul the mid 1960s). Second, in areas where wa te r loggng  and  salinity 
was a growing p r o b l e m  (such as parts of Punjab) i t  was realized that  encouragement of groundwater 
pumping prov ided  a n  effective mechanism for lower ing  the groundwater table a n d  reducing the 
severity o f  waterlogging and  salinity. Third, modes t  n e w  modu la r  w e l l  and  pump technologies became 
widely  available, as did subsidized credit. Fourth, farmers realized that groundwater  was abundant, 
especially in the large alluvial basins. Fifth, farmers reahzed that c o u l d  apply water “ jus t  in time” from 
groundwater sources, someth ing w h i c h  was not possible in the inst i tut ional ly-complex a n d  increasingly 
corruption-r idden canal systems. 
T h e  result was an  extraordinary “quiet revolution”, in which, begmn ing  a r o u n d  1960, groundwater  
i r r igat ion developed at  an  explosive rate, as shown in Figure 16, whi le  tank  i r r igat ion almost 
disappeared and  surface water i r r igat ion g rew m u c h  m o r e  slowly. 
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Figure 16: The evolution of forms of irrigation in India 1950-2000 
Bhalia 2005 
O v e r  t ime  two other  pressures developed. Irr igators who used tubewells argued that they were 
disadvantaged relative to those who received virtual ly free canal water. In U t t a r  Pradesh, for example 
(where electricity charges are relatively high, as shown in Figure 17, i r r igat ing a hectare o f  wheat during 
the r a b i  season would cost abou t  Rs 2,800 from groundwater, whereas farmers pay only about  Rs 70 
p e r  hectare -- abou t  2% of the cost o f  pumping) for canal irrigation21. Polit icians responded and  soon  
there was a widespread culture o f  "free or nearly free" electricity for irrigators (see F igure 17). 
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Simultaneously, t he  reliabdity of canal water supplies deteriorated, as systems were not maintained a n d  
as co r rup t i on  became m o r e  widespread and  the historic al location systems such as warabandi a n d  
shejpali no longer funct ioned as effectively. This, too, mot i va ted  farmers to turn to groundwater. In 
large areas a p r i m a r y  func t i on  o f  surface water systems evolved into "involuntary" recharge of 
groundwater. In Eas t  a n d  W e s t  Punjab i t  i s  estimated that  50% a n d  8O%, respectively, of 
groundwater i s  recycled canal water. 
O v e r  the last two decades, 84% of the total addi t ion to n e t  irr igated area came from groundwater, and  
only 16% from canals. Thus, as shown in Figure 16, at present the n e t  area irr igated by private 
tubewells i s  about  double the area irr igated by canals. 
T h e  fact i s  that  groundwater now supplies water to about  70% of the irrigated area, and  about  80% o f  
domestic water supplies. As emphasized in the background paper by Tushaar Shah22, “we need to 
recognize that  self  provision of water i s  the best i n d c a t o r  o f  the failure o f  publ ic  water supply systems. 
Tubewel ls  prol i ferate in canal commands because pub l i c  i r r igat ion managers are unable to deliver 
i r r igat ion on demand. U r b a n  households wan t  their own boreholes because munic ipa l  service i s  
inadequate a n d  unreliable”. F igure 18 shows the proportion of groundwater potent ia l  w h i c h  i s  
developed in each of the ma jo r  r iver  basins o f  I n d a .  
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Figure 18: Level of groundwater development by basin 
Source: Tyagi data - G I s  work courtesy o f  I W M I  
As dscussed elsewhere in t h i s  report,  the poor quali ty o f  pub l i c  infrastructure i s  a pervasive p r o b l e m  in 
I n d a .  Studes throughout the world23 have shown that where industries have to self-provide, costs of 
p roduc t i on  go up sharply, competit iveness i s  reduced a n d  economic growth i s  dampened. T h e  self- 
provision of water supplies i s  j u s t  one  manifestat ion o f  a far broader break-down in pub l i c  
infrastructure in India.  A recent survey24 shows that 60% of  I n d i a n  manufactur ing entities have 
captive p o w e r  generating units - a f igure w h i c h  i s  j u s t  16% for China, 17% for Braz i l  and  42% for 
Pakistan. 
This groundwater revolut ion brought immense benefits to I n d a ,  playing a m a j o r  ro le  in the 
“ irr igation/rural development/poverty reduction” achievements. T h a t  said, i t  i s  increasingly clear that  
the groundwater  revo lu t i on  has run i t s  course in the most product ive agricultural and  u rban  areas of 
the economy. There  are, m o r e  specifically, two m a j o r  sustainabhty challenges. 
F i r s t  i s  the contentious issue o f  the energy subsides, a n d  their inexorable increase (as the a m o u n t  of 
electricity used in agriculture grew, as shown in Figure 19) to farmers for groundwater irr igation. 
Es t ima t ion  of the rea l  economic value of these subsides i s  a cottage industry. Some see i t  as the 
fundamental p r o b l e m  facing the electricity sector. A c c o r d m g  to the  Planning Commission25, wh i l e  the 
agriculture sector accounts for nearly one- th i rd  o f  the sales of the State Elect r ic i ty  Boards, the 
revenues from farmers account for only 3% of to ta l  revenue. O the rs  (as described in the background 
paper by Bhatia26) have a d f f e r e n t  view, pointing out that  simplist ic estimates vastly overestimate the 
value o f  electricity subsides to agriculture. This i s  so f i r s t  because the large transmission a n d  
distribution losses (colloquially known as “theft a n d  dacoitry”) are rout ine ly  counted as free supplies to 
farmers. And second because the supplies to farmers are, in fact, off  peak and  highly unreliable and  
thus do not cost the electricity system anythmg hke the marginal or average cost of supply. T h e  
estimates of the total annual cost to the economy of subsidized power  to farmers vary by a factor of 4. 
T h e  World B a n k  estimates that subsides to farmers account for about  10% of the to ta l  cost o f  supply, 
or abou t  Rs 240 bfion a yearz7 . This i s  equivalent to about  25% of India's fiscal defici t  and  two a n d  
a half times the annual expenditure on canal IrrigauonZ8, with large impacts on fiscal deficits a t  the state 
level, as sho 
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Figure 20: Electricity Subsidy t o  Agriculture as 
Percent o f  Gross Fiscal Deficit 2000-01 
Bhatia 2005 
And it i s  clear that things are get t ing worse, not better, in most states, in par t  d r i ven  by the deeper a n d  
deeper depths from w h i c h  farmers have to pump water. In Gujarat, for example as shown in Figure 
21, electricity subsides now d w a r f  o ther  forms of f a r m  input subsidies, a n d  are equivalent to 20% of 
state agricultural domestic product29. 
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abstractions come into balance with sustainable yield and  the dep th  is, say, 150 meters, then t h i s  makes 
i r r igat ion impossible without large and  permanent energy subsidies. 
This i s  a grave situation, the implications of w h i c h  form the heart of the water challenges facing In&a 
in c o m i n g  decades and  w h i c h  frames the central themes of this report.  
2. 
I m p l i c i t  in the discussion in the previous chapter was the notion that the emerging water challenges 
which I n d i a  has to face are qui te  d i f ferent  from those w h i c h  i t  has faced in the past. In the words of 
the  Planning Commission (Sekhar, background paper) “Policies and  practices have to come to grips 
with this basic fact - to face the fu ture a n d  not the past”. In explor ing wha t  some of these challenges 
rmght be, i t  i s  usefu l  to consider the experience of water transitions in other countries. As par t  of a 
s d a r  exercise w h i c h  was done  recently with the Governmen t  o f  China, the diagram in Figure 23 i s  
instructive. I t  suggests that the focus on the provision of infrastructure has to, in different ways in 
dt f ferent  parts o f  India, b e  supplemented by m o r e  effective management of that  infrastructure and  o f  
the  under ly ing water resource base. 
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I t  i s  broadly  recognized that  I n d t a  i s  currently in the early stages o f  a profound demographic, social 
a n d  economic transition. T h e  proportion o f  the populat ion w h i c h  i s  u r b a n  has doubled over  the last 
thirty years (and i s  now about  30%); agriculture now accounts for only abou t  25% of GDP; a n d  the 
economy has been growing at  a r o u n d  7% a year. 
L i f e  in ru ra l  areas i s  already in the process o f  large-scale change, particularly in the higher-productivi ty 
areas. In parts of Maharashtra, for example, the transition to high-value agriculture i s  already 
underway for some time, with m a j o r  implications for the use o f  technology, i nc lud ing  water 
technology. Where  a decade ago there was j u s t  one lonely  company provicltng drip i r r igat ion 
technology, the marke t  i s  expanding very fast, with h a l f  a dozen such suppliers now in Maharashtra 
alone. Wh i le  state extension services stagnate, the private sector i s  meet ing the rapidly-growing 
demand: T h e  original supplier of drip i r r igat ion technology in the  reg ion i s  now a m a j o r  one-stop- 
shop for farmers, providing not only equipment  but training on a large scale. And there i s  now a 
travel agency in r u n e  w h i c h  speciakzes in “agro-tourism”, organizing study tours for private farmers to 
go to Israel and  other  countries to learn about  the latest in “precision agriculture”31 
With these changes i s  c o m i n g  a remarkable change in the w a y  in w h i c h  I n d i a n  agriculture i s  viewed. 
Rather than being seen as a dead-end a n d  pove r t y  trap, n e w  visions o f  I n d i a n  agriculture are emerging. 
For example, o n e  of India's telecom moghuls32 has said: "to my mind, the nex t  big wave - w h i c h  d 
b e  bigger than  telecoms or outsourcing - i s  in agriculture. India's strength lies in i t s  huge area of 
arable land, with great weather conditions. For three, four or f ive months E u r o p e  doesn't grow a fig - 
- but w e  can grow anything. I w a n t  to connect India's farms to the world. I believe an  Ind ian  farmers' 
i n c o m e  can jump from Rs 5000 per  acre to Rs 20,000 straight away, j u s t  by moving away from r ice a n d  
wheat..  .. tomatoes sell for just Rs 2 a lu logram at  the f a r m  gate in India, a n d  m o r e  than 50 times that 
on the shelves of UI< supermarkets". These sh i f ts  from low-value to high-value agriculture have 
profound impl icat ions for the demand  for labor  and  therefore for the well-being o f  the poor. F igure 
24 shows the dramatic differences in direct labor  demand between staples and  m a n y  cash crops. 
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Figure 24: Employment Generation by Crop 
Source Bhalla 2005 
In m a n y  parts of the coun t ry  ( including the Communist - ru led W e s t  Bengal33) "contract farming" i s  
becoming  increasingly impor tant ,  a n d  shows great promise (as i t has in o the r  countries34) as a 
mechanism for bringmg u n i f i e d  packages o f  technology, services a n d  marketing, in m a h n g  the 
transit ion to high-valued agriculture, and  in lifting large numbers o f  people - both those who stay in 
agriculture a n d  those who m o v e  into the associated service sectors - out o f  poverty. 
T h e  Financial Times35 has captured the essence of the changes underway in ru ra l  areas: M o r e  than  a 
third of India's ru ra l  households already derive their i ncome from manufactur ing or services, not from 
farming; in the successful f a rm ing  states of Punjab a n d  Haryana already over  h a l f  o f  a l l  r u ra l  
households have escaped agriculture altogether a n d  "the best way  to escape pove r t y  i s  to escape 
agriculture"36. 
These transformations are, of course, happening organically on a massive scale -- in coming  years close 
to 100,000 people a day wdl enter the m idd le  class37. M a n y  o f  these people d live in revitalized ru ra l  
areas, but m a n y  d inevitably l i ve  in towns and  cities. 
These changes have profound implications for the ways in w h i c h  water needs to b e  allocated a n d  used. 
I t  i s  essential that  the avadabll ity o f  water does not constrain the development  o f  n e w  types o f  
economic activity in n e w  places. And here there i s  a serious mis-match between the water ideology 
of the past in I n d i a  - one  that  operates on a paternal system of command-and-control, with l i t t le  
transparency and  l i t t le  accountabl l i ty - and  the requirements of the present a n d  future. As 
summarized by VS Vyas (background paper): 'With increase in popu la t i on  a n d  changes in l i f e  style, 
the gap between water  demand  a n d  supply i s  get t ing aggravated, l e a d n g  to disputes among  various 
users". 
As a p a r t  of t h i s  Report, the World Bank, workmg with a group of eminent I n d i a n  scholars, under took  
a m a j o r  analytic study to examine the economic irhpact of flexible rather than rigid water al location 
practices in T a d  Nadu38 where there i s  already strong evidence o f  the effect of water shortages on 
indust r ia l  choices. In a drought during the 1990s, for example, ma jo r  chemical and  f e r d z e r  plants 
outside of Chennai  were closed for six months39 because they cou ld  not get water; and  i t  i s  clear that  
decisions on locat ion o f  industries in the state i s  be ing affected by water availabhty40. 
T h e  results of the study are striking, suggesttng that if flexible rather than rigd water al location 
procedures were adopted: 
0 Water  use would b e  dramafically d f fe ren t :  
o 
o 
o 
to ta l  water use would b e  15% lower  (Figure 25) 
abstractions from aquifers (which are already under  great stress in the state) 
would b e  25% less 
water use in agriculture sharply reduced, wh i l e  water for mdustry and  u r b a n  uses 
would increase substantially (Figure 25). 
Figure 25  
Total and Sectoral Water Use in 2020 Under Two Management Scenarios 
Bhatia et ai 2005 
~ 
0 And economic performance, too, would b e  quite d i f ferent  (Figure 26): 
o 
o 
o 
State i n c o m e  in 2020 would b e  20% hgher ;  
U r b a n  household incomes would b e  15% to 20% higher for al l  four categories 
included; 
There  would b e  small  losses in i n c o m e  for f a d e s  who remained self-employed 
farmers a n d  for laborers who stayed as agricultural workers, but ru ra l  incomes 
would b e  15% to 20% higher  for self-employed and  non-agricultural labor. 
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Figure 26. Difference in income in Tamil Nadu in 2020. Flexible 
compared t o  fixed water allocations 
Bhotia et .I 2005 
T h e  writing, then, i s  on the w a l l  - I n d i a  i s  changing very fast, and  there are great environmental and  
economic benefits from transforming the I n d i a n  water economy into one that  i s  far m o r e  flexible and  
adaptive. 
As this transit ion takes place, the development o f  a v i t a l  a n d  eff icient u r b a n  water supply and  
sanitation sector i s  a ma jo r  challenge. A companion repo r t  by the World Bank41 examines the 
challenges that I n d i a  faces in meet ing the Mil lennia1 Deve lopmen t  Goals. A succinct summary i s  that 
India’s water a n d  sanitation sector i s  woefu l ly  &equipped to mee t  this growing challenge. T h e  sector 
has no identity, i s  bankrupt, i s  not developing the required h u m a n  resources, a n d  focuses pr imar i ly  on 
adding infrastructure, not improving services. 
In 1999 the Na t iona l  Commiss ion  on Waterd2 assessed the overal l  availabll ity o f  water, the hkely 
demands, a n d  the imp l i ed  “water available for fu ture use” (Figures 27 and  28). 
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Figure 28: "Unused" surface and groundwater 
National Commission on Water 1999 
These figures are a stark a n d  unequivocal portrayal of a coun t ry  about  to enter an  era of severe water 
scarcity. And there are a host of realities w h i c h  make the situation far worse than depicted in Figures 
27 and  28. 
First, water i s  not a nat ional  issue, but an  intensely local one. 
severe situations in m a n y  localities (and less severe ones in others). 
cr i t ical condit ion, a n u m b e r  w h i c h  i s  projected to increase to a f r ightening 60% by the year 2030. 
Aggregates t h u s  conceal m u c h  m o r e  
Al ready 15% of aquifers are in 
Second, in i t s  deliberations the Na t iona l  Commission o f  Wate r  gave l i t t le  attention to env i ronmenta l  
realities a n d  need@. I t  therefore impl ic i t ly  assumed that  the quan tum of available water would b e  
constant, despite the fact that ever-larger stretches of r ivers in I n d i a  are becoming so po l l u ted  that 
their water can b e  used for fewer and  fewer uses and  the quali ty of water in an  increasing n u m b e r  of 
aquifers i s  be ing  s d a r l y  degraded by h u m a n  use and  saline intrusion44. 
Thd ,  there are s t rong indca t ions  that clunate change i s  l ike ly  to affect I n d i a  in a n u m b e r  of ways. 
There  i s  l i t t le  uncertainty about  some o f  these impacts. 
As global  temperatures cont inue to rise, this will affect the "water banks" (glaciers) w h i c h  are a 
p r o m i n e n t  p a r t  o f  the Himalayan water systems. Wh i le  there i s  clear evidence of de-glaciation across 
the w h o l e  o f  the Himalayas the effect on r iver  flows i s  l ike ly  to b e  substantially dif ferent in different 
areas45, as shown in Figure 29. 
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Simulated effects o f  deglaciation on Himalayan river flows over ten 
decades 
Gwyn Rees et  al 2005 
In the eastern Himalayas, high levels o f  snowfa l l  appear to retard glacial retreat a n d  runoff generated 
in the non-glaciated areas rapidly lessens the downstream impacts (see for example see the modest  
impacts on the Brahmaputra, before the r iver  dtsgorges from the T ibetan Plateau into Arunachal  
Pradesh). In the west, as dus t ra ted  by the Indus, where precipitat ion i s  lower  a n d  the v o l u m e  of snow 
at high elevations does not protect  the glaciers in the hot summer months, deglaciation i s  m o r e  rap id  
(see Skardu, for example, where there are large increases in f lows for the nex t  half-century, fo l lowed by 
up to 50% reductions from contemporary levels of runoff), a n d  the impacts are felt  for a considerable 
dtstance downstream (with I n d u s  flows predicted to be  around 30% less in the nor thern  plains of 
Pahstan). In the Ganges there would b e  large impacts o f  deglaciation in the mounta ins (see 
Har idwar  on Figure 29), effects w h i c h  are mi t igated by non-glacial forms of runoff in the plains (as 
i l lustrated for Allahabad on Figure 29). 
Deglaciat ion is, of course, not the only way in w h i c h  clunate change i s  hkely to affect the availabdtty 
a n d  timing of runoff in the sub-continent. T h e  Intergovernmental Panel on Clunate Change (IPCC) 
uses ten General Ckculat ion models, n ine  o f  w h c h  pro ject  that precipitat ion during the summer 
monsoon d increase substantially (Figure 30). 
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Figure 30: 
Change in South Asia summer rainfall predicted by nine 
General Circulation Climate Models I p c c  
T h e  IPCC has used a regional m o d e l  (curiously based on the one g lobal  m o d e l  w h i c h  showed reduced 
precipitation) to explore possible changes in the number  o f  rainy days a n d  in extreme rainfall. This 
m o d e l  p r e d c t e d  a decrease in the  n u m b e r  of rainy days (Figure 31) but substantial increases in extreme 
precipitat ion events (Figure 32). 
W h a t  does seem l ikely i s  that  clunate change wdl increase the va r iabh ty  of already highly-variable 
rainfal l  patterns, requi r ing greater investments in managmg both scarcity a n d  floods. 
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Figure 31 Predicted change in number o f  rainy days from the 
'decreased rainfall" I P C C  model PCC 
Figure 32. Predicted change in rainfall intensity (in mm per day) 
from the "decreased rainfall" IPCC model 
From this fog of in fo rma t ion  the following conclusions emerge very clearly: 
a T h e  area affected by floodmg, w h i c h  has not changed systematically in decades (Figure 33) i s  
l lkely to increase substantially since m a n y  of the f lood-prone areas (Figure 34) d b e  affected 
by changes in glacial behavior a n d  precipitat ion in the Himalayas. 
ooding are  vulnerable t o  climate change 
TVM~ 
T h e r e  are m a j o r  regions, inc lud ing m a n y  of the most highly product tve agricultural and  
mdustr ia l  regions of India, where water scarcity i s  already a fact o f  l i f e  (illustrated with 
increasing frequency in cartoons in I n d i a n  newspapers, such as F igure 35, by B inay  in the 
Business Standard). 
Figure 35 Running out of groundwater 
Binav in the Business Stwdard 
a Water  scarcity i s  going to become widespread in I n d i a  in a Euture w h i c h  is, given the fact that 
changing water use habits takes decades to effect, j u s t  a round  the corner. 
De-glaciat ion i s  going to result ing in inadvertent "mining" of  the water banks o f  the 
Himalayas. This i s  going to result in a runoff w ind fa l l  for a f e w  decades, to b e  fo l l owed  by 
major, permanent, reductions in runoff. 
C h a t e  change i s  l ikely to substantially increase overal l  monsoonal  rainfal l  in India, but this i s  
hkely to b e  poorly distr ibuted in the sense that m u c h  of the addit ional rainfal l  i s  l ikely to b e  in 
hgh- in tens i ty  storm events. 
What, then, are the implications of these changes? Despi te  the m a n y  uncertainties, they include: 
0 A need for large investments in water storage. As described earlier, I n d i a  actually has 
relatively l i t t le capacity to store water. For example, whereas there i s  about  900 days o f  
storage capacity on the Colorado a n d  Murray-Dar l ing Rivers, there i s  only about  30 days o f  
storage capacity in most of India’s r iver  basins. Accord ing ly  m a j o r  investments need to b e  
made  to increase capacity to store water, in both surface and  groundwater reservoirs, in 
projects small  (such as loca l  rainwater harvesting) a n d  big (such as large dams). In so doing, 
however, there i s  a need for concomi tant  adopt ion o f  quite d i f ferent  development and  
management strategies. In addi t ion to expanding irr igated area (the pr inc ipa l  just i f icat ion for 
most projects) care needs to b e  taken to safeguard existing downstream uses, a n d  attention 
also needs to b e  p a i d  should pr imar i ly  b e  for improving the reliabdtty of supplying existing 
demands and  for meet ing historically deprived environmental uses. 
T h e  me l t i ng  o f  the glaciers offers I n d i a  a window o f  opportunity, f i rs t ,  to make product ive use 
of this “windfall”, but also to understand that this window should b e  used to prepare for the 
ve ry  h a r d  days, with substantial flow reductions in the Himalayan region, w h i c h  l ie  ahead. 
W h i l e  the exact shape o f  the fu ture clunate regune i s  uncertain i t  i s  very  l ikely that there will b e  
greater variabdtty - both of droughts and  floods. As was shown in a detaded examination by 
the Na t iona l  Atmospher ic  a n d  Oceans Admin is t ra t ion of U S  water  practices, the best 
preparat ion for managing unpredictable future changes i s  to put in place a water  resource 
infrastructure and  management system w h i c h  i s  dr iven to a m u c h  greater degree by knowledge 
( including but not h t e d  to hydro log ic  knowledge), and  w h i c h  i s  designed and  operated to b e  
m u c h  m o r e  flexible and  adaptive. 
Flooding, w h i c h  already affects large areas of the poorest  parts o f  I n d i a  ( including B iha r  a n d  
the east), has yet to b e  effectively addressed. T h e  standard response in I n d i a  has been to 
build embankments a n d  to advocate the const ruct ion o f  large dams a n d  embankments as the 
solutions to the problem. I n d i a  i s  only now starting to explore the combinations o f  “hard” 
interventions (to p ro tec t  high-value infrastructure) a n d  “soft” interventions (smart adaptation 
to living with floods, inc lud ing changing in land  use patterns a n d  c ropp ing  patterns, and  
const ruct ion o f  emergency shelters for people a n d  animals), w h i c h  have been used to 
considerable effect in countries as diverse as the U n i t e d  States46 a n d  Bangladesh47and are 
globally-accepted best practice. 
With respect to scarcity, there i s  a pervasive complacency - “we have m u d d l e d  though up to 
now and  w e  will find a w a y  to m u d d l e  through in the future” - on the pa r t  o f  m a n y  in 
government  and  citizens. This has been compounded  by the recent percept ion (which i s  
l ikely to b e  temporary) that “the I n d i a n  economy i s  no longer dependent on the vagaries of 
the monsoon’’48. This mudang through has w o r k e d  because i t  has been possible for 
farmers, city-dwellers a n d  industries to “exit”49 from unsatisfactory pub l i c  supply systems by 
tapping once-abundant groundwater. But now the w e l l  i s  running dry, a n d  with it the exit  
option i s  becoming  tenuous in m o r e  a n d  m o r e  parts of the country. T h e  twin challenges, to 
w h i c h  w e  re tu rn  later in th is  report,  are: to greatly i m p r o v e  the robustness and  f lexibdtty of 
water resource management systems; to i m p r o v e  the flexibil i ty a n d  quali ty o f  service p r o v i d e d  
by the m a j o r  pub l i c  water supply a n d  i r r igat ion systems; and  to develop government/cit izen 
partnerships for managing groundwater  in a sustainable manner. 
0 
Conf l ic ts  over  water are so ancient that the idea i s  incorporated into language: the word “rivals” i s  
derived from the  L a t i n  rivalis, meaning “the one using the same stream as another”j0. In the sub- 
continent, too, there i s  a long history of water conf ic ts .  T h e  origin o f  Buddhism i s  related to a water 
dispute between the kingdoms of Shakya a n d  Koliya. Pr ince Siddharth t r ied to resolve this by 
negotiat ion a n d  compromise, but failed. T h e  Peoples’ Assembly o f  Shakya declared war  on K o l i y a  and  
asked Siddharth to leave the states’. 
So con f i c t s  over  water are not new, either in the world or in India.  But there i s  no question that the 
incidence a n d  severity o f  c o n f i c t s  has increased sharply in recent times. O v e r  the past year the Union 
Min is ter  o f  Wate r  Resources has remarked that ‘‘I really a m  not Min is ter  of Water  Resources but 
Min is ter  o f  Wate r  Conficts”, a n d  the Union Finance Min is ter  has n o t e d  a “growing set o f  small  c iv i l  
wars” over  water at a l l  levels in I n d i a n  societyjz. 
I t  i s  usefu l  to unbundle t h i s  growing set o f  conf ic ts ,  from the international down to the local level 
Conflicts at the international level: 
At the international level, I n d i a  has been a. par ty  to several water treaties w h i c h  are widely  considered 
to b e  g lobal  good practice. Most notable, o f  course, i s  the Indus Treaty  o f  1960 w h i c h  allocates the 
waters o f  the Indus, Jhelum a n d  Chenab to Pakistan (while a l lowing run-of-the-r iver hydro on the 
headwaters be fo re  the r ivers enter Pahstan), a n d  the waters of the Ravi, Beas a n d  Sutlej to Ind ia.  T h e  
central feature of the Indus Treaty  i s  that the rights (and obligations) o f  both parties are 
unambiguously defined. This clarity a n d  the permanence of the assignment of rights has meant  that 
the two countries have concentrated most o f  their attention on using w h a t  i s  theirs effectively, rather 
than  haggling over  their entitlements53. S d a r l y  impor tan t  i s  the Ganga Wate r  Treaty between I n d i a  
a n d  Bangladesh o f  1986, w h i c h  once again rests on an agreed-upon al location of low flows among the 
parties and  in w h i c h  seasoned bilateral dlplomats were able to find a n “acceptable second-best’’ 
solution for both parties54. A somewhat  dif ferent but equally interesting case i s  that of “benefit- 
sharing” arrangements for development  of the hydropower resources of Bhutan55, w h i c h  has shown 
the way for mutual ly  beneficial development  between I n d i a  a n d  i t s  smaller Himalayan neighbors. In 
the international arena, then, I n d i a  has fo rged  a n u m b e r  of examples of good practice; now there i s  a 
need to modern ize some elements of these treaties (especially the conf l ic t  resolut ion mechanisms) and  
to put into place m o r e  such agreements on the substantial n u m b e r  o f  r ivers where agreement between 
I n d i a  and  h e r  neighbors has not been reached. 
Conflicts at the inter-state level: 
At the nex t  level down, a m o n g  the  States o f  the I n d i a n  Union, the situation i s  m u c h  less satisfactory. 
T h e  issue i s  pervasive, since 90% of  the l a n d  area o f  I n d i a  i s  drained by inter-state rivers. U n d e r  the 
Constitution authority i s  conferred on the Union Governmen t  with respect to regulat ion of inter-State 
rivers: (Entry 56, L i s t  I) states that  “Regulation and  development o f  inter-State r ivers a n d  r i ve r  valleys 
to the extent to w h i c h  such regulat ion a n d  development under  the con t ro l  of the Union i s  declared by 
l a w  to b e  expedient in the pub l i c  interest.” In the words of the Planning Commission56: “The Central 
Governmen t  has not so far exercised this authority..  .. (and) . . .inter-state confl icts over  water sharing 
have been the bane o f  water  resources development  in the country. Tr ibunals  have been consti tuted 
in the past for Narmada, Godavar i  a n d  I e i s h n a .  Tr ibunals  for Cauvery, Ravi-Beas a n d  I e i s h n a  
(second Tribunal) are presently engaged in adjudication. Although t ime  h t s  have now been 
prescribed for Tribunals, s u l l  the adjudication process i s  a long drawn  affairs. T r i b u n a l  decisions are 
interpreted dif ferently by co-basin States a n d  this again leads to disputes in operat ion o f  the Award.” 
And in the words o f  the fo rmer  Chair of the Central Wate r  Commission57: ‘Va r ious  alternate 
doctrines based on, say the r iparian principle, the chronology of use, the pr inc ip le  o f  causing no h a r m  
to the downstream entities, on the contr ibut ion o f  the State to the basin waters, as also those based on 
the pr inc ip le  o f  equitable distribution are available in the l i terature about  international water law. These 
are c i ted during the process o f  negotiations or adjudication, with each pa r t y  normal ly  prefer r ing the 
doct r ine w h i c h  serves i t s  interest. A p a r t  from the doctrines, there are m a n y  other  c o m m o n  contentious 
issues, w h i c h  are o f ten  discussed, but about  each no agreed guidelines are available in India.” 
This anarchic situation means that in most cases there i s  no clarity about  who can use w h a t  amoun t  of 
water. And w h e n  there are awards they are incompletely specified and  have no accompanying 
enforcement  mechanisms. Unilateral actions are the norm, with the instruct ions o f  the Tribunals and  
even the Supreme Court rout ine ly  flouted. (As n o t e d  by M a r i a  Saleth58 “as a point o f  contrast with 
these inter-state squabbles, one  notes a high degree o f  respect a n d  s tabh ty  o f  water-sharing provisions 
in international water treaties”.) T h e  consequences are wide-rangmg a n d  serious. 
There  are m a j o r  po l i t ica l  consequences. There  i s  a high level o f  vitriol in the endemic clashes between 
states on inter-state water issues. In some cases inter-state water disputes have contr ibuted to terrorist 
a n d  secessionist movements59. Because anyth ing can b e  claimed in inter-state waters, polit icians raise 
the specter of such “popular responses” w h e n  justifying non-compliance with water agreements. And 
the very basis o f  a federal state are put into question (as in the case of the 2004 unilateral abrogation by 
Punjab o f  a l l  water-sharing agreements with other state@). 
And there are ma jo r  economic consequences. T h e  lack o f  clear, permanent  allocations means that 
states o f t e n  spend m o r e  t ime  a n d  resources over “securing our future rights” than they do to using 
w h a t  i s  theirs. Th ree  cases dus t ra te  this general point. 
First i s  economic waste in a n  upstream state, as described by N i r m a l  Mohanty61 : “The p r o b l e m  of 
poorly established p roper t y  rights in the t r ibunal  awards . . ..has encouraged states to secure interstate 
claims to the headwaters o f  r ivers by building large dams regardless of the financial and  env i ronmenta l  
consequences, a n d  impac t  on downstream states. Maharashtra, for example, spent heavily on the 
Maharashtra IG ishna  Valley Corporat ion to create storage capacity to get prior appropriat ion rights to 
IG ishna  water; because if it did not do so, i t s  share in I G i s h n a  awarded by the IG ishna  Water  D ispu te  
T r ibuna l  would have been subject to revision. In terest  a n d  equity payments for these dams 
accounted for 17% of the  state fiscal defici t  in 2003/4.” 
Second i s  economic waste in downstream states. T h e  G o v e r n m e n t  o f  T a d  N a d u  does not make  
investments in improving water efficiency in the water-starved lower  Cauvery Basin, because it 
perceives that  any demonstrat ion of greater efficiency would weaken i t s  bargaining p o w e r  vis a v i s  
Karnataka during the nex t  Cauvery T r ibuna l  award. 
Third are the foregone opportunit ies for win-win projects between states. During the vigorous debate 
in 2004 on inter-basin transfers (“linhng rivers”) a m a j o r  obstacle to translating any sensible projects 
into practice was that  o f  state water entitlements. A repor ted  in teract ion between the Chair o f  the 
Task  Fo rce  on L i n h g  Rivers a n d  Laloo Prasad Yadav showed  the only w a y  in w h i c h  “surplus states” 
would agree to share water  with “deficit states”. “Laloo warned  that  not a glass o f  water d b e  
al lowed to b e  diverted from the Ganga basin. A f e w  days more, however, the de facto ru ler  of B iha r  
declared that  water was l i ke  oil - if the right pr ice was offered, h e  m a y  b e  ready to sell’’62 
And final ly there are m a j o r  env i ronmenta l  consequences. I n d i a n  water managers continue to perceive 
o f  any water not h e c t l y  used for h u m a n  purposes to b e  “wastage”. As described by the  fo rmer  
Chai r  of the Central Wate r  Commission63: “The need to balance the use o f  water with i t s  deliberate 
non-use in order  to ma in ta in  environmental balance o f  the riverine, estuarine, and  the coastal 
ecosystems i s  negated (in at  least parts of the 2002 Na t iona l  Water  Policy)”. G i v e n  the lack o f  
specification of states’ water entitlements, this means that any water releases to estuaries, for example, 
would b e  the basis for other  states to c la im “wastage” and  therefore an  appeal to reduce the share of 
the  o f fendmg state. 
T h e  lack of Union Governmen t  act ion on inter-state waters has become a subject on w h i c h  the 
government  i s  w ide ly  r idcu led,  sometimes even by the government  itself. T h e  Union Secretary of 
Water  Resources wonders64 how i t  i s  that, 50 years after the passing o f  the River  Boards Act, the 
Union Governmen t  has not once used 
that  A c t  to deal with inter-state r iver  
development. T h e  Ch ie f  Min is ter  of 
T a m d  N a d u  describes the Cauvery 
R ive r  Authority65 as “a toothless 
wonder”. Sunita N a r a i n  o f  the Centre 
for Science a n d  the E n v i r o n m e n t  sums 
the situation up as follows66: “In the 
pol i t ica l  m ine f i e ld  o f  r iver  dsputes, the 
government . .  . just watches, waits for 
God to bring ra in  and  temporary relief, 
or scurries about  for a n e w  
appeasement package. W in all, i t  
makes a farce of the issue staring i t  in 
the face: how the country  i s  to l ive and  
share i t s  now-scarce water resources”. 
And, as always, cartoonists (Figure 36, 
I 
Figure 36: Chief Ministers o f  Karnatako and Tamil Nadu resolving the 
conflict over the  waters of  the  Cauvery River 
Conflicts between upstream and downstream riparians in intra-state rivers: 
As scarcity becomes a fact so 
there i s  growing c o n f i c t  between 
exist ing a n d  n e w  users o f  water, 
even within single-state basins. 
T h e  Vaigai Basin in T a d  N a d u  
was a beneficiary o f  the century- 
old Periyar scheme, whereby pa r t  
o f  the water o f  the western 
flowing Periyar River  in Kera la 
was d v e r t e d  by the revered 
Co lone l  Pennyquick over  the 
Western Ghats to the Vaigai  
Basin in T a m d  N a d u  (Figure 37). 
Periyar water was used to 
establish m a j o r  canal commands 
in the l ower  Vaigai Basin. In the 
1960s the Vaigai D a m  was b d t  
to harness the natural flow o f  the 
Vaigai. I t  was i m m e d a t e l y  
I 
Figure 37: Water entitlements in the Vaigai Basin 
apparent to those who h a d  benefi ted from the Periyar water that this posed  a threat to their water 
entit lements. Accordmgly and  quite remarkably, the authorit ies at the Vaigai  D a m  keep two sets o f  
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books - one o f  w h i c h  records the inflows and  releases o f  Periyar water (which i s  o f  high reliability) and  
the other  w h i c h  records the inflows a n d  releases of the much-less-reliable Vaigai River  water. O v e r  
the years, however, there has been an  ineluctable increase in the dams in the basin. E a c h  of these has 
been built to p rov ide  water  to a n e w  c o m m a n d  area. For example, the Sothuparai Reservoir in the 
headwaters was recently built (with World B a n k  fundmg) to the del ight o f  farmers in the couple o f  
thousand hectares served by the dam. But the waters o f  the Vaigai Basin were, i f  accounts were kept, 
already fully allocated. This was, in short, nothing m o r e  than  a pro ject  (of considerable cost) w h i c h  
added l i t t le  to overal l  water  availabhty, but simply r o b b e d  downstream Peter to pay upstream Paul. 
W h i l e  the basics of water  balances apparently elude m a n y  o f  the State water engineers, they do not 
elude the downstream farmers. At a meet ing o f  the inc ip ient  ‘“Vaigai River  basin committee” in 
Madura i  this was the m a i n  top ic  o f  conversation, with one  downstream farmer (dubbed “the water 
lawyer of the basin”) m a k i n g  a cogent (and widely-understood) presentation on water balances and  
creeping expropr ia t ion of water rights. In 1934 the Madras High Court, in the case o f  Setharama 
l i ngam v s  Ananda  PadayachiG7 “asserts that  in case the l ower  r iparian feels that there has been an  actual 
decrease in the supply o f  water  to him h e  has a cause for action”. But because water accounts are not 
kep t  a n d  there are no f o r m a l  entitlements, the de facto l a w  o f  water here (as elsewhere in I n d a )  i s  
“what the State gives the State m a y  take away (without informing YOU)”. 
Conflicts between communities and the State: 
A ma jo r  phenomenon  o f  the last f ive years has been an  explosion in community-based projects for 
“rainwater harvesting” schemes, w h i c h  i nvo l ve  rehabil itating a n d  buildmg small check dams and  tanks, 
and  household groundwater recharge structures, with over  $150 d o n  a year spent on such projects 
in recent years68 T h e  in i t i a l  impetus was from the Sukormajr i  pro ject  in Punjab, with a host o f  other  
celebrated a n d  less celebrated c o m m u n i t y  projects, and  a substantial n u m b e r  o f  large scale state- 
sponsored projects ( inc ludmg the mult i-state World Bank-f inanced Shival ik H d l s  pro ject  and  large 
State-financed projects in A n d h r a  Pradesh and  T a d  Nadu). T h e  per formance of such projects varies 
widely. Object ive evaluations show that  performance i s  m i x e d  (with only 10 of 27 Hill Resource 
Management Societies func t i on ing  in Haryana69 , for example, and  only 40% in Maharashtra70, and  
other evaluations showing only 25% or even 15% of such projects successfu171). 
V i r tua l ly  by definit ion, these projects “take hold” only in areas where water  i s  already ve ry  scarce. And 
in al l  cases communi t ies d only participate, reasonably, i f  they can use the water, pr imar i ly  to irrigate 
their crops. This means that  the rainwater harvesting schemes have two impacts - increased storage 
of water and  increased use of water. Since there are already very low outflows from most of the 
highly-stressed basins, this means that  the n e t  add t iona l  storage i s  p robab ly  small. T h e  result, in zero- 
sum cases, i s  that the n e w  uses mean  yet another set of a d d t i o n a l  claims on h t e d  water, claims 
w h i c h  are h o n o r e d  only by reducing the  availability for some anonymous downstream user. 
This has l e d  to c o n f i c t s  between the State and  the communit ies. T a r u n  Bharat  Sangh i s  a rainwater 
harvesting NGO l e d  by the charismatic Rajendra Singh. In one  well-publ icized incident, community 
activities l e d  to the rev iva l  of a loca l  stream, the water of w h i c h  was t h e n  claimed by the State, which, 
under  the I n d a n  Easement  Ac ts  o f  1882 has the sole right to collect, retain a n d  ds t r i bu te  surface 
water72. So not only does the State c la im the right to take away that  w h i c h  i s  has given, but it also 
exercises the right to take away that w h i c h  i t  has not g iven (but owns anyway). 

Conflicts within irrigation projects: 
Finally, there are an  increasing number  o f  serious dtsputes among  farmers within canal commands. An 
i m p o r t a n t  recent case i s  that  of the I n h a  G a n d h i  Canal in Rajasthan73 (the ma jo r  pro ject  for using the 
substantial quanti ty o f  waters allocated to Rajasthan under  the Indus Water  Treaty). T h e  farmers in 
the f i r s t  h a l f  o f  the pro ject  to b e  completed were al lowed to share the water for the w h o l e  project, on a 
temporary basis, with this water to b e  gradually reduced to their design share as the other  c o m m a n d  
areas were completed. But this fact was either communicated in formal ly  to the farmers or not 
communicated at  all. T h e y  thus became accustomed to having p lenty  of water a n d  p lanted water- 
intensive crops74. W h e n  the t ime  came for t h e m  to reduce their water to the original ly envisaged 
a m o u n t  they perceived this as “confiscation” and  revolted. Four farmers were k i l led in the summer of 
2004. O n c e  again the core issue was lack of clarity and  certainty about  entitlements. 
V i j ay  Vyas75 has summarized the situation well: “It d b e  inf in i te ly  better to avoid conf l ic t  situations 
rather than  seek mechanisms for c o n f i c t  resolution. Two precondit ions for minimizing confl icts at the 
loca l  level are: clear def in i t ion o f  usuf ructory  rights, a n d  dependable estimates o f  the water avai labhty 
over  t ime  a n d  over  space. I f  the usuf ructory  rights are clearly defined they can b e  used as an  explicit 
provision in fo rma l  or i n f o r m a l  contracts among  d i f ferent  water users and  among  water users and  
water providers. Ambiguity in proprietary rights i s  at the root of several disputes.” 
I n d i a  has a large 
s tock of hydraulic 
infrastructure: 
since 1960 the 
Union 
Governmen t  has 
invested o f  the 
order  o f  $120 
bdhon in water 
resources and  
irrigation76, with 
the approved 
outlays for 
irrigation alone in 
the T e n t h  P lan  
be ing  $10 bdhon 
for i r r igat ion and  
$1 bdhon for 
flood ~ 0 n t r 0 l 7 7 .  
As described 
earlier, the services 
p r o v i d e d  by this 
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Figure 39: The stock of major water infrastructure 
(large dams in this case) is aging 
Tyagi 
infrastructure are cri t ical for economic growth. But the services are only fo r thcoming  if this enormous 
asset - w h c h  i s  now aging, as dus t ra ted  in Figure 39 -- i s  mainta ined and  replaced. And the evidence 
i s  palpable that this i s  not happening. 
No State in I n d i a  has a m o d e r n  Asset Management  Plan, a n d  thus there are no reliable estimates o f  the 
cost of replacing and  mainta in ing this infrastructure. From international experience a typical f igure - 
assuming regular maintenance - of  replacement a n d  maintenance i s  abou t  3% of the  value of the 
capital stock o f  water infrastructure78. This would imply that the cost of replacement a n d  maintenance 
o f  Indta’s stock of water resource a n d  irr igation infrastructure would b e  about  $4 bitlion a year, w h i c h  
i s  about  twice the annual capital budget  in the F i ve  Year Plan. I t  i s  abundantly clear that not m o r e  
than a tiny fract ion of th is  i s  actually been spent on asset maintenance a n d  replacement. 
The re  are a series o f  dtstortions w h i c h  are leadtng to the erosion of this asset base. T h e  f i r s t  dtstortion 
i s  that the publ ic  agencies w h i c h  p rov ide  these services are hugely over-staffed. Mumbai Mun ic ipa l  
Water  Corporation, for example, has about  35 workers pe r  thousand connections, whereas well- 
funct ion ing utl l i t ies have abou t  3 workers per  thousand connections. And the UP Ir r igat ion 
Depar tmen t  employs a n  astonishing 110,000 people. T h e  polit ics o f  these pub l i c  enterprises i s  such 
that salaries have the f i r s t  call on revenues - in Haryana, for example, 83% of the allocation for 
i r r igat ion operation a n d  maintenance goes to paying salaries77. 
T h e  second dtstort ion i s  that  revenue col lect ion i s  low and  declining. Gross recoveries as a proportion 
o f  workmg expenses decl ined from 85% in 1975 to 42% in 198880 a n d  to 35% (for a sample o f  states) 
in 19988l. 
T h e  result o f  t h i s  pat tern 
o f  decl ining revenues 
and  rising personnel 
costs i s  a pat tern 
dus t ra ted  schematically 
in Figure 40. In a 
financially-well- 
structured i r r igat ion 
system (such as that in 
Australia), users pay  for 
eff icient operations a n d  
maintenance and  for the  
replacement costs of the  
assets w h i c h  p rov ide  
their services. T h e  
government  Pays 
(reluctantly!) the interest 
on debt  accumulated in 
the past. T h e  system 
(see p a r t  (a) on Figure 
40) i s  clean and  the  
incentives right (for the  
users to demand eff icient 
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Figure 40: The financing o f  water services in India 
operations a n d  maintenance (0 a n d  M), a n d  replacement only of essential assets a n d  that  a t  least cost). 
T h e  typical I nd tan  system i s  m u c h  m o r e  complex (see pa r t  (b) on Figure 40). First, there i s  an  extra 
“block of payment” to b e  made  for the extra costs i ncu r red  by hav ing  large numbers of unnecessary 
workers. Second, the user payments represent only a small  fract ion o f  the to ta l  m o n e y  avadable for 0 
and  M (includtng salaries). M o s t  o f  the 0 and  M allocations are from the budget  (that is, p a i d  for by 
al l  taxpayers), but these amounts typically do not cover  w h a t  i s  requi red for 0 a n d  M, leaving an  
unf i l led “deficit” for 0 a n d  M. At the top end  the interest on past investments i s  p a i d  for by 
taxpayers. W h a t  this means i s  that  there i s  a yawning gap, p a i d  for neither by users nor taxpayers. 
This means that 0 a n d  M i s  not done  adequately a n d  - since i t  i s  last in the queue - there i s  no 
investment in replacing agmg assets. 
T h e r e  i s  no doubt that  only a very tiny fract ion o f  this required expenditure for rehabhtat ion i s  actually 
be ing  made. T h e  e n d  result i s  the famdiar sight for virtual ly a l l  water infrastructure in most parts of 
I n d i a  - crumbling, rusting, l e a h n g  dams, canals a n d  pipes. T h e  situation i s  serious even for 
infrastructure where f d u r e  would b e  catastrophic, such as large dams. Where these are revenue- 
generating hyd ropower  facilities the situation i s  generally m u c h  m o r e  satisfactory than for the i r r igat ion 
dams w h i c h  are total ly a t  the mercy of budgetary financing. 
And i t  means that m u c h  of wha t  masquerades as “investment” is, in fact, a belated at tempt  to 
rehabil itate the c rumb l ing  infrastructure, both for i r r igat ion and  for munic ipa l  water supplies. (Most 
World B a n k  “investments” in water infrastructuve are, in fact, not investment in n e w  infrastructure, 
but a n  at tempt  to make  some inroads into the huge l iabht ies from deferred maintenance, wh i l e  
simultaneously a im ing  at  modern izat ion o f  the infrastructure a n d  developing inst i tut ional and  financial 
practices w h i c h  wdl he lp  break out o f  t h i s  vicious cycle.) T h e  contrast between globally-accepted 
good maintenance-and-replacement practice and  that o f  the systems in I n d i a  -- accurately described by 
N i r m a l  MohantyE2 as “Build-Neglect-Rebuild” -- i s  represented schematically in Figure 40. 
Two examples dus t ra te  how serious the situation has become. In the 1980s the Governmen t  of 
T a m i l  N a d u  p a i d  for the construction of a canal from the IG ishna  R ive r  in A n d h r a  Pradesh to bring 
water to Chennai. T w e n t y  years after construction, a n d  as a result of the usual practice of deferred 
maintenance, the canal was in very b a d  shape. Since the State was unable to pay for rehabhtation, the 
rehabihtat ion h a d  to b e  “privatized” -- it was l e f t  to the religious ‘leader Sai Baba to pay for the 
rehabihtat ion of the canal. And in a recent nat ional  meet ing on water the CEO of India’s biggest 
pump manufacturer told o f  his bittersweet v i e w  of the burgeoning n u m b e r  o f  lift i r r igat ion schemes. 
T h e  State o f  Maharashtra h a d  bought 34 large pump sets from h i s  company. ‘‘I was, of course, quite 
pleased by this for our business. But I a m  also a taxpayer, and  w h e n  I know that j u s t  2 o f  these 34 
pumpsets are actually funct ion ing i t  breaks my heart.”*3 
Again i t  i s  instruct ive (Figure 
41) to compare reasonable 
g lobal  practice with that in 
Indta. In the “good practice” 
case, the stock of infrastructure 
grows fast in “Stage 1” 
(referr ing back to the “Stages” 
dus t ra ted  in Figure 1) a n d  then  
tails of f  in Stages 2 a n d  3. But 
as this stock grows, so the 
financial demands for 
mainta in ing a n d  replacing this 
stock increase. In the I n d t a n  
case - arguably in Stage 2 - the 
stock i s  s d  growing, but the 
finance available for 
mainta in ing a n d  replacing that 
stock has fallen rather  than  
risen. 
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Figure 41: Depleting India‘s infrastructure stock 
In context  of social services, i t  has been estimated that no m o r e  than 15% o f  allocations actually e n d  
up be ing  delivered to those for whom the funds were intended. m e  the parallel i s  not precise, a n d  
numbers are not available, i t  i s  clear that the infrastructure system i s  similarly leadmg to hugely 
ineffect ive appl icat ion of resources. M u c h  of w h a t  i s  built i s  not being maintained, a n d  that w h i c h  
does s u l l  function, delivers services o f  a low quality. This in turn reinforces the vicious cycle - users 
who are receiving such poor services reasonably refuse to pay, meaning that revenues decline s u l l  
fur ther  a n d  the maintenance and  replacement gaps w iden  s t d l  further. T h e  e n d  result i s  that people 
supposedly be ing served by pub l i c  i r r igat ion and  water supply services v o t e  with their feet (or, m o r e  
accurately, with their tubewells) so that  they have alternative sources of supply. 
La te r  in the repo r t  w e  look at some ways of trying to approach the d i f f icu l t  but v i ta l  challenge o f  
moving from a vicious to a virtuous cycle. There  i s  no silver bu l le t  for t h i s  - i t  will need dramatic 
increases in the efficiency of the prov iders o f  the publ ic  services, i t  wdl require “transit ion plans” so 
that  i m p r o v e d  services can induce greater confidence in the services a n d  d n g n e s s  to pay for them, 
a n d  i t  d require recogni t ion o f  a simple financial fact. In the words of Rakesh M o h a n  “there are only 
two ways to pay for infrastructure - from taxes or from user charges. As long as I n d a  i s  not prepared 
to do either or both of these, there i s  no h o p e  for buildng and  mainta in ing the infrastructure necessary 
for a m o r e  product ive econorny.’’84 
In a d d t i o n  to the m a j o r  f inancial challenge of rehabil itating a n d  mainta in ing i t s  stock o f  water 
infrastructure, I nd ta  also has to m a k e  m a j o r  investments in a d d t i o n a l  water infrastructure. T h e  need 
for these n e w  investments can b e  seen from several perspectives. 
Looking at  I n d a  in a g lobal  context, the country  has remarkably small  stocks of water infrastructure. 
As shown in Figure 42, the a m o u n t  of water storage capacity in I n d a  i s  very  low for a semi-arid 
coun t ry  - whereas the U n i t e d  States a n d  Austral ia have capacity to store over  5,000 cubic meters for 
every citizen, China 2,500 cubic meters p e r  capita a n d  M o r o c c o  a n d  South A f r i ca  500 cubic meters pe r  
capita, I nda ’s  storage capacity amounts to j u s t  200 cubic meters p e r  capita. 
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Figure 42: storage per capita In dif ferent semi-arid countries 
A d f f e r e n t  perspective i s  the q u a n t u m  of water that  can b e  stored as a proportion of  average r iver  
runoff. In the Colorado R ive r  Basin a n d  in Austraha’s M u r r a y  D a r h n g  Basin this f igure i s  900 days; in 
South Africa's Orange R i v e r  Basin i t i s  350 days, but overal l  I n d a  can store just  50 days o f  average 
runoff, with w ide  variations - from 220 days in the IG ishna  to j u s t  2 days in the Brahmaputra/Barak 
basin (Figures 43). 
Figure 43: Days o f  average flow which reservoirs i n  semi-arid 
countries can store in di f ferent basins 
A complementary perspective i s  that  of the degree to w h i c h  I n d i a  has u&ed i t s  substantial 
hyd ropower  resources. Aga in  international comparisons are usefu l  - Figure 44 shows that r i c h  
countries have developed abou t  80% o f  their economically-viable hydroelectr ic potential. In&a has 
substantial economically-viable hyd ropower  potential, but has developed only about  25% o f  t h i s  
potential. 
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Figure 44: The development o f  economically feasible hydropower potentials 
in India in international context 
Most o f  I n d a ' s  hyd ropower  potent ia l  i s  in the Himalayas (Figure 45), a n  area w h i c h  has m a n y  o f  the 
world's most environmental ly and  socially benign sites for hyd ropower  (Figure 46). 
Figure 45: Status of Hydropower Development in 
Different Regions 
Source Ministry of Power. 1998 
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igure 46: Environmental and social indicators for 
hydropower dams 
Figure 47 shows how the level o f  hyd ropower  has fal len relative to o the r  sources. (Over  the past 6 
years, instal led hyd ropower  capacity has increased by abou t  8,500 mw, raising the ' /o of hydro to 26% 
in 2005.). O v e r  the past  decade it has become clear t h a t  t he  avai labhty of electricity i s  emerging as a 
serious constraint to I n d t a n  economic growth. G i v e n  the particular impor tance of peaking p o w e r  (a 
unit o f  w h i c h  i s  est imated to b e  worth abou t  four times the value of a unit o f  base load85) In&a has 
appropriately embarked on an accelerated hyd ropower  development  program. 
Figure 47: The declining role of hydropower in India 
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T h e  accelerated hyd ropower  p r o g r a m  has brought to the fore two serious water resource challenges, 
w h i c h  have yet to b e  effectively addressed. M a n y  of the world’s most successful r iver  basin 
development  programs - ranging from the legendary Tennessee Valley Authority of the 1930~86 to the 
present-day Yangtze Basin development  pro ject  87- have rel ied on hyd ropower  to generate the 
resources necessary to fund “public goods”, such as navigation and  flood control.  (The Th ree  Gorges 
D a m ,  for example, i s  operated as a flood con t ro l  dam, at  an  opportunity cost of a massive $1.5 blUlon 
a year in foregone p o w e r  revenues.) W h i l e  there i s  a history o f  successful mul t ipurpose projects in 
I n d i a  ( including the Bhak ra  D a m  cbscussed earlier), the Governmen t  o f  I n d t a  now does not have a n  
enabling f ramework w h i c h  fachtates the  same socially-optimal outcomes. In the Brahmaputra Basin, 
for example, there are large benefi ts from mul t i -purpose storage projects that  are be ing  foregone88 
because p o w e r  companies are l icensed to develop “power-only” projects, w h i c h  are typically run-of- 
the r iver  projects with few flood c o n t r o l  or navigation benefits. This cbfficulty i s  exacerbated by the 
fact that “host states” get very  large royalties (12% of gross power  sales) from hydropower  sales. T h e  
situation i s  best dus t ra ted  by considering the situation with projects in Arunachal  Pradesh. T h e  
G o v e r n m e n t  o f  Arunachal  Pradesh gives no weight  to flood con t ro l  a n d  navigation benefits (which 
would benef i t  the m u c h  larger populat ions in downstream Assam) a n d  gives high weight  to any 
submergence (which would displace people in Arunachal). T h e  Union G o v e r n m e n t  has not found a 
fo rmu la  for gett ing good mul t i -purpose outcomes from such development opportunit ies. 
As described earlier, wh i l e  overal l  levels of reservoir capacity in Incba are low in internat ional  terms, 
there i s  w ide  variation. Figures 48a a n d  48b show, for each I n d i a n  basin, the annual  f lows and  the 
n u m b e r  o f  days o f  flow that  can b e  s tored in reservoirs. 
Figure 48a: flows in billions o f  cubic meters per year in the major 
rivers basins o f  India 
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Noting that there are sharply dirmnishing addit ional yield from a unit of storage once there i s  
substantial reservoir capacity89, these figures suggest: 
T h a t  there i s  l i t t le  value to addit ional storage in most o f  the  peninsular r iver  basins, (the 
Cauvery, I G i s h n a  a n d  Godavari) and  in the Narmada  and  Tapi .  
The re  are l ike ly  to b e  a n u m b e r  of attractive possibhties for storing water in some of the “low 
storage basins” ( including especially the Brahmaputra, Ganga, B rahman i  a n d  Subanerekha as 
w e l l  as the west- f lowing r ivers south of the T a p i  and, to a lesser degree, the Mahanadi  and  
Go davari) 
T h e  idea o f  “linhng rivers” has surfaced several t imes 
in I n l a ’ s  history. In 1984 the Na t iona l  Water  
Deve lopmen t  Authority was set up to identi fy 
appropriate inter-basin transfers a n d  to undertake 
feasibllity studies for these. F igure 49 shows the links 
being considered by the NWDA. 
T h e  idea of these inter-basin transfers has p r o v o k e d  
m u c h  discussion a n d  controversy in India.  On the 
one h a n d  the idea seems obvious to most lay people 
who observe annual cycles of simultaneous drought 
in some parts o f  the coun t ry  a n d  floods in others. 
On the other  h a n d  there are m a n y  legitimate (and 
some less legitimate) causes for concern. T h e  
legitimate concerns are that each “link” needs to 
evaluated not j u s t  from an  engineering perspective 
but from economic, financial, environmental,  social 
and  pol i t ica l  perspectives. T h e  pol i t ics are impor tan t  
both domestically a n d  international ly. Domestically, 
because such links c o u l d  only materialize if there are 
willing “givers” -who would need to b e  compensated 
Figure 49: 
Possible inter-basin water transfers 
-- as w e l l  as “takers” -who would need to compensate. And international ly because such inter-basin 
transfers would affect ne ighbor ing countries, who would necessarily have to b e  consulted a n d  have 
their concerns taken into account. 
T h e  less legit imate concerns are those w h i c h  consider any inter-basin transfers to b e  “un-natural” a n d  
even “causing m u t a t i o n  in the DNA o f  rivers”! In fact m a n y  a r id  countries have invested in m a j o r  
inter-basin transfers. In South Africa, for example, seven of the n ine  provinces get m o r e  than 50% of 
their water from interbasin transfersgo. And I n d i a  i tse l f  has benef i ted from a substantial n u m b e r  of 
beneficial inter-basin transfers (some old, l ike the Periyar pro ject  a n d  some m o r e  recent such as the 
Bhakra-Beas system). T h e  Linking Rivers Task Fo rce  headed by Suresh Prabhu, MP,  funct ioned in 
a refreshingly d f f e r e n t  manner  from the normal, “behind-closed-doors’’ approach taken to water 
issues in India. T h e r e  were dozens o f  publ ic  hearings and  m u c h  pub l i c  debate. Unfor tunate ly  the 
quali ty o f  this debate was compromised because, despite numerous assurances to the contrary, the 
NWDA has never made  publ ic  (with one  recent exception) the feas ibhty  studies w h i c h  i t  says exist. 
The re  remains very substantial “unfinished business” in the provision o f  i r r igat ion a n d  water a n d  
sanitation services, too. 
Noting that there were a large n u m b e r  of i r r igat ion projects w h i c h  h a d  been started a n d  not completed 
(some for fifty years!), a n d  that there were other  situations where headworks were constructed but 
c o m m a n d  area development  was incomplete, the Union Governmen t  wisely gave a n d  g v e s  high 
priority to comp le t i on  of that w h i c h  has already been  started. T h e  Accelerated I r r igat ion Benefi ts 
P rog ram i s  designed to complete projects w h i c h  would eventually serve 10 d o n  hectares, with abou t  
2 d o n  hectares completed to date. I t  d take abou t  $10 bLUion to complete this programgl. 
S d a r l y  the C o m m a n d  Area Deve lopmen t  and  Wate r  Management P rog ram i s  designed to complete 
distribution services in another 10 d o n  hectares. 
W h i l e  the returns to n e w  i r r igat ion investments are decl ining (Figure 50), i t  i s  clear that government  
w d  s d  need  to m a k e  very substantial investments in n e w  i r r igat ion in coming  decades. T h e  I n d i a  
Wate r  Vision of 200092 estimated that  government  would need to invest  about  Rs 80 bLUion a year for 
i r r igat ion every year for the nex t  twenty years. 
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, Figure 50: The poverty reducing impact o f  irrigation is declining .... 
Source Analysis o f  14 states by Dr. RPS Malik, 2005 
As shown in Figure 51, the proportion o f  p lan  expendtures allocated to these sectors has been fal l ing 
over  tune, with the Ninth P lan  allocations to i r r igat ion and  flood con t ro l  be ing abou t  Rs 80 blUton a 
year93 . T h e  T e n t h  Plan, however, represents a large increase, mth annual allocaaons averaging about  
Rs 170 biUion a year". In add inon  to these allocations, the water-related sectors absorb substantial 
s u m s  of h idden  subsides (Figure 52). 
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Figure 51: Allocations to major water Infrastructure are declining 
Figure 52: Subsidies t o  water related sectors 
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On the water supply a n d  sanitation side, o f f ic ia l  figures show coverage with water  supply to b e  94% in 
r u r a l  areas and  90% in u r b a n  areas, a n d  sanitation 24% in ru ra l  a n d  62% in u r b a n  areas. These 
numbers are probably  a better ind icat ion of the infrastructure that  has been built than  the services that 
are actually provided95 - there are large numbers who do not have adequate services. T h e  large 
subsidies, justif ied in the name o f  the  poor, in fact benef i t  those who get  water (who are those who can 
exert inf luence on rat ioned supplies, a n d  are therefore not the poor) a n d  those who use a lot of water 
(the m idd le  class a n d  rich). T h e  p r i m a r y  immediate challenges for the water a n d  sanitation sector are 
to extend services to the unserved, to i m p r o v e  the quality of services to those who are nominal ly  
served, and  to do this though uultt ies w h i c h  are eff icient a n d  accountable. M o s t  of the revenues for 
these services are going to have to c o m e  from users, because (as discussed later) the u r b a n  authorit ies 
are going to have to invest massive amounts o f  pub l i c  m o n e y  in the sewerage systems needed to clean 
up the po l l u ted  rivers. 
T h e  I n d i a  Wate r  Vision has estimated that i t  will require about  $1.6 b f ion  a year for the nex t  twenty 
f ive years if a l l  are to p rov ided  with water supply services, and  about  $0.8 b&on a year for household 
sanitation. 
Finally, i t  i s  obvious that  there are huge financial needs for addressing the water environment. The re  
i s  no systemic study of w h a t  the aggregate “needs” are, or w h a t  the priorit ies are. And there are only 
very patchy data - the repo r t  of the Na t iona l  Commiss ion on Integrated Water  Resources 
Management, for example, does not give a single piece of h a r d  data on water quality. T h e  magnitude 
of the organizational a n d  financial challenge for d e a h g  with the m a j o r  issue of r iver  pollution i s  
dus t ra ted  in a b r f i a n t  recent study by the Centre for Science a n d  the Environment96 o f  the Yamuna  
A c t i o n  P lan  (See Box 1). 
T h e  Yamuna  case shows the d ismal  and  deteriorating state of one  of Indla’s ma jo r  and  most sacred 
rivers. I t  also shows the  scale of the organizational, p lanning a n d  financial e f fo r t  required to even 
make  a dent  in the problem, a n d  suggests both the impor tance a n d  h u t a t i o n s  of a l it igation-based 
approach to dealing with these issues. I t  does show that  there i s  a rising awareness about  the 
impor tance o f  env i ronmenta l  issues, a n d  a growing wihngness to use financial a n d  other tools to 
address these. 
In summary, the water  sector in I n d i a  faces a massive financial challenge. T h e  annual requirements for 
rehabll i tat ing the exist ing infrastructure probably  amounts to Rs 200 bdtton. T h e  I n d i a  Water  Vision 
projects needs for n e w  investments - with very modes t  allowances for sewage treatment -- o f  about  Rs 
180 bf ion a year”. A n n u a l  allocations in the recent past have var ied between Rs 90 and  Rs 170 
bdtton a year’s. At the same t ime  there are heavy (and reasonable) demands for pub l i c  investments in 
other  infrastructure. I t  i s  estimated, for example, that  the investments needed in roads, ports, railways, 
airports and  telecoms for the n e x t  decade will average Rs 2000 bf ion a year, a n d  that  government  will 
b e  about  to finance, a t  most, abou t  two-thirds of thisgg. 
Box 1: Water  env i ronmen t  challenges - the case o f  the Yamuna  R ive r  a round  D e l h i  
There are several bits o f  “good news”. First that India has such competence in the environmental watchdog 
sector that produces first-rate analyses, such as t h s  piece on the Yamuna, and gets i t in to  the public domain and 
to the attention o f  politicians, the courts and the government. Second, that over the past 15 years the Supreme 
Court has played an active role in pushing for greater attention to environmental issues, n o t  least on the  Yamuna. 
Third, that in some instances at least - and the  Yamuna Action Plan i s  one o f  these - the government, with 
support o f  donors (the Government o f  Japan, in t h i s  case), are investing h e a d y  in environmental improvement 
projects, with about Rs 1500 crores invested in the Yamuna Action Plan (about Rs 600 crores o f  which were 
invested in Delhi). 
There is, however, “bad news”, too, and lots o f  it. First i s  the fact that t h i s  important start has barely scratched 
t h e  surface o f  what i s  needed. Repairing the plumbing that feeds into sewage treatment plants i s  a huge and very 
diff icult task. A large port ion o f  the 5600 kdometers o f  sewers are silted or settled, with only an estimated 15% 
o f  the  130 kilometers o f  trunk sewers in order. And t h e  seventeen sewage treatment plants have a capacity to 
treat only about half  o f  the sewage produced, whlch in turn covers only about 60% o f  the population o f  D e h .  
Second are the problems o f  operation - only about 60% o f  the capacity o f  the exist ing treatment plants i s  
actually used. The end result i s  that less than 20% o f  the pollution load in to the river i s  actually treated. Since 
the BOD load on the river has more than doubled in the last ten years, i t  i s  n o  surpr ise that condtions in the 22 
kilometer stretch o f  the Yamuna around D e l h i  have gone f rom terrible to  appalling. As shown in Figures 53 and 
54, the  river i s  dead (there i s  no dissolved oxygen in the water) and there are more than 10 d o n  fecal coliforms 
per 100 ml, a level over 10,000 times what i s  considered a threshold for “bathable water”. Third, there are 
pestions about the implementabil ity o f  the rulings of the Supreme Court. In 1985 the court  ordered the 
:onstruction of C o m m o n  Ef f luent  Treatment Plants to treat 190 mld o f  industrial sewage; twenty years later only 
j3 mld can b e  treated. In 2001 the Supreme Court ordered the government t o  ensure a level  of dissolved oxygen 
,f 4 parts per d o n  within two years; today the level  of dissolved oxygen i s  zero. In 1992 the Supreme Court 
ieard a plea t o  ensure that all o f  the waters o f  the Yamuna could not b e  chverted before i t  reached D e l h i  - the 
minimum flow case’ “is s t i l l  on”. T h e  lessons are that judicial activism can n o t  and should n o t  be  a substitute 
.or effective government action. 
Figure 53: Yamuna river dissolved oxygen - . -  
Source: CSE 2005 
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Figure 54: Yamuna river quality - faecal coliforms 
Source: CSF 2005 
As described in detail in Section 2, I n d t a  faces a daunting set o f  water-related challenges. There  i s  s t t l l  
m u c h  n e w  infrastructure to b e  built, but by far the most impor tan t  a n d  serious challenges are those o f  
management - of exist ing infrastructure and  o f  the water resources itself. And here there i s  a m a j o r  
p r o b l e m  - governments at  both the Union and  State levels rema in  focused, in the words of the 
P lann ing  Commission “on the problems of the past”, and  (with a f e w  notable a n d  part ial  exceptions) 
are yet to even init iate a dtscussion o f  the changes w h i c h  are necessary to c o n f r o n t  the urgent  and  
m a j o r  n e w  challenges o f  water management in In&a 
As the problems with the current  system become m o r e  clear a n d  serious, numerous high-level 
commissions have been appointed over  the past f i f teen years - a m o n g  others to examine Union 
responsibdities on inter-state riversio0, pricing101 a n d  dealing with integrated water  management102 -- 
a n d  n e w  national a n d  state policies have been promulgated . In m a n y  cases the recommendations are 
sensible, but in most cases the commissions come and  go, the policies are promulgated, and  the 
machine grinds on unchanged. In the words of a ma jo r  Governmen t  of I n d t a / W o r l d  B a n k  rev iew in 
1998: “in recent years there has been realization a n d  pol icy  pronouncements regarding the need to 
address these problems; however  the policies have not been translated into action.” Some experienced 
commentators have argued that  r e f o r m  of government  m a c h e r y  for managing water in I n d t a  i s  a 
hopeless case. Tushaar Shahlo3 suggests that, “in designing water governance strategies for India, i s  
seems sensible (in the intermedtate run) to take the ‘nature o f  the state’ as given.. . rather than  assume 
that  the nature o f  the state d change to resolve water sector problems”. 
This dtsconnect between p rob lem/p ronouncement  and  practice has l e d  to widespread loss o f  
legit imacy a n d  c red tbh ty  of the state apparatus for water development a n d  management. This i s  
evident most obviously in the fact that most citizens have come to re ly  on i n f o r m a l  mechanisms for 
get t ing the water they need to grow their crops a n d  for their household needs. I t  i s  patent in every 
encounter between the state and  cit izens on water matters, and  i t  i s  expressed acerbically every day in 
the press - “(government) makes a farce o f  the issue staring i t  in the face: how the  country  i s  to l ive 
a n d  share i t s  now-scarce water resources” 104 - a n d  in the numerous water-related cartoons. 
To an  observer who has interacted with In&a over  the last thirty years, t he  greatest a n d  most 
promising change has been that t he  standard response to any dtscussion o f  reforms has changed from 
“well  that cannot work here, because I d a  i s  such a special case” to “why not”? Regrettably m u c h  of 
the  water bureaucracy o f  Ind ta  s t t l l  l ives in the “not here” rather than  the “why not?” world. 
To a large degree this crisis o f  the  water  state i s  a ref lect ion o f  the general set of challenges facing 
government  in a rap id ly  evolv ing Indta. A recent book, ‘‘Governance’’, by a p r o m i n e n t  min is ter  in the 
last Union Governmen t  states the general case: 
“The malaise affects a l l  the institutions o f  State .... T h e  malaise i s  w e l l  known to those in the 
system, too. Proposals for r e f o r m i n g  that  system are adopted from t ime  to t ime  and  decrees go 
out to imp lemen t  the measures ‘in a t ime-bound manner’. But in every case the proposal  i s  put 
through the same d... a n d ground to dust ..... M e r e  announcements amoun ted  to r e f 0  rm.... 
(many) spelled a ma jo r  advance.. . but now actual governance has to b e  changed.. . a n d  the way  to 
r e f o r m  the system i s  not to t inker  with t h i s  procedure or that  institution, but to jett ison the 
function, to hack  away the h b  whenever this i s  possible. . . . Cont inue to transfer functions a n d  
p o w e r  from the State structure to society. A leaner machine, l i ke  a leaner body, d then  b e  easier 
to improve .  For w e  need  to i m p r o v e  the State (because) there are several tasks that only the  State 
can di~charge”~05 
Water  management i s  one of these “several tasks w h i c h  only the State can discharge”. Section 2 o f  
this repor t  describes a wide range o f  tasks w h i c h  (a) the State currently undertakes and  per forms 
poorly (maintain stocks of infrastructure and  ensure that they prov ide good services in a .financially 
sustainable way) and  (b) only the State can per form,  but abou t  w h i c h  it does l i t t le (including: clari fying 
who has an  enti t lement to use water a t  a l l  levels, from the inter-state to the canal distributary; 
regulat ing groundwater; providing pub l i c  goods inc ludmg flood protect ion a n d  sewerage treatment). 
Section 2 also describes the cop ing  mechanisms w h i c h  farmers, households a n d  industry have 
developed to “work around” a poorly func t i on ing  pub l i c  water sector, a n d  how these “exit options” 
are becoming  less and  less feasible as resources - a n d  especially groundwater, w h i c h  has been the 
“safety valve” - become scarce. 
I f  i t were easy to change the way  in w h i c h  the State performs, this would have been  done  some t ime  
ago. There  i s  ample evidence that changes in organizational arrangements within the exist ing system 
of incentives i s  a h n  to shuffing the deck chairs on the Titanic, and  d make no difference. For this 
reason t h i s  repo r t  will not examine propositions such as the much-discussed one o f  “creating a single 
Union M i n i s t r y  w h i c h  d deal with al l  water  issues”, because such a change would make  l i t t le  
fundamental difference in the w a y  in w h i c h  the state operates. 
T h e  only way  in w h i c h  change d take place i s  i f  re fo rm-minded  pol i t ica l  leaders shift the balance of 
p o w e r  between the state machinery, on the one  hand, and  users - farmers, citizens, industries -- on the 
other. T h e  state needs to surrender those tasks w h i c h  i t  does not need to p e r f o r m  to others, and  the 
state needs to develop the capacity to do the m a n y  things w h i c h  only the state can do. Figure 55 gives 
a schematic representation o f  how the I n d i a n  water sector looks ‘how” and  a vision of how, on the 
basis of wha t  works in wel l -per forming water sectors in other  countries, i t  might look “then”, after the 
needed changes. 
T h e  m a i n  features of the changes are: 
1. 
2. 
3. 
4. 
5, 
that the pub l i c  sector d cont inue to have a n  i m p o r t a n t  ro le  in providing i r r igat ion and  water 
supply services, but 
this d now b e  in compe t i t i on  with a large a n d  v ib ran t  non-governmenta l  sector - inc lud ing 
the private sector, NGOs a n d  cooperatives - for provision of formal i r r igat ion a n d  water 
supply services. 
as service p rov ided  by this m i x e d  service sector improves, large numbers of people d m o v e  
from the informal, self-providing, water economy into the f o r m a l  service sector; 
the pub l i c  sector d play  an expanded ro le  in the f inancing a n d  provision of  pub l i c  services 
(such as flood con t ro l  a n d  sewage treatment); 
the government  will develop a set o f  laws, policies, capacities and  organizations for def in ing 
and  del ivering an  e n a b h g  environment, with special emphasis on the establishment a n d  
management of water entit lements, a n d  the regulat ion of services a n d  resources.). 
Keep ing  t h i s  desired evo lu t i on  in mind, a n d  building on the analysis presented in Section 2, thls 
section describes some of the cri t ical changes w h i c h  can get this re fo rm started, describes some of the 
areas in w h i c h  progress i s  be ing  made  in India, shows w h a t  changes o the r  countries faced with s d a r  
challenges have made  a n d  how they have managed the process, and  offers some “rules for reformers” 
who are p a r t  of this change process. 
(c) Instruments, not organizational forms, are key 
Discussions about  “water strategy” in I n d i a  are typically dominated by “we need to spend m o r e  on 
flood control,  or on rehabil i tat ing tanks, or hking rivers, or on rainwater harvesting or on 
desalination”, with the answers usually depending on the r e g o n a l  experience of the minister or 
bureaucrat who i s  leading the discussion. In some instances these are supplemented by extensive sets 
o f  recommendations of a very specific nature - w h a t  crops should b e  grown where, how tariffs should 
b e  manipulated to achieve a h o s t  of objectives. T h e  nature of these discussions reflects, in the words  
on the fo rmer  Chair of the Centra l  Wate r  Commission, a v i e w  of water  that  i s  embedded in the 
command-and-control v i e w  o f  the economy106. T h e  dialogue within the  water sector, with some 
impor tan t  exceptions, has not adjusted to either the b r o a d  l iberal izing economic changes init iated in 
the I n d i a n  economy in 1991, and  has not internal ized the lessons from water management re fo rms  
throughout the world. 
These l scuss ions  have se ldom i n v o l v e d  an  assessment of the incentives w h i c h  g v e  rise to present 
per formance and  w h a t  m u s t  b e  done  to change those incentives (and thus behavior). T h e  M e m b e r  o f  
the Planning Commission who i s  responsible for water a n d  p o w e r  has said i t  well: “. . . i t  i s  the absence 
of sound incentives w h i c h  i s  the fundamental p r o b l e m  facing water management in India”107. W h a t  
would such a n  incentive-based approach to water r e f o r m  in I n d i a  invo lve? 
Most fundamental ly i t  would involve, as suggested in Figure 55 a ma jo r  change in the ro le  o f  the state . 
T h e  gove rnmen t  would a l l ow  others (including the private sector) to compete for the right to supply 
water  supply a n d  i r r igat ion services, whi le  the government  would turn i t s  attention to the f inancing 
(and in some cases the delivery) of flood control, sewage treatment a n d  other publ ic  goods a n d  would 
have as i t s  cent ra l  task the development a n d  implementat ion o f  an  integrated package of instruments 
- entit lements, pricing, regulat ion -- w h i c h  would structure the relationships among  water users so that  
water i s  used efficiently, a n d  environmental a n d  financial sustainabhty i s  assured. 
M a n y  dtscussions o f  water r e f o r m  in Ind ta  (and elsewhere) focus on organizational issues - the 
perennial favourites be ing  Part icipatory I r r igat ion Management (l‘IM)and a single Min is t ry  cover ing a l l  
water (for water  resource management). T h e  perspective of t h i s  R e p o r t  i s  that the p r imary  emphasis 
for inst i tu t ional  re fo rm should be, in the words of N o b e l  Laureate Douglass Northl@s “on the rules o f  
the game” tha t  shape behaviour. T h a t  is, the p r imary  focus should b e  on instruments, rather than 
organizational forms. (Organizations do, of course, matter. For example a l l  wel l - funct ion ing water 
systems separate the providers o f  services from the overal l  water resources management authority. But 
this i s  someth ing that i s  m u c h  m o r e  about  the instruments that gove rn  the relationships between 
regulator a n d  user than  i t  i s  about  n e w  names a n d  separation o f  cadres, the issues w h i c h  too o f t e n  
occupy center-stage in discussions of Ind tan  water reforms.) Accordingly, this section describes each 
of the central instruments that would form par t  of an  inst i tut ional package o f  reforms, stressing 
cont inuously  that  this i s  a n  integrated package in w h i c h  the who le  i s  m o r e  than the sum o f  the parts. 
Consider, for example, the issue of irr igation services. In his excellent book on the pol i t ica l  economy 
of water in Peninsular I n d a ,  D a v i d  Mosse1@9 describes the necessary set of i n t e r l o c h n g  changes well: 
“Since i r r igat ion involves w ide r  hydraulic systems w h i c h  are b e y o n d  the c o n t r o l  of WUAs and  w h i c h  
inevitably render  t h e m  dependent upon the state, farmers organizations have l i t t le chance of surviving 
as independent  self-managed social organizations. T h e  nex t  step therefore does not l ie  in knowing 
how to organize farmers organizations.. . but how to overhaul  the adrmnistrative system so that t he  
state i r r igat ion departments a n d  farmers can b e  bound into product ive relations. PIM cannot  become 
a reality nor can i t  become self-sustaining without the restructuring o f  state i r r igat ion departments.. . 
W h a t  i s  s t r ik tng in Indta’s IMT/PIM programs i s  how l i t t le  a t tent ion i s  given to water rights. T h e  
government’s rights to water are unchallenged, wh i l e  i t s  obligations to deliver water to WUAs i s  rarely 
legally bindtng ...” In short, as il lustrated in Figure 56, a sound i r r igat ion service m o d e l  requires 
mutual ly-reinforcing changes in all  three “legs o f  the stool”. 
I k 
Figure 56: The basis for sound irrigation service provision 
(d) Stimulating competition in and for the market of water supply services 
As described in Section 2, the provision o f  fo rma l  i r r igat ion and  water supply services in I n d i a  i s  the 
v i r tua l  exclusive monopoly o f  government  agencies, w h i c h  do not p rov ide  services to m a n y  - 
especially the poor - and  p rov ide  poor quali ty services to those who do have access. As Tushaar 
Shah110 has noted, the large-scale self-provision of irr igation and  water supply services that  i s  the most 
damn ing  test imony to the failure of the government-dominated fo rma l  service p rov ide r  model. The re  
are a couple of exceptions - TISCO in Jamshedpurl]’, for m a n y  years, and  recently the textde town of 
T i rapu r  in T a d  N a d u  -- are where industry has such a dominant  presence in a part icular town, that  
industry has s imply  taken over  responsibhty  for providing water supply services to households. In 
these cases service quality has i m p r o v e d  substantially. But they have largely been seen as anomalies 
rather than  models  on w h c h  to build. T h e  situation in I n d i a  remains one  in w h i c h  pub l i c  
monopol ies face no compe t i t i on  either “in the market” , or (‘for the market” (where head-to-head 
compe t i t i on  i s  not possible). 
T h e  one over-r idmg lesson from the g lobal  revolut ion in the provision o f  pub l i c  services i s  that  
compe t i t i on  matters. For example, it i s  
technically qu i te  conceivable, in the large i r r igat ion systems, to unbundle the bulk a n d  dstribution 
functions and  then  have a variety o f  forms - cooperatives, the private sector -- for providing 
distribution services to farmers. As has happened elsewhere (in the airlines a n d  telecoms sectors in 
India, for example, a n d  in a p le thora o f  pub l i c  services a round  the world) such changes would unleash 
a chain of healthy systemic changes w h i c h  would t ransform the business o f  the provision o f  pub l i c  
services. require a clear contract between the bulk p rov ide r  (the I r r igat ion 
Depar tment)  and  the non-governmenta l  p rov ide  w h i c h  would define the rights a n d  responsibhties (for 
water a n d  for payments) of both parties. (Such a contract between the D e l h i  Jal B o a r d  a n d  the private 
operator of the Sonia V iha r  water treatment p lan t  in Delh i ,  shows this process at  work. D e l h  Jal 
B o a r d  i s  responsible for ensuring the bulk water supply for the plant, a n d  pays a f m e  o f  Rs 50,000 a 
day i f  the bulk supply i s  not prov ided.  This has l e d  to the DJB m a k i n g  unusually energetic efforts to 
ensure provision of bulk water supply for the plant112 and, coincidentally for the people to b e  served. 
T h a t  said, these efforts remain fraught with the  usual problems arising from lack of clarity about  water  
entit lements - one  day the Governmen t  o f  U t t a r  Pradesh says it i s  commi t ted  to supplying water  to 
Delh i ,  the nex t  day the situation has changed”?, with the fate o f  water supply to one  of the world’s 
largest sities depending on shor t - term pol i t ica l  haggling.) Second, i t  would require a clear contract 
between p rov ide r  and  those who receive services (probably Water  Users’ Associations in most 
i r r igat ion cases). T h e  absence o f  such contracts i s  one o f  the m a j o r  reasons why the monopoly- 
providers remain unaccountable to users, a n d  in fo rma t ion  remains so poor and  opaque. As always, 
discret ion a n d  lack of accountabhty  i s  the handmaiden to corruption. (In IUltgaard’s”4 famous 
equation “corrupt ion = monopoly + discretion - accountabiLtty” .) T h e  Vaidyanathan Commission 
on the Pr ic ing o f  I r r igat ion Waterlls put this clearly in the I n d i a n  context: “the discretionary powers of 
the bureaucracy.. . p rov ided  by the exist ing system are p o w e r f u l  reasons for the functionaries to 
oppose any change w h i c h  reduces their p o w e r  and  enhances the r o l e  of user in decision-makmg”. 
Third it would require that costs are ‘(revealed”, a n d  the dist inct ion between legitimate costs a n d  those 
- such as massive over-staff ing - w h i c h  should not b e  passed on to users. Fourth, the ent ry  o f  
private a n d  other non-governmental prov iders would natural ly lead to comparisons between the costs 
a n d  quali ty of services p rov ided  by di f ferent  providers, a n d  thus pressures - for the f x s t  t ime  - on 
pub l i c  providers to i m p r o v e  their performance. (This latter factor has, arguably, been the single 
biggest advantage of the i n t roduc t i on  of the pr ivate sector in other countries. In the US, for example, 
pub l i c  water ud t t i es  have improved,  in large part, as described in a study by the U S  N a t i o n a l  Academy 
of Sciencesllh, “because if pub l i c  u t h t i e s  did not i m p r o v e  they would b e  taken over  by the pr ivate 
sector”.) 
In some cases compe t i t i on  “in the market” i s  possible. 
First, i t  would 
Until quite recently i t  was assumed that the private sector cou ld  play a ro le  in the provision of fo rma l  
water services in cities a n d  towns, but that this would never happen in Irrigation. Indeed, the m i x  o f  
pub l i c  and  pr ivate f inanc ing for the provision o f  services does vary widely  for dtfferent types of 
infrastructure (Figure 57). 
ai Power generation 
But recent developments have shown that whi le  most canal i r r igat ion services will remain in publ ic  
hands for the foreseeable future, the pr ivate sector can play the same stimulating, competit ive ro le  that 
i t  plays in water  supply. Pakistan i s  considering experimenting with “professional management” 
contracts whereby a canal c o m m a n d  would b e  given under  management contract for a private sector 
operator would operate under  license to p rov ide  farmers’ organizations with thei r  water entitlements. 
In other  countries - Chi le  and  M o r o c c o  - for example, the authorit ies have gone fur ther  and  given out 
“reverse concessions” whereby pr ivate operators operate pub l i c  i r r igat ion systems, with the “winning 
operator” be ing  the one  that requires the smallest subsidy to p rov ide  the services. (There are m a n y  
advantages to such delegation to the private sector, and  i t  i s  an  approach w h i c h  has w o r k e d  we l l  in 
other  sectors - such as highways - in Indta, as described by N i r m a l  Mohanty117 a n d  Sebastian 
Morris118. These a n d  o the r  “special purpose vehicles” were be ing  explored as p a r t  of the work of the 
now-dtsbanded Task  Fo rce  on Linhng Rivers. I m p o r t a n t  as such innova t ion  are, i t  i s  impor tan t  to 
realize that they do not create someth ing out o f  nothing a n d  that the basic f inancial ari thmetic remains 
that revenues s d  have to come from either users or taxpayers.) 
S d a r l y  in the historical ly-publ ic business of wastewater treatment, there i s  m u c h  innova t ion  taktng 
place. In relatively advanced developing countries, typically less than  25% of sewage treatment plants 
actually functionllq. T h r e e  years ago the  Federal Governmen t  in Braz i l  took a n  innovat ive approach 
to this problem. I t  set up a fund, called “Compra de Esgoto” (or “buying treated sewage”) whereby 
municipalit ies are p a i d  for the p r o d u c t i o n  of treated sewage, not for the const ruct ion of treatment 
plants. T h e  p r o g r a m  i s  worktng well, a n d  p roduc ing  m u c h  better outputs than  the tradtt ional “pay for 
inputs” approach. 
Sebastian MorrislZ0 has described in detail some o f  these possibhties, their advantages, and  N i r m a l  
Mohanty121 describes how such arrangements have pe r fo rmed  w e l l  where they have been t r ied in Ind ta  
(for example with annui ty  contracts in the Na t iona l  Highways D e v e l o p m e n t  Program). And Vi jay 
Vyas122 notes tha t  the m o d e l  of hav ing “ bulk water p rov ided  to private parties who can retad i t to 
actual users has w o r k e d  we l l  with cooperative institutions”. 
As described by Sekhar123, in recent years there has been a lot o f  discussion about  “benchmarhng” in 
i r r igat ion services, wor ldw ide  and  in India.  T h e  In ternat ional  Commission on I r r i ga t i on  and  Dra inage 
a n d  others have developed a usefu l  set of practical tools for “benchmarhng” of i r r igat ion services124, 
a n d  the As ian  Deve lopmen t  B a n k  has p roduced  similarly impor tan t  material for compar ing the 
per formance o f  water utihties across Asia125. T h e  c o m m o n  reaction to these materials has been for 
the pub l i c  uul i t ies to see these as technical inputs to b e  considered by the engineers o f  the agencies 
w h e n  consider ing if and how they might change their modus operandi. 
This misses the central value o f  such tools, w h i c h  i s  to expose monopol ies to forms of “comparative 
competit ion”, and  in w h i c h  publ ic  discussion a n d  transparency are as impor tan t  as the technical 
i n fo rma t ion .  In some cases technical benchmarkmg in fo rma t ion  has been supplemented by 
“ a c c o ~ n t a b h t y ”  scorecards in w h i c h  users are h e c t l y  asked their percept ion o f  crit ical service issues. 
These have been done  by the Publ ic  A c c o u n t a b h t y  Center in Bangalore126. T h e  I r r i ga t i on  
Depar tmen t  w h i c h  part icipated in this experiment saw this init iat ive as a threat and  refused to 
cooperate in dissemination of the i n fo rma t ion  or in extension o f  the idea. 
T h e  s t imulat ion o f  “competit ion in the i r r igat ion distribution market” i s  o f  high priority. I t  d 
require a lot o f  technical assistance from professionals from countries who have done h s  (with 
Austral ia be ing  a “best practice” case.) I m p o r t a n t  question include: How does one  ensure a leve l  
playing f ield? How might workers in the I r r i ga t i on  Depar tments b e  encouraged, as was done  in 
M e x i c o  City‘27, to form their own i r r igat ion services companies, t h u s  ensuring that their expertise i s  
put to work, that  resistance to the change i s  reduced, a n d  even that  h s  helps ret rench a heavily over- 
staffed state? How should audit ing of performance a n d  flows of water and  m o n e y  b e  done  so that  
audits are trusted by all? How does one  wr i t e  enforceable contracts “up” - between the service 
p rov ide r  a n d  the government, and  “down” between the service department a n d  the users? Nothing 
l i ke  t h i s  has been done  in India, but some states w h i c h  are working with the World B a n k  - inc lud ing  
Maharashtra a n d  UP - are now considering such experiments. I t  i s  essential that these efforts b e  g iven 
high priority a n d  suppor ted with the necessary technical assistance a n d  capacity building support. 
Section 2 argued that the absence of clear, enforceable water enti t lements at al l  levels i s  a t  the root of 
m a n y  o f  the service shortcomings, water use inefficiency, corruption, f inancial problems a n d  confl icts 
w h i c h  plague the water sector in I n d i a  
In a definit ive legal rev iew  of water rights in India, Chattrapati  Singh128 provides a n  elegant overv iew of 
the history a n d  pol i t ics of water rights in India. Singh notes that “the fact that right over  water has 
existed in al l  ancient laws, inc lud ing our own dharasastras a n d  the Is lamic laws.. .”. H e  notes that “the 
pre-capitalist customary conceptions o f  group rights have compe ted  with a parallel set of post- 
capitalist ind iv idual  rights” a n d  that  the various 19th century i r r igat ion and  canal acts “ implici t ly 
recognize ind iv idual  rights in grant ing that the gove rnmen t  d grant  compensation for damage done  
in respect o f  any right to water”. 
In I n d i a  there are excellent cases of clear entit lements at  the in ternat ional  level (the Indus a n d  Ganga  
Treaties). In India, as in al l  parts o f  the world where water  i s  scarce, i n f o r m a l  water markets have 
arisen, in w h i c h  those who have (implicit) rights sell water to those who need it. 
Moving towards a fo rma l  water enti t lement system f i r s t  requires clari fying that water i s  publ icly o w n e d  
a n d  that  a water  enti t lement i s  usufructory- i t  i s  a right to use, not a right to own w a t e P .  As stated 
by Chattrapati  Singh: "the only kind of  rights that can become operative for anyone are usufructory 
rights, that  i s  right to use water. T h e  rea l  question i s  who has wha t  kind of right to use water, and  w h a t  
corresponding duties attach to it." 
In al l  cases, i nc lud ing  in India, the ownership of water resides, and  must cont inue to reside, with the 
state. T h e  essence of the change to a fo rma l  system i s  that water entit lements (of individuals a n d  
communit ies, inc lud ing tradit ional users) are separated from land  r ights (although land  rights, along 
with tradit ional rights of nodandholders13U would logically b e  the ma jo r  factor in assignment o f  the 
original rightsl-il), and  then  enjoy the same legal certainty as l and  and  other  p roper t y  rights. 
Experience throughout the world n2 has shown that, after lengthy debates about  entrenching exist ing 
privileges, t he  only politically-feasible solution to the establishment o f  in i t ia l  entit lements i s  to 
recognize de facto exist ing rights, m a k i n g  adjustments where the sum of exist ing uses exceeds 
sustainable use (which i s  the case in m a n y  aquifers). A s  described by h lar ia  Saleth133 the usual 
mechanism i s  for users to apply, within a specified period, for a fo rma l  enti t lement or license, based on 
proof o f  their water use over  the preceding f ive years. Licenses are generally waived for small  
abstractions for meet ing hnmedmte domestic uses. 
O n c e  established, such entit lements give rise to a series o f  fundamental a n d  healthy changes. First, 
those requi r ing addit ional water (such as high-value agriculture and  people living in growing cities) will 
frequently b e  able to mee t  their needs by acquir ing the entit lements o f  those who are using water for 
low-value purposes. ( A s  described in Box 2, there i s  a n  impor tan t  recent example of such 'c t rade~" in 
Indm In 2003 70% of al l  water used by the city of Chennai was leased from wells o f  nearby farmers.) 
Second, there are strong incentives for low-value water users to voluntari ly "forebear" from use, 
m a k i n g  real location both poli t ical ly attractive a n d  practical. For example in the p ioneer ing watershed 
management pro ject  in Sukormajr i  in i t ia l  entit lements were distr ibuted to al l  in the village, giving 
people a valued n e w  asset. M a n y  of the poor later chose to cash in their entit lements by sell ing t h e m  
to landowners who cou ld  put the water to better use. 
Box 2: Incipient Water Trading around Chennai 
The city o f  Chennai suffers f rom chronic and severe water shortages. In the past i t  has meant that major 
industries (fertilizer and chemical factories) have closed for months because o f  water shortages. And it has 
meant, and means, that people in t h i s  city have learned to live with small amounts o f  water for  a few hours a day. 
The standard coping strategy - sinking household tubewells - became ineffective as water tables dropped and as 
salt water f rom the sea intiuded into the aquifer under the city. There  were a number o f  different proposals for 
augmenting the meager supplies o f  water t o  the city (in addition to strenuous efforts to repair leaks and more 
generally improve the quality o f  the udty - Metrowater -- and i t s  infrastructure). In 1996 Metrowater and the 
Wor ld  Bank did an assessment o f  the feasible alternatives for supplying additional bulk water to the city. The 
major sources being considered by  the city were the T'eeranum Tank (which required construction o f  a 250 
kilometer pipeline) and desalination, bo th  o f  which were very expensive, especially relative to  t h e  domestic tariff 
o f  Rs 2 per cubic meter. But what was striking w a s  that, while the  city suffered f rom water shortages, there were 
large areas growing paddy j u s t  nor th  of the city, using water f rom t h e  AK aquifer. A detailed prior 
hydrogeological study indicated that the sustainable yield o f  the aquifer was very large, and back-of-the-envelope 
calculations showed that the water would cost the city j us t  a small fraction o f  the cost o f  water f rom any other 
sources, as shown in Figure 58. 
"This i s  all well and good" explahed the Metrowater officials, but "that water i s  used b y  farmers, who are a 
strong lobby and who will no t  permit u s  t o  take their water" (showing, incidentally that the ubiquitous Indian 
policy o f  "priority for drinking water then agriculture was impossible to implement in practice. "But what if you 
bought  the water from the farmers”, they were asked. “So,  our farmers are very wedded to growing paddy, they 
wou ld  not b e  interested in giving up their water.. . “ T h e  seed o f  t h i s  idea WAS, nevertheless, planted, and in 
2003 70% o f  the raw water for the city came f r o m  buying water from farmers in the AK aquifer! “Did the 
farmers react unfavorably as you thought?” Metrowater was asked. “The farmers are not happy” was the reply. 
“W%y?” “Because al l  the fiarmers want t o  sell their water, and we  cannot buy f r o m  all o f  them!” was the reply. 
There i s  both good news and bad news in t h i s  story. T h e  good news i s  that the experience unequivocally showed 
that farmers were quite WiUing to  accept “forbearance payments” to desist from irrigated crops, when they got 
more  money that way than from plant ing water-guzzling crops l ike paddy. And in t h i s  i s  one o f  the very rare 
cases where a b a n  on additional wells i s  actually enforced. However  there i s  a darker side to the story, too. Eight 
years ago Metrowater h a d  funding for a major  study wh ich  would look both at the hydrogeology @ow m u c h  
water could the aquifer yield on a sustainable basis?) and at institutions (how to set up formal  water entitlements 
wh ich  would add up to the sustainable yield and which could b e  leased or sold to the city?). As i s  standard for 
Ind ian  water institutions, Metrowater showed litt le interest in the second, wh ich  has not yet been done. In fact 
they did worse - they pumped  far more  f r o m  the wells than could be  sustained over time, and  did nothmg to  put 
in place arrangements to  safeguard the aquifer. 
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Figure 58: Cost and quantity of raw water from different sources 
f o r  Chennai 
Third, t h e  establ ishment  of f o r m a l  wa te r  ent i t lements gives r ise to s t r o n g  pressures for improving the  
data r e q u i r e d  to manage the  resource. And fourth, th is  reduces t h e  pressures of a "race to the  bottom," 
since those  who have  ent i t lements have  a p o w e r f u l  interest  in susta inabhty  of the resource base. T h i s  
i s  not to suggest t ha t  there is u n a n i m i t y  on the concep t  of wa te r  entit lements, for s o m e  see this as a n  
unhea l thy  c o m m o d i f i c a t i o n  of a p u b l i c  good. Nor i s  it m e a n t  to imply that  i t  i s  s imple to i n t r o d u c e  
ent i t lements-based systems for a f u g t i v e  resource with deep cu l tu ra l  impl icat ions in a h n i s t r a t i v e l y  
w e a k  env i ronmen ts  a n d  in ones in w h i c h  there are m i l l i ons  o f  sma l l  users. Nonetheless,  t h e  last  10 
years has seen e n o r m o u s  progress g lobal ly  in t h e  use of f o r m a l  water  ent i t lements - with wel l -  
f u n c t i o n i n g  systems now working in Australia, Chile, Mexico,  A rgen t ina  a n d  South Afr ica. .  (Box 3, 
from Australia, p rov ides  a part icular ly clear descr ip t ion o f  t h e  centra l  but qui te  d i f f e ren t  roles o f  wa te r  
ent i t lements a n d  p r i c i n g  in Sustainable wa te r  management)  I t  i s  n o t e w o r t h y  that  a l l  such  establ ished 
systems are worhng, o f t e n  after i n i t i a l  adjustments, a n d  are p e r f o r m i n g  well. In n o n e  of the  countr ies 
tha t  h a v e  a d o p t e d  such  systems i s  there any  thought to r e t u r n i n g  to the  prev ious government-managed 
a l locat ion procedures.  
BOX 3: Water entitlements are the principal mechanism for ensuring efficiency, sustainability and 
voluntary reallocation of water 
Unpublished, Letter to the Editor, The  Economist, July 2003: 
Your special survey on water ("Priceless", July 19) embodes in i t s  title a prejudice that experience from the real 
world rarely justifies. You refer specifically t o  the experience o f  the Murray-Darling &GD) basin. 
In the M-D, water use i s  constrained to  equal the sustainable supply through a complex system o f  water rights, 
defined in terms o f  volumes and security o f  supply. In t h i s  drought year - the worst for more  than a century - 
many users are receiving less than 16% of  their "normal" entitlement, and that restriction i s  enforced entirely 
through the water rights system - not through pr ic ing mechanisms. 
Formal ly codifying these property rights - in systems that were already wel l  managed and orderly; where 
customers were educated and accustomed to fol lowing rules; and allocation rules were already broadly in place 
and enforced - took a number of  decades. Once t h i s  process was complete, i t  was possible to introduce a 
system of  trading in these codified property rights, allowing managers the flexibility t o  better manage their 
enterprises (in some areas last year as m u c h  as 80% of  water delivered was traded). The  water rights system also 
provides the basis for improved environmental management. T h e  parallel system of charging for water services 
in the M-D i s  quite separate from the sale and purchases o f  water rights, and exists to  ensure that the income of  
water supply agencies i s  adequate to  cover ongoing maintenance and projected major capital replacements. 
Three lessons may be  drawn from t h i s  successful achievement o f  sustainable financial management and 
sustainable resource use: First, the pr imary means of balancing supply and demand for water resources i s  
definit ion o f  water rights consistent with available supply. This i s  the approach followed in Australia, Israel, the 
US, and elsewhere. Second, defining water rights i s  contentious and d f f i cu l t  at the best o f  times. Where water 
i s  already over-allocated so that "tail enders" of ten get no water, or fresh aquifers are consistently overdrawn to 
meet current demand, defLning and enforcing sustainable water rights i s  an  enormous polit ical and social 
challenge. T h i s  i s  the case in many water-short developing countries. Third, the primary role o f  water pr ic ing in 
irrigation i s  not to  balance supply and demand, but rather to achieve sustainable financing. Implymg, as the 
Economist  article does, that pr ic ing water has a central ro le in achieving the required resource balance is to 
grossly mislead policymakers facing the challenge o f  reducing water consumption to a level consistent with long 
term availabllity and proper environmental management. T h e  solution inevitably requires stable and wel l  
specified access rights to water, institutions with the capacity to manage the water access regime, and 
appropriate water pr ic ing to ensure the long term operation o f  the infrastructure. 
Don Blackmore Chief Executive Murray-Darl ing Basin Commission Australia 
Chris Perry, Professor, Economics o f  Irrigation, Cranfield University, UK 
In I n d i a  there are pressures at a l l  levels for clarity and  formalization of entit lements to use an ever- 
scarcer resource. T h i s  ranges from the local  level (villagers who have stored rainwater in Rajasthan, 
a n d  downstream irrigators in the Vaigai Basin, for instance, as described in Section 2) to the 
in ternat ional  level (between I n d i a  a n d  i t s  neighbors, for example). 
A f t e r  years o f  academic discussion o f  water entitlements, there has recently been a n  impor tan t  
development, since the State of Maharashtra has, after years o f  study and  extensive consultations with 
c o m m u n i t y  and  a l l  po l i t ica l  parties, passed (in April o f  2005). T h e  Maharashtra Water  Resources 
Regulatory Authority A c t  o f  2005 , the heart o f  w h i c h  i s  the creation and  management o f  a water 
enti t lement system p o x  4). 
Box 4 T h e  Maharashtra Wate r  Resources Remla to rv  Au tho r i t v  A c t  o f  2005134 
As described in the background paper by  Mara Saleth: “The creation o f  water entitlements system i s  at heart o f  
the MWRRA Bill. The bill clarifies the legal issues and contemplates the establishment o f  the institutional 
arrangements needed for the distribution, enforcement, and monitoring o f  the entitlements. While establishment 
o f  individual and transferable water entitlements i s  the long terms strategy, the Bill adopts a politically and 
administratively pragmatic intermediate strategy o f  establishing bulk water entitlements for entities such as water 
user organizations, urban and rural water supply agencies, and industries. Notably, water entitlements are no t  
ownership rights but only usufructory rights defmed in volumetric sense. Such entitlements cover both surface 
and sub-surface water sources. The water quota implied in the water entitlements can be transferred, sold, and 
bartered either in part or in fd. Water entitlements also carry with them the correlated duties including 
payments, efficient use, and quality maintenance. The bulk water entitlements will be  defmed and implemented 
within a basin and sub-basin framework. Whde the  A M W R R A  will allocate bulk rights, the basin organizations 
and user  organizations at lower level  will have responsibility in the day-to-day monitoring and enforcement. 
Adequate provisions are also made for resolving conflicts and grievances both at the local and regional levels.” 
T h e  issue of water entit lements i s  a sensitive and  controversial one, in I n d i a  a n d  elsewhere. T h e  
experienced Ind lan  consultants who contr ibuted to this repor t  -- several o f  whom served or serve in 
high positions in the Union G o v e r n m e n t  -- consider h s  issue to b e  central, a n d  one  that has to b e  
addressed a n d  resolved. And every discussion with users comes back to the pervasive question o f  lack 
of clarity of who has the right to use w h a t  water. 
The re  i s  no issue m o r e  central for the effect ive management of water in India, a n d  m o r e  impor tan t  in 
reducing w h a t  the Finance Min is ter  has described as the “growing number  of l i t t le  c i v i l  wars”135 over  
water. This i s  an  issue on w h i c h  the  Union Governmen t  should b e  t a h n g  aggressive leadership, 
since, in the words of Chattrapati  Singh “to make  the state accountable a n d  make  water  use equitable 
for all, a n u m b e r  of amendments are requi red in the Easement Act, the I r r i ga t i on  laws, Panchayat and  
Mun ic ipa l  Corporat ion laws, Wate r  Supply Ac ts  a n d  other  laws related to water”136. F a r  from doing 
this, the position o f  the Union G o v e r n m e n t  i s  to actively discourage pub l i c  dxussion o f  water  
entitlements, “because i t  i s  too sensitive”. 
O n e  o f  the great transformations in I n d i a  over  the past  f i f teen years i s  that there are large areas o f  the 
economy in w h i c h  the response to n e w  ideas i s  no longer “no, that  d not work in India”  a n d  i s  
rather “why not”? But in the government-dominated water sector this change of perspective i s  part ial  
a t  best and  most n e w  ideas are rejected as <‘this i s  okay for advanced economies, but cannot  b e  done 
here”. In t h i s  context, i t  i s  instruct ive to n o t e  that China i s  now c o m m i t t e d  to putting in place a 
system of water ent i t lement~ ’3~,  a n d  to see that  in neighbor ing Pakistan Pun jab  a better-defined water 
entit lements system has been in place since 1991 a t  both the prov inc ia l  a n d  canal c o m m a n d  level, and  
that, as described in B o x  5, the Federal a n d  Prov inc ia l  governments are moving to make  the 
implementat ion o f  t h i s  water enti t lement system m o r e  transparent a n d  verif ied. 
Box 5: T o w a r d s  a t ranwaren t  water enti t lement recrime in Puniab. Pakistan 
The Indus Waters Treaty shows very clearly that a well-defined set o f  entitlements, w h c h  are monitored by  both 
stakeholders, and which have clear enforcement mechanisms, can provide a high (not perfect) level o f  trust ,  even 
when the parties involved have literally gone to war several times. The IW i s  a great example o f  h o w  "good 
fences make good neighbors". 
Within Pakistan the issue o f  provincial water entitlements is ,  as in India, a controversial issue. In 1991 Pahstan's 
four provinces concluded a 'Water Accord" which allocates the waters o f  the Indus Basin, and defines the  way 
in which additional assured water will be shared. There have been important deficiencies in the transparency 
with which t h e  Accord has been implemented, deficiencies which Pakistan i s  n o w  moving to  overcome. 
A very important element o f  the 
Accord i s  that it formalized the  
entitlements at the intra-provincial 
level. Consider the  case o f  Punjab 
as an example. The allocations to  
the 24 canal commands are specified 
for 10-daily periods in bo th  the 
Aharifand rabi seasons in the annex 
to the Accord, based o n  the hstoric 
allocations for a five year period in 
the late 1970s (Figure 58a)I38. The 
administrators of the allocation 
system in Punjab apparently respect 
these, for the most part. The 
Irrigation Department keeps detailed 
records o f  the entitlements for each 
season, o f  the amounts o f  water 
actually delivered and o f  the 
"balances" for each canal command. 
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Figure 58a: Pakistan Punjab canal entitlements from the 1991 Water 
Accord Source Gowrnrner* nf  Pakistan 1991 
(For example, as can be seen in the first few entries for the current season, a number o f  canal commands did not 
wish to receive their full shares, but they get "credit" for this,  and can use these saved amounts later in the 
season.) The one big missing piece i s  the 
transparent, verified, implementation o f  the allocations, a direction in which Punjab i s  n o w  committed to move. 
Ths system i s  very close to something that would be ideal. 
O n e  o f  the m a n y  virtues o f  an  enti t lement system i s  that, once started, i t  induces a strong demand 
from users for better measurement, transparency, regulat ion a n d  in format ion,  issues w h i c h  are an  
integral pa r t  o f  "the water  inst rument  package" and  to w h i c h  w e  now turn our attention. 
A central feature o f  m o d e r n  water management in a liberalized economy a n d  democratic env i ronment  
i s  that of openness a n d  transparency. In most countries now al l  relevant i n f o r m a t i o n  - hydrological, 
performance, p lanning - i s  available publicly, on the w e b  a n d  in real  t ime. Representative websites 
show t h i s  clearly: TVA in the U S  (www.tva.gov), the M u r r a y  D a r l i n g  Bas in  Commission in Austral ia 
(www.mdbc.gov.au), the M i n i s t r y  of Wate r  a n d  Forestry in South A f r i c a  (www.dwaf.gov.za), the 
Na t iona l  Water  Agency in Braz i l  (www.ana.gov.br) to cite j u s t  a f e w  examples. 
Despi te  be ing  one of the world's IT centers (and thus hav ing  immense  capacity) I n d a  has been s l o w  
and  uneven in adapting to t h i s  changed i n f o r m a t i o n  environment. I t  remains ve ry  d i f f icu l t  for a user 
to even find out w h a t  data might b e  available -- the web-site for the M i n i s t r y  o f  Water  Resources 
(httn: //wrii i in.nic.in) does not p r o v i d e  any Qsaggregated or real-time h y d r o l o g c  in format ion.  A f t e r  
m u c h  &gent e n q u q  a persistent a n d  connected user i s  duected to a web-site set up by the Central 
Water  Commission under  the World Bank- funded Na t iona l  Hydrology Pro ject  (www.india- 
water.com). And then  even a user with a high-speed connect ion and  moderate s l i l l l s  finds i t  
impossible to find out w h a t  data are actually available a n d  how to get them. T h e  situation for State 
Governmen ts  i s  the same, even for the leading IT states (htttx/ /waterresources.kar.nic.in and  
htm: / /www.aDonltne.pov.in) i s  even worse. 
In I n d i a  the “hyd ro logc  data secrecy” culture has changed slowly in recent decades, even by standards 
o f  the sub-continent13g. T h e  state of affairs i s  dus t ra ted  by the most highly-discussed water issue in 
recent years in India; that  of “linking rivers”. T h e  Na t iona l  Water  Deve lopmen t  Agency (NW’DA) h a d  
been studying possible inter-basin transfers since 1984. Those  who championed the idea, a n d  the 
m a n y  who h a d  reservations, quite reasonably requested to b e  shown the data, the analysis a n d  the 
plans. Desp i te  20 years of study, n o n e  of the data were made available. This denial of i n fo rma t ion  
natural ly leads to suspicion about  “secret plans” and  about  incompetence and  poor performance 
hiding b e h i n d  the man t ra  of “national security”. 
Recently there has been some modes t  progress. Now the “linlung rivers” website does have the 
feas ibhty  study for one  of the proposed links (the Ken-Betwa link) o n - h e  (www.riverlinks.nic.in). 
U n d e r  the N a t i o n a l  Hydrology Pro ject  “. . . the Hydrology I n f o r m a t i o n  System data i s  currently 
generally accessible to the  user community, except in situations where data i s  considered sensitive a n d  
higher-level authorization i s  required140.” “Generally avadable” i s  a relative t e r m  -- a Goog le  search 
t u r n s  up no reference to these data on the web, a n d  requests have to b e  made  in writing to the 
government. 
In other  areas I n d i a n  practice i s  changmg. - as dus t ra ted  by I n d i a n  Radways To someone farmliar 
with the  drama of get t ing tickets on I n d i a n  Railways in the past, the current system was unimaginable. 
Now reservations can b e  made  easily online, in w h i c h  tickets are delivered to D e l h i  addresses within 12 
hours, a n d  in w h i c h  electronic refunds take place in a week. I f  other  democratic countries (who also 
have neighbors with whom they share water, a n d  several of whom have federal structures with 
complex inter-state water  matters) can make  a l l  water data -- i nc ludmg hydrological data, reservoir 
status a n d  operation, water  deliveries, budgets, costs, agency performance, etc. - easily accessible in a 
user-fr iendly fo rma t  on the w e b  in real time, why can t h s  not b e  done  in India? I t  i s  obviously not a 
question o f  capabdtty but one of d a n d  attitude. There  i s  no doubt that t h i s  change would 
stimulate a chain react ion of accountabdtty, par t ic ipat ion a n d  demand  for m o r e  a n d  better data w h c h  
would t ransform the culture o f  water management in the country. 
Finally, there i s  a p o w e r f u l  feedback loop between data availabdtty, qual i ty a n d  support for data 
col lect ion activities. G l o b a l  experience shows that  hydrology data systems d b e  mainta ined only 
w h e n  there are users who can get easy access to the information, who find the data they need in a user- 
fr iendly way, a n d  who then  become pressure groups on government  to c o m m i t  the necessary funding 
to the data col lect ion activities. M a h n g  this change i s  a central objective o f  the follow-on World 
Bank-suppor ted N a t i o n a l  Hydrology Project. 
This R e p o r t  has made  clear that in the fu ture there d b e  two pr imary  challenges facing the I n d i a n  
water sector - f i r s t  to i m p r o v e  the quali ty a n d  coverage o f  f o r m a l  pub l i c  water supply a n d  i r r igat ion 
services a n d  second to regulate the use o f  groundwater. In both cases the government  has to p lay a 
qu i te  d i f ferent  ro le  from that w h i c h  it plays a t  present. On the p rov ide r  side the government  has to 
corporatize the government- run service providers, a n d  a l l ow  the ent ry  o f  private and  cooperative 
service providers. T h i s  means that the service sector d increasingly b e  characterized by contracts 
between (public and  private) providers, on the one hand, and  users, on the other. These contracts d 
describe the rights a n d  responsibil i t ies of both parties, in terms o f  both water a n d  money. A key 
requirement, therefore, i s  that government  develop regulatory capacity for balancing the disparate 
interests of the providers, the users, a n d  the government  i tse l f  (as shown in Figure 59). There  i s  now 
growing experience in I n d t a  with independent regulat ion (in the telecommunications and  electricity 
sectors). T h e  Maharashtra Water  Regulatory Authority i s  a n  impor tan t  f i r s t  step towards buildmg such 
capacity. 
I t  d take some years a n d  a process o f  tr ial  and  error to find the right fo rms  for such regulat ion , 
especially in a sector in w h i c h  the  notion of contracts and  compet i t ion and  transparency have been 
almost entirely absent. I t  i s  cr i t ical to take a learning approach to this, a n d  not to see the f i r s t  s i g n s  of 
dtff iculties as a reason to go back to “the old ways”. 
Figure 59: Participants in modern regulation 
On the second great challenge - groundwater management - the issue o f  regulat ion i s  also key. 
G l o b a l  experience shows that moving from an  anarchic groundwater management system to one 
where there i s  a balance between abstractions a n d  recharge i s  a very dt f f icu l t  one, w h i c h  i s  less than  
per fect  even in very good governance environments. Experience also shows that command-and- 
c o n t r o l  type o f  approaches - “prohibiting m o r e  abstractions” - simply do not work, again even in 
relatively easy  environment^'^^. T h e  essential ingredtents o f  “the least unsuccessful approach” are 
clear142. Groundwater  management requires: a legal framework w h i c h  constrains the rights of  people 
to pump as m u c h  water as they wish from their land; the separation o f  l a n d  rights a n d  water 
entitlements, with the latter usually based on historical use; strong government  presence to give legal 
back ing for the development o f  part icipatory aquifer management associations a n d  to p rov ide  the 
decision-support systems w h i c h  enable aquifer associations to monitor their resource; and, above all, 
clarity that  the p r imary  r e s p o n s i b d q  for the maintenance of the resource on w h i c h  they depend i s  with 
those who have entit lements to use water  from a particular aquifer. 
T h e r e  are many  dt f f icu l t  technical details to b e  w o r k e d  out - for example, the t radeof f  between 
hydro log ica l  reality (which would suggest large aquifer associations in the m a n y  extensive aquifers) a n d  
the transactions costs of i nc lud tng  large numbers of small  farmers (which argues for smaller 
associations). Experience in o the r  ve ry  large aquifers (such as the Ogallala aquifer w h i c h  r u n s  from 
Minneso ta  to Texas a n d  in Mexico)  shows that i t  i s  perfectly practical to c h o p  a single aquifer up into a 
large n u m b e r  o f  “semi-independent” aquifers w h i c h  are run by a reasonable number  o f  users143. 
this case i t  i s  very  i m p o r t a n t  that  the best does not become the enemy o f  the good! 
In 
As described in Section 2, the “water sector” in I n d i a  i s  in severe financial distress. N i r m a l  M o h a n t y  
has apt ly  described the p r e v a h n g  m o d e l  as “Build-Neglect-Rebuild”. The re  i s  an  enormous l i abh ty  
from deferred maintenance. And the stock i s  such that even, once rehabhtated, the annual 
requirement for maintenance a n d  rehabhtat ion would b e  abou t  equal to a l l  pub l i c  funds currently 
invested. But then  there are also ma jo r  n e w  needs - for providing services to those who do not have 
services, for mee t ing  the needs of a growing populat ion and  economy, a n d  for the massive investments 
needed to mee t  the “debt to the aquatic environment”. 
In addressing this issue, there are some “red herrings” w h i c h  have to b e  addressed. First ,  al though the 
massive distortions in the p r i c ing  of water services are justified “in the name o f  the poor”, i t  is, 
paradoxically, the poor are the ma jo r  vict ims o f  these distortions. And, as po in ted  out by 
Vaidyanathan144, i t  was “in the era o f  redtstr ibution (form 1964 onwards) that  prices began to get out 
of l ine with costs”. 
Raj iv  G a n d h i  famously said that no m o r e  than 15% of the benefits o f  pub l i c  distribution programs 
actually reached the  beneficiaries, a figure w h i c h  i s  believed to have changed litt le. In the case of 
water subsidies this i s  p robab ly  true, too, because the subsidies go where the water goes, and  this i s  to 
those who can manipulate the system and  get access. Those  without p o w e r  - the poor -- are rat ioned 
out of the system. F a r  m o r e  equitable, as described by Sebastian Morris 145 would b e  a system w h i c h  
provides subsidies to people, not providers, along the lines o f  the “water stamps” p r o g r a m  in Chile. In 
this p r o g r a m  the poor are g iven vouchers for the purchase o f  water, for w h i c h  a l l  pay the ta r i f f  
required to cover operation, maintenance and  capital costs. 
T h e  disconnect between prices a n d  costs induces very large overal l  economic costs. As po in ted  out by 
Sebastian Morris146, “price based subsidization has the ma jo r  infirmity that i t  robs prices o f  their crucial 
ro le . .  . o f  informing investment  a n d  input choices a n d  the du-ection of technical change”. Morris147 
also points out that  “arbitrage of the difference between tari f fs a n d  wdhngness to pay’’ i s  the 
fundamental source of the endemic co r rup t i on  in these services. 
Aga in  there i s  a massive and  growing gulf between principles, po l i cy  statements a n d  practice. 
1991 repor t  o f  the Vaidyanathan Commission on I r r igat ion P r i c ing  lays out most of the crit ical issues. 
T h e  
“much o f  the i n f o r m a t i o n  w h c h  i s  crucial for a p roper  assessment o f  the performance o f  
i r r igat ion systems i s  hard ly  even compi led regularly, m u c h  less analyzed” 
“the a l l - round deteriorat ion in the financial per formance o f  i r r igat ion projects i s  stark and  
nearly universal” 
“it i s  d i f f icu l t  to accept the case for subsidtzing such a user-oriented (sector) as irrigation” 
“the government  i s  not in a position to sustain subsidies on i r r igat ion on the present scale” 
“it i s  not possible to determine how m u c h  o f  the imp l i c i t  subsidy i s  attr ibutable to ineff iciency 
and  how m u c h  really benefi ts farmers because o f  the underpr ic ing o f  water” 
“the discretionary powers  of the  bureaucracy a n d  the attendant opportunit ies for “rent-seeking 
behavior” p r o v i d e d  by the exist ing system are p o w e r f u l  reasons for the functionaries to 
oppose any change w h i c h  reduces their power. .  .” 
0 
So w h a t  can b e  done  to start t he  arduous but central process o f  arresting the rot and  putting the water 
sector in I n d i a  back on track? 
First i s  a real izat ion that there i s  no such thing as a free lunch. There  are only two sources of revenue 
to pay  for the (rising) costs of these services - taxes or user charges. I f  governments are not d n g  to 
raise either o f  these then, as emphasized by Rakesh Mohan148 , there i s  simply no way  forward. For 
the foreseeable future, there will need to b e  budget  support (taxpayers’ money) for irrigation. But i t  i s  
also obvious tha t  user charges simply must b e  increased, for a host o f  reasons. T h a t  said, i t  i s  clear 
that  start ing with the idea of increasmg charges (for b a d  services p rov ided  by co r rup t  a n d  inef f ic ient  
agencies) will qui te  reasonably b e  resisted. For t h i s  reason the idea of bringing tari f fs into balance with 
costs must b e  the  third leg  of a triangle in w h i c h  the f i r s t  two legs must b e  “ improve services f i r s t ”  and  
“provide those services in an  eff icient and  accountable manner”. “Yu will pay for the costs of those 
services” can come only after the f i r s t  two have been clearly done  and  are so perceived by users, 
F igure 60 gives an  interesting example o f  how this was done  in an  u r b a n  water pro ject  in Africa. 
Providmg subsidies for the “transition costs” for moving a low-level to a high-level equi l ibr ium (the 
triangle in the  figure) i s  wha t  Union Governmen t  and  World B a n k  and  other  agencies should b e  
supporting. 
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Figure 60: From low level t o  high level equilibrium in Conakry 
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A part icular challenge in I n d i a  i s  that  households have made  such large personal investments in 
“coping with poor pub l i c  services”. This has not w o r k e d  badly  - a middle-class fami ly  in any of the 
m a j o r  cities actually gets water twenty- four  hours a day, even though the water from the uthty comes 
for j u s t  an  hour or two. M i d d l e  class families have done this by m a k i n g  large investments to cope. 
But the existence o f  these “sunk costs’’ poses a part icular challenge, because these users would actually 
benef i t  l i t t le  in the short run from m o r e  reliable supplies. This means that, again in the short run, they 
would oppose higher user charges, even if service quali ty i m p r o v e d  (as i s  evident in D e l h i  in 2005). 
T h e y  would only become supporters in the m e d i u m  run w h e n  they understood that  they did not need 
to replace their assets (their pump a n d  overhead tanks a n d  water  filters) because they c o u l d  now re ly  
on the p i p e d  distribution system. At the ve ry  least this requires that i n f o r m a t i o n  on improvements,  
a n d  the savings t h i s  brings in the short run (lower electricity costs) and  m e d i u m  run (no replacement 
of equipment for coping) needs to b e  made  clear and  communicated effectively. I t  also means that the 
t i m e  span for bringing tariffs in l i ne  with costs needs to b e  tai lored to t h i s  reality. 
An a d d t i o n a l  factor that needs to b e  factored in to the design of ta r i f f  r e f o r m  is the fact that the status 
quo i s  qu i te  satisfactory to m a n y  in the publ ic  agencies who profit from the discret ion w h i c h  they 
exercise. This i s  - see the last quote from the Vaidyanathan Commission above - a central, perhaps 
the central challenge for progressive government. As D a v i d  Mosse notes in h i s  book on water 
management in T a d  N a d u l ?  “Only the rare engineer supports PIM. Most consider i t  a fad  that 
should wear i tse l f  out in t ime. .  . with fear for the loss of gratuitous incomes should farmers begin to 
func t i on  independent of the i r r igat ion department” 
T h e  ant i - re form rhetor ic  of “increased tariffs wdl hurt the poor” a n d  “ th i s  wdl cost jobs” have been 
h o n e d  to a f ine art, a n d  have the strong support of some pol i t ical parties. There  i s  no easy answer to 
this issue, but i t  i s  clear w h a t  some o f  the elements that need to b e  addressed are. On the “carrot” side 
there are creative ways o f  providing n e w  opportunit ies for those in the pub l i c  sector agencies to 
part icipate in a n e w  service arrangement. As was done in a successful process in M e x i c o  City, pub l i c  
workers were given training, capital a n d  preferential access in setting up firms who cou ld  compete for 
contracts w h i c h  were handed over  to the private sector. On the “stick” side, the government  i tse l f  i s  
compl ic i t  in, and  even the architect of the present arrangement and  i s  un l ike ly  to b e  a n  effective 
change agent. W h a t  i s  needed is, as described earlier, to bring as m u c h  as possible “into the light of 
day” - Who has entit lements to the water? W h a t  i s  the contract between the p rov ide r  and  the user? 
W h a t  are the penalties for non-performance? W h a t  i s  the per formance of the d f f e r e n t  providers? 
Finally, i t  i s  impor tan t  to n o t e  that, as Sebastian Morris150 has aptly n o t e d  “the issues of pricing, 
subsides, water rights and  financing (and h e  might have added inefficiency, lack o f  accountabhty  a n d  
corruption) are deeply interl inked”. Jus t  one dus t ra t i on  of this i s  that, as described earlier, the lack of 
def in i t ion of enti t lement to I G i s h n a  R ive r  water has l e d  to il l-advised investments in Maharashtra 
w h i c h  contr ibute to abou t  18Yoof the fiscal defici t  o f  the State151. 
I n d i a  has a long a n d  justly-proud t rad i t ion o f  buildng and  managing of some of the largest a n d  most 
complex hydraulic engineering works of  the world. And I n d i a  justif iably takes great p r i de  in the world 
standing o f  some of i t s  institutions o f  technical education. 
Y e t  the fact i s  that, compared with al l  developed and  middle-income countries, I n d a  has not 
developed the h u m a n  resources necessary to mee t  the water needs of a growing a n d  changing country. 
T h e  mind-set o f  the state bureaucracies i s  one  that  m a y  have been appropriate forty years ago, but i t  i s  
not w e l l  adapted to the n e w  challenges. 
T h e  m a j o r  reason why t h i s  i s  so is, of course, the set of incentives w h i c h  s tu l t i fy  i ndv idua ls  in the 
pub l i c  water organizations of I n d i a  today. T h e  Planning Commission(152has described some of the 
things that need to change: “The  approach of the government  i s  no rma l l y  hierarchical rater than 
funct ional  and  the lack of due impor tance to professional a n d  funct ional  aspects tends to blur 
responsibhties and  inh ib i ts  specialization. I n te r -d i sc ipha ry  teamwork, w h i c h  i s  so essential in water  
sector i s  absent. T h e  links between academic institutions and  water sector personnel  are poor with the 
result that the academicians are k e p t  away from impor tan t  practical issues a n d  problems, a n d  water 
managers are not exposed to latest technologies.” To this l i s t  cou ld  b e  added another stark contrast 
with m a n y  other developing countries. T h e  water  professionals of India, with f e w  exceptions, have 
h a d  no protracted exposure to m o d e r n  water  management practices in other  countries, either through 
education, post-graduate training, work experience or even study tours. 
I n d i a n  water sector i s  parochial. 
T h e  weltanschauung of the 
Unquest ionably  the change in the way  in w h i c h  government  water organizations funct ion i s  a t  the 
heart of the needed water  re forms in India. And as these organizations evolve, they d need quite 
d i f ferent  types of water professionals. V i jay Vyas153 notes: “TLU recently water management was 
ident i f ied with i r r igat ion management, and  within irr igation department i r r igat ion engineers dominated 
in c o n t r o h n g  a n d  supervising water resources. E v e n  now r o l e  of other  disciplines i s  not fully 
appreciated.” 
As with most o the r  statements on a country  so complex a n d  large, this i s  not exactly true. In the 1970s 
there was a substantial Ford Foundation-funded p rog ram managed by the H a r v a r d  Water  P rog ram and  
involving I n d i a n  water  professionals from some of the elite institutions (such as the CWC) a n d  
universit ies ( including Roorkee, the D e l h i  Univers i ty  Inst i tu te  for E c o n o m i c  Growth, and  the IITs). A 
substantial a n d  impressive cadre of multi-disciplinary Ind ian  professionals was trained and  returned to 
India. T h e y  describe, thirty years later1S4 a great personal experience that somehow d ied upon their 
return. There are “pull” factors, inc lud ing the spectacular 
opportunit ies in IT w h i c h  most o f  the best students can not resist. And there are “push” factors, 
because bright students do not wan t  to b e  condemned to a l i fe t ime stuck in antiquated government  
institutions. 
T h e  factors appear to b e  complex. 
Whatever the cause, the bottom l ine i s  that a central p a r t  of any r e f o r m  p r o g r a m  would b e  a massive 
investment  in improving the quali ty a n d  diversity of professionals engaged in the water sector. 
T h e  era in w h i c h  m a j o r  
water infrastructure was 
built in I n d i a  was o n e  in 
w h i c h  the hegemonic  
idea was that the 
adverse effects on 
affected people was a 
pr ice that h a d  to b e  p a i d  
for the progress of the 
majori ty. In the 
in tervening decades this 
t radeof f  to b e  false, on 
both ethical a n d  
practical grounds. As 
shown by the World 
Commission on D a m s  
(Figure Goa) there have 
been m a j o r  
improvements in the 
ways in w h i c h  affected 
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people participate in a n d  are affected by m a j o r  water projects. 
I n d i a  remains, a coun t ry  in w h i c h  there are serious issues abou t  how affected people - many  of whom 
are from Scheduled Tr ibes -- are dealt with in m a j o r  infrastructure projects. The re  has been 
considerable progress, especially by modern i z ing  hydropower companies, but there i s  s t iU  a long way 
to go be fo re  practice in I n d i a  can compare favorably to practice in, say, China, where resettlement i s  
considered to b e  "a development opportunity" rather than  a cost155. 
M u c h  o f  the  m a j o r  water infrastructure w h i c h  d b e  built in Ind ia  in c o m i n g  decades includes 
hydropower.  H y d r o p o w e r  projects generate large revenues, and  in most cases the number  of people 
to b e  resettled by hyd ropower  projects in I n d a  d b e  relatively small (Figure boa). I t  i s  therefore a 
doable task, with f e w  d f f i cu l t  tradeoffs, to ensure that loca l  people are ma jo r  beneficiaries o f  such 
projects. This i s  not only ethically the right thing to do, but it means that costly delays in pro ject  
imp lemen ta t i on  can b e  avoided. 
This means that developers need to see the economic and  social development o f  loca l  communi t ies to 
b e  as i m p o r t a n t  as the technical aspects. D a m  developers in I n d a  need to recruit  and  value excellent 
c o m m u n i t y  developers, j u s t  as they recru i t  a n d  value excellent engineers. 
T h e r e  are impor tan t  issues of responsibhty  w h i c h  need to b e  w o r k e d  out between pro ject  developers 
a n d  state governments (to whom non-state developers pay massive royalties o f  12% of the g r o s s  value 
o f  the p o w e r  generated). Prior to pro ject  approval  developers and  state governments must agree on 
who d finance a n d  manage local  development activities so that affected people become the f i r s t  
beneficiaries of such projects. 
T h e  bottom l ine i s  that these n e w  hyd ropower  projects should b e  a big boost to local  economies, and  
that  the aspirat ion of developers a n d  host governments should b e  to make  such projects so attractive 
to local  people that  communit ies compete with each other  to become "host communit ies" for such 
projects. 
As demonstrated in this Report,  the p r imary  water  challenges facing the Union and  State governments 
inc lude - to dramatically i m p r o v e  the quali ty o f  pub l i c  i r r igat ion and  water supply services; to 
modern i ze  the systems for allocating a n d  monitoring surface a n d  groundwater resources a n d  to 
i m p r o v e  the quali ty of the poor a n d  deteriorat ing water-related environment. 
I t  i s  instruct ive to differentiate two di f ferent  water-related environmental challenges. Category O n e  
are issues of env i ronmenta l  degradation that would i m p r o v e  dramatically if water were used  a n d  
managed m o r e  effectively a n d  efficiently; a n d  Category Two are issues that require supplementary 
actions and  resources. 
Two messages c o m e  out of the background paper  on the env i ronment  by George Vamghese15G. First, 
i f  the recommendations dscussed in earlier sections of t h i s  repo r t  -wa te r  entitlements, water pricing, 
accountable institutions, effective regulat ion - were implemented, the major i ty  of water-related 
env i ronmenta l  problems in I n d i a  would b e  ameliorated to a significant degree. Specifically this would 
m e a n  a n d  e n d  to wasteful water use in both agriculture a n d  u r b a n  areas, i t  would mean  reductions in 
mining of aquifers a n d  the consequent qual i ty problems. I t  would also mean  shifting the focus o f  
gove rnmen t  attention away from the tradit ional areas (of constructing a n d  operating water  supply 
infrastructure) and  "creating fiscal space" for invest ing in environmental qual i ty and  o the r  pub l i c  
goods. 
An impor tan t  area where mindsets have to change i s  that o f  instream flows. Any water flowing out o f  
a r iver  basin i s  s t i l l  seen by m a n y  water engmeers as "wastages". But t h i s  i s  changing, with the 
Governmen t  of A n d h r a  Pradesh, for example, recognizing that some flow into the Godavar i  D e l t a  i s  
necessary for preservation of the coastal zone and  the fisheries on w h i c h  substantial numbers o f  
people depend's'. 
G l o b a l  comparisons show that there i s  someth ing l ike a "ICuznets curve" for many  indices of 
env i ronmenta l  quality. As i l lustrated schematically in Figure 61, in the early phases of development 
there i s  typically a sharp decline in environmental quality. As economic growth i s  sustained, however, 
societies place a h igher  value on envi ronmenta l  quality, and  they have m o r e  resources to spend on the 
environment. For m a n y  measures of environmental quality there i s  t hen  a slow but steady c lunb out 
o f  the environmental abyss. T h e  example of the Yamuna  (in Section 2) suggests that  parts of I n d i a  
a n d  for some measures of env i ronmenta l  quality, the long c lunb i s  starting. 
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Ths R e p o r t  (and m a n y  other  documents) make it clear that I n d i a  i s  going to have to make  m a j o r  
changes in the w a y  in w h i c h  i t  develops and  manages i t s  water resources, a n d  that  t h i s  process has to 
start soon. 
Tushaar Shah158 has described several types o f  r e f o r m  init iatives in India, a l l  o f  w h i c h  have “failed to 
p roduce  b r o a d  a n d  deep changes.” T h e y  include: 
“[a] a re fo rm is t  measure i s  proposed, dtscussed and  shelved. T h e  draf t  Groundwate r  Regulat ion bdl i s  
the case in point. I t  i s  tossing a round  for 35 years; yet has found f e w  takers because f e w  pol i t ical 
leaders are WLLling to absorb the transaction costs ( including pol i t ica l  costs) o f  seriously implement ing 
it;” 
‘‘PI a bold re fo rm is t  measure i s  proposed, discussed and  dduted by r e m o v i n g  a l l  I f f i c u l t - t o - i m p l e m e n t  
elements, result ing in paper re fo rm.  India’s Water  Policy announcements of 1987 as we l l  as 2002 are 
good examples. Nothing in the way  India’s water sector f unc t i on  has changed as a result o f  these.” 
“[c] a bold re fo rm is t  measure i s  proposed, discussed a n d  launched but cold-stored in the face of 
popu la r  opposition or insurmountable dlff iculties in implementation. Efforts by many  Ch ie f  Ministers 
to meter  electricity supply to tubewell  i r r igat ion during recent years i s  a good example. So are 
Maharashtra’s 10 year old l a w  to protect  drinking water wells from groundwater overdraft by i r r igat ion 
wells, a n d  A n d h r a  Pradesh’s m o r e  recent land, water a n d  trees act.” 
“[d] a bold re fo rm is t  measure i s  in t roduced and  enforced to p roduce  desired outcomes. Examples o f  
this are rare; Chennai’s groundwater law, w h i c h  has begun to bite, i s  an  example. Ano the r  i s  West  
Bengal’s enforcement  of permi ts  for n e w  electricity connections for i r r igat ion wells. In Chennai‘s case, 
extreme water scarcity has l ikely created popular  support for strong measures. In West  Bengal’s case, 
restrictions began to b e  enforced long before w e l l  i rr igators organized into a p o w e r f u l  po l i t ica l  force.’’ 
“[e] finally, there are examples o f  r e f o r m  ideas that refuse to d ie despite recurr ing evidence of their 
failure to deliver. Part icipatory I r r i ga t i on  Management i s  one  such; I n d i a  has been trying farmer 
management or i r r igat ion for nearly 150 years. W h i l e  there are islands o f  excellence, there i s  no 
evidence of WUAs hav ing  p roduced  sustained per formance improvements on a significant scale. 
S d a r  communi tar ian models  have dominated for decades inst i tu t ional  dlscourse in culture and  
capture fishery, watershed management, water supply systems. Countless studies show that f ishermen 
co-operatives are a lmost  always fronts for contractors, that watershed associations seldom mainta in  
structures after fundmg r u n s  out.’’ 
Review of s d a r  r e f o r m  water r e f o r m  efforts throughout the world suggests tha t  the guiding mantra 
must b e  “principled pragmati~rn”~59. “Principled” because principles matter, a lot. And “pragmatic” 
because principles can only b e  translated into practice by following a step-by-step, persistent process 
w h i c h  “ f i ts ”  with the loca l  culture, people a n d  environment. This section reflects on some of the 
lessons of “principled pragmatism” in water r e f o r m  processes elsewhere160, a n d  from r e f o r m  processes 
in other  sectors in India.  T h e y  are presented in the form o f  “rules” (really suggestions) w h i c h  a 
r e f o r m i n g  government  might keep in mind. 
T h e r e  i s  m u c h  that aspiring water reformers can learn from reforms in other sectors - such as power  
a n d  telecommunications a n d  transport. But it i s  also true that water is,  a n d  i s  perceived to be, 
d i f ferent  from these other  “created” sectors in m a n y  fundamental ways. T h e  resource economist 
K e n n e t h  Boulding’s ode to waterIG1 captures m a n y  of these distinctions very well. 
Water  i s  far from a simple commod i t y  
Water’s a sociological oddity 
Water’s a pasture for science to forage in 
Water’s a m a r k  of our dubious origm 
Water’s a link with a distant futurity 
Water’s a symbol of r i t ua l  purity 
Water  i s  polit ics, water’s rel igion 
Water  i s  j u s t  abou t  anyone’s p igeon 
Water  i f  frightening, water’s endearing 
Water’s a lot m o r e  than  mere engineering 
Water  i s  tragical, water i s  comical 
Water  i s  far from the Pure  Economical. 
This specialness does not mean  that r e f o r m  i s  impossible, or that water reformers can not learn from 
re fo rms  in m a n y  other  areas of pub l i c  service provision. W h a t  i t  does mean  i s  that  there has to b e  a 
part icular emphasis on publ ic  discussion a n d  on addressing the m a n y  concerns w h i c h  people 
legit imately have abou t  water. 
Hab i t s  o f  water  management a n d  use, and  the organizations a n d  practices involved, have evolved over  
t i m e  a n d  have, a t  some time, “f i t ted” the part icular prevalent economic, social and  env i ronmenta l  
circumstances. Change i s  not easy or welcomed, unless there i s  a very strong need for change. 
Abst ract  a n d  idealized statements (such as “river basin management” or “integrated water resources 
management”, the mantra of the international c o m m u n i t y  in recent years) have some resonance with 
professionals, but do not consti tute a reason for organizations and  people to change the w a y  water i s  
managed. 
Because changes are dif f icult  a n d  o f t e n  wrenching, they will b e  undertaken only w h e n  there i s  a 
p o w e r f u l  need a n d  a demonstrated demand  for change. G l o b a l  experience162 shows that the impetus 
for change i s  usually either a serious b reakdown in services, an  env i ronmenta l  f d u r e  w h i c h  affects 
large numbers o f  people, or a fiscal crisis which makes the status quo untenable. 
In I n d i a  today there are a n u m b e r  o f  settings where there i s  a p o w e r f u l  need  a n d  demonstrated 
demand  for change a n d  w h i c h  are, accordingly, the areas where reformers should put their in i t ia l  
efforts. These include: 
- Cities where ind iv idual  households are facing greater a n d  greater diff iculties in m a k i n g  their 
“coping strategies” work, because the groundwater  option i s  no longer tenable. T h e  case of 
Chennai  (described in Box 2) i s  such a case, where the pol i t ica l  pressures are great a n d  the State 
government  i s  be ing  forced to c o n f r o n t  the systemic issues. In some cases these responses are o f  
the “silver bul let” variety (hoping that  inst i tu t ional  changes can b e  avoided by get t ing someone 
else - Union Government ,  as always - to pay for the very costly desalination can resolve the 
problem, for examplel63). But it i s  increasingly clear that  Chennai has to seek a range o f  n e w  
sources o f  supply, as w e l l  as greatly i m p r o v e  the funct ion ing of the distribution cities within the 
city. I t  is, therefore, not surprising that Chennai emerges in several places in this repor t  - in 
establishing inc ip ient  "water markets" for the voluntary transfer of water from farmers to the city; 
in "purchasing" water from the neighbor ing state o f  A n d h r a  Pradesh (albeit in such a poorly- 
specified contract that the c i ty  se ldom gets the water); in mobhzing n e w  forms of finance (from 
the Sai Baba  phi lanthropic  foundation); and  in pushing for n e w  forms o f  inter-state agreements 
on water ( including "river linhng"). T h e  number  o f  cities a n d  towns f a b n g  into s d a r  
circumstances ( includmg the metropol i tan area around Delhi,  where the groundwater table i s  
fal l ing almost a meter  a yearlG4) i s  growing rapidly, and  the pol i t ica l  pressure to find n e w  
inst i tut ional arrangements to mee t  their needs i s  surularly strong. Dea l i ng  with u r b a n  bulk water 
issues i s  thus an  opportunity for r e f o r m  in water allocation practices. 
Fiscal constraints will, sooner or later, constitute a heavy pressure to i m p r o v e  the financial 
performance o f  pub l i c  i r r igat ion a n d  water supply systems, both o f  w h i c h  are m a j o r  sources o f  
r e d  ink. This will force cities to look for lower-cost sources o f  supply - calculations by the 
Hyderabad M e t r o  Water  Supply a n d  Sewerage Board, for instance, show that the city cou ld  buy 
water from farmers in the Singur area at  less than h a l f  of w h a t  i t  would cost to bring water from 
Nagarjunasagar on the IG ishna  River. 
Industr ies in areas where water availabdtty i s  a serious constraint. I t  i s  a commonplace in I n d i a  
that the availability and  quali ty of infrastructure i s  one o f  the ma jo r  threats to the cont inued health 
of the I n d i a n  economy. In the words of the Finance Minister, "India's most glaring deficit i s  i ts 
infrastructure deficit." 165 Unttl recently "infrastructure" meant  ports, railways, roads and  electricity. 
Now there i s  a palpable sense that water i s  joining this l is t ,  with the  two m a j o r  industrial 
associations - FICCI a n d  the C I I  - both becoming very active on water  issues. Industry leaders 
have a m a j o r  r o l e  to p lay in loca l  polit ics, and  can become p o w e r f u l  voices pushing for i m p r o v e d  
water management at  the loca l  level. An example o f  this i s  the p a t h  b r e a h n g  takeover by the 
texttle industry of the T i rapu r  u r b a n  water supply in T a m i l  Nadu'66. 
Agr icu l tura l  areas where water security i s  o f  high importance. Agrar ian I n d i a  i s  undergoing a 
quiet but r a p i d  revo lu t i on  - contract f a rm ing  i s  happening in m a n y  places, high-value crops are 
displacing food grains, aquaculture i s  increasing. In each case the impor tance of a predictable 
supply of water becomes vital. The re  has been a r a p i d  uptake of drip i r r igat ion and  other  n e w  
technologies, but these "exit options" will not b e  sufficient, a n d  there will b e  pressures to a l low 
water to m o v e  m o r e  f lexibly a n d  voluntari ly from low-value to high-value uses. As Mar ia  
Saleth167 details in h s  background paper, m u c h  o f  this now takes place in i n f o r m a l  water markets 
but as agricultural p r o d u c t i o n  moves to scale there will b e  pressures to formalize such 
relationships. Again, this i s  a n  i m p o r t a n t  area where there will b e  demand  for changes in water 
management practices. 
T h e  key message i s  that there are m a n y  windows of opportunity opening up for water re fo rms  w h i c h  
will constitute specific, practical solutions to local  problems. I t  i s  these w h i c h  d show w h a t  can b e  
done, and  will, by p roduc ing  tangible results, consti tute a pressure on, a n d  example for, others to 
follow. T h e  centrality o f  ' L d e m ~ n ~ t r a t i o n "  has been w e l l  stated in a s d a r  context: " W e  don't need 
the government  of I n d i a  to t rans fo rm every aspect o f  In&an  infrastructure," says Ratan Tata, head of 
the Tata companies w h i c h  compr ise India's largest private-sector group. "All you need i s  for a private 
company to take over  one a l rpor t  a n d  t h e n  show by results w h a t  everyone else i s  missing."l@ 
People are, for good reasons, always apprehensive abou t  changes w h i c h  will b e  thrust upon them. 
And w h e n  i t  involves someth ing as sensitive as water, communication, discussion a n d  in fo rma t ion  
become central elements for any r e f o r m  process. W h a t  would t h i s  m e a n  in I d a ?  
Fi rs t ,  there i s  a general tendency for government-led discussions of water po l i cy  to take place a m o n g  
water professionals, the vast major i ty  of whom are engineers, a n d  the vast major i ty  of whom have l i t t le  
exposure to changing g lobal  good practice. This commun i t y  o f  practice i s  SUU - see the discussion in 
Chapter 2 - very  m u c h  a p a r t  o f  the “this will not work in Ind ia ”  school  of thought, one w h i c h  s t d l  
thinks in terms of c o m m a n d  a n d  con t ro l  (Mohile, background paper’bg) a n d  w h i c h  tends to look 
backward, not f o r w a r d  (Sekhar170, background paper). This means that discussions of r e f o r m  are 
o f t e n  severely truncated, and  o f t e n  quite at odds with the reality on the ground. To take j u s t  one 
example -- the engineers o f  Chennai  Metrowater  were emphatic that farmers would never lease their 
water to the c i ty  because i t i s  “against their culture”; once the t rad ing was started the farmers were, 
indeed, unhappy, because almost a l l  farmers wanted to trade some o f  their water (and the c i ty  cou ld  
not buy from all). 
Second, there i s  o f t e n  a n  att i tude by government  that “there should not b e  dscuss ion o f  issues of 
water entit lements or water  re fo rms  because these are too sensitive”. And w h e n  there i s  a forum for 
discussion i t  i s  exactly these issues w h i c h  people wan t  to discuss, because they are sensitive and  central. 
Things are, however, changing. T h e  process fo l l owed  by Suresh Prabhu, the Chai rman o f  the (now- 
disbanded) T a s k  Fo rce  on Linking Rivers was a m o d e l  o f  o p e n  communicat ion in m a n y  respects. 
P rabhu  h e l d  l iterally hundreds o f  publ ic  meetings, throughout the country, to apprise people of wha t  
was at  stake, a n d  to l isten to their concerns and  get their suggestions. This l e d  to enormous amoun t  
of pub l i c  discussion, not j u s t  of linking rivers, but o f  virtual ly a l l  of the m a j o r  challenges facing the 
water sector in India.  I t  put some o f  the most crit ical issues - l ike the  need for a new, modern, 
approach to state water  rights in a federal system - on the front burner. (The ma jo r  caveat was that 
the machinery of government  was not equipped to do i t s  part, a n d  the process suffered from a paucity 
o f  material available to both the Task Force and  the pub l i c  on the specifics of w h a t  was be ing  
proposed, a n d  the results o f  the twenty years of work that the Na t iona l  Water  Deve lopmen t  Authority 
h a d  under taken on this subject.) 
The re  i s  a palpable sense o f  a looming water crisis in India, a n d  an  opportunity a n d  need for the Union 
Governmen t  to undertake a major, multi-stakeholder dialog-cum-campaign. 
Such a campaign would need to engage farmers with the hydro log ica l  reality of the aquifers that they 
currently re ly  on. Farmers know that suicides are increasing because, even with massive electricity 
subsidies, larger a n d  larger numbers o f  farmers simply cannot  a f f o r d  to drdl deeper and  deeper. T h e y  
need  to know that  there i s  simply no alternative to adjusting aggregate abstractions to the level of 
sustainable yield. T h e y  need  to know that o ther  countries have made  such transitions, often, 
remarkably, with posi t ive economic outcomes. T h e y  need  to understand the combinat ion of 
government  regulation, user involvement, and  packages of “virtuous  subside^" that cou ld  reasonably 
substitute for the vicious subsidies that are driving their aquifers (and them) to ruin. T h e y  need to b e  
in fo rmed  that f o r m a l  water entit lements would not h a r m  them, but p rov ide  t h e m  with assets they do 
not now have. 
Irr igators must realize that  in the  fu ture surface supply systems - now so d s c r e d t e d  - must again play 
a central role. This means that  there must b e  a n e w  social compact  for pub l i c  surface i r r igat ion 
systems - a compact  in w h i c h  users have clear entitlements, in w h i c h  they pay for reliable services, 
w h i c h  are p rov ided  by accountable, transparent a n d  eff icient suppliers. Irr igators must also 
understand that with h t e d  resources a n d  growing cities a n d  industries, there must b e  transfers of 
water from the f a r m  to the city. T h e y  must understand tha t  m a n y  countries have developed 
mechanisms for this to happen  in a w a y  that  such transfers are transparent, vo luntary  a n d  to the 
m u t u a l  benefi t  of both parties. T h e y  must understand that if such mechanisms are not put into place, 
t hen  these transfers d take place by stealth, without any compensation. 
Such a campaign would need to engage the u rban  m idd le  class, who have “exited7’ from pub l i c  water 
supply systems by self provision. T h e y  need to understand that with massive u r b a n  growth a n d  rap id  
aquifer deplet ion these “coping strategies” d not work for m u c h  longer. T h e y  need to realize that 
they d, as do people in al l  large cities o f  the world, rely on effective, accountable prov iders of pub l i c  
water  services. T h e y  also need to understand that there are large demands for tax revenues for t rue 
pub l i c  services (such as cleaning up the r ivers w h i c h  have turned into sewers in al l  the cities of India), 
a n d  that  they must b e  d n g  to pay for water supply services (provided, o f  course, the p rov ide r  i s  
eff icient a n d  accountable). 
Such a campaign must engage industry, so that  it understands that the standard industr ial response (of 
“captive generation o f  water”, mostly by groundwater pumping, but also increasingly through 
expensive recycl ing a n d  desalination) i s  inherently h t e d .  Industrialists must exert their considerable 
pressure on government  for putting in place systems - w h i c h  work w e l l  in m a n y  countries - whereby 
they can purchase the water they need from d n g  sellers (often farmers) for whom the value o f  water 
i s  m u c h  lower  than  i t  i s  for industry. 
Such a campaign must engage the leadership of State Governments. T h e y  must b e  made  to realize that 
there i s  a n  alternative to the current anarchic inter-state system. T h e y  must b e  presented with the data 
on the huge costs w h i c h  t h i s  system imposes on al l  parties (upstream and  downstream ahke) a n d  must 
come to understand that there i s  an  alternative for sharing waters (and sometimes sharing benefits) that 
works w e l l  in developed a r id  federal countries a n d  w h i c h  has w o r k e d  w e l l  in InQa’s international water 
treaties with Paktstan and  Bangladesh. 
Finally, a n d  pulling al l  o f  these strands together, such a campaign must engage nat ional  po l i t ica l  
leadership, again with complacency as the greatest enemy. A c o m m o n  commentary on InQa’s 
economy was, in the memorable words o f  a Finance M in i s te r  “every budget  i s  a gamble on the 
monsoon”171. A feature o f  InQa’s recent economic growth was captured in a newspaper h e a d h e  
stat ing that “India’s economy i s  no longer  a gamble on the monsoons”, noting that InQa’s growth in 
the b a d  monsoon year of 2004/5 h a d  been reduced only by about  2% (to 6% overal l  growth). Pol i t ica l  
leaders must b e  aware that this m a y  b e  a b r i e f  a n d  temporary escape from hydrological constraints, and  
that  unless the economy i s  put on a sustainable water p la t form,  the “water brake” on the economy - 
worhng through the industrial, agricultural a n d  u r b a n  economies as described above -- d become 
endemic rather than sporaQc. T h e  urgency of this t ransformat ion i s  accentuated by the  hkely  effects 
o f  c h a t e  change. T h e  best project ions suggest, for example, that in the western Himalayas, where 
prec ip i ta t ion and  snow deposit ion are relatively low, glaciers are particularly vulnerable a n d  are l ikely to 
result in, for example, a runoff “windfall” during the nex t  couple of decades, f o l l owed  by flow 
reductions w h i c h  m a y  b e  o f  the order  of 20% for the Ganga at  Haridwar, for example, by the year 
2100. As for so m a n y  other  reasons, t h i s  requires the establishment o f  a water management system 
w h i c h  i s  f lexible a n d  robust. 
Ideas l i ke  “river basin planning” and  “integrated water resources management” have sound conceptual 
roots, a n d  appeal to technicians, m a n y  o f  whom perceive implementat ion o f  these ideas as the p a t h  
towards better water management. Use fu l  as they are, in the words of the Operations Evaluations 
Depar tmen t  o f  the World B a n k  “progress takes place m o r e  through ‘unbalanced’ development  than  
comprehensive p lann ing  approaches”172. As K a r l  Marx (had h e  addressed the subject!) might have 
said it as follows: water  r e f o r m  i s  a Qalectic, not mechanical process. 
Improvemen ts  in water management- occur w h e n  there are tensions (between users, between users 
a n d  the environment, between the  water agencies and  the finance ministries) w h i c h  can no longer b e  
accommodated within the exist ing inst i tut ional arrangements. But reforms do not lead to “mukti” 
(l iberation for ever) - they simply mean  that “lower-order tensions” are replaced by higher-order 
tensions. 
Aga in  T a d  N a d u  prov ides a usefu l  i l lustration. State-wide approaches to water r e f o r m  have b d t  
some impor tan t  building blocks, but have made few contr ibutions to actually resolv ing specific 
problems. These general re forms therefore lack legitimacy a n d  “demonstrat ion power”. But w h e n  
the textde manufacturers of T i rapu r  actually resolve the p r o b l e m  o f  their own water service, this has a 
p o w e r f u l  demonstrat ion effect. I t  does not mean  that “water problems in T i rapu r  are now over”, but 
it means that  as the issue of get t ing water delivered to industries and  households i s  largely resolved, the 
focus wdl inevitably and  appropriately shift to the “higher-order” problems of ensuring adequate 
supplies of bulk water a n d  of dealing with water pollution from the town a n d  industries. 
Lawrence Summers has observed173 that the great dist inct ion between developing countries w h i c h  have 
progressed over  the last 30 years a n d  those that have stagnated i s  not the abdity to formulate perfect 
policies, but the abdity to translate reasonable policies into actions on the ground. Paraphrasing Bdl 
Clinton’s famous election mantra, “it’s implementation, stupid”. 
And so i t  i s  with water in I n d i a  a n d  elsewhere - policies a n d  recommendations abound, some very 
good (such as the recommendations of the 1991 Vaidyanathan Commission). But as Tushaar Shah174 
has emphasized., w h a t  matters i s  ident i fy ing improvements that can actually b e  implemented. 
Any journey requires a knowledge o f  the destination and  a r o a d  m a p  for get t ing there. H o w e v e r  the 
journey i tse l f  i s  taken step by step. And so i t  i s  with water re fo rms  - there must b e  a l ong - te rm vision, 
but immediate attention must b e  on putting f E s t  things f i r s t  - to sequencing a n d  priori t izat ion. T h e  
practice o f  (aborted) water r e f o r m  by government  agencies in I n d i a  (reinforced by some of i t s  external 
supporters) has o f t e n  been to m a k e  everything (and therefore nothing) a priority. A m a j o r  recent 
water commiss ion for an  advanced state in I n d i a  came up with a set o f  over  340 “recommendations”, 
ranging from m a j o r  legal changes to w h a t  c rop  should b e  grown in w h a t  district. S d a r l y  a ma jo r  
1998 World B a n k  repo r t  on the water sector in India175 made 170 recommendations, a l l  presumably to 
b e  done  simultaneously. 
A relevant example of a p r inc ip led  but pragmatic approach to sequencing relates to that  o f  “cost 
recovery” for irrigation services. Cost recovery is, of course, an  appropriate aspiration, but it i s  almost 
never  the place to start. Farmers will not a n d  should not, pay  for the costs o f  poor services w h i c h  are 
delivered by inef f ic ient  a n d  co r rup t  agencies. T h e  f i r s t  step must b e  to address the  issues o f  
accountabil ity and  efficiency (as described earlier in t h i s  report). O n c e  services are i m p r o v e d  a n d  there 
i s  t r u s t  in the service provider, t hen  ta r i f f  increases to bring revenues in h e  with costs becomes 
possible. As shown in Figure 60 on the u r b a n  water supply example in Guinea, Afr ica, pub l i c  funding 
wiU generally b e  necessary, on a dec l in ing basis, to “finance the transition”. 
Water  r e f o r m  processes are never short, decisive affairs, A rev iew of the experience of r i c h  countries 
by the OECD176 shows that  progress in water re forms takes place over  decades, not years, and  that 
even the m o s t  advanced of countries is only about  h a l f  way  towards the ideal forms of water 
management described in declarations o f  i n ten t  by the countries themselves a n d  by the international 
community177. In the case o f  a vast, federal democratic coun t ry  l ike India, as described by the D e p u t y  
Chai rman of the  P lann ing  Commission178 “pluralistic and  highly part icipatory processes forces one to 
gradualism. . . .” 
T h e  world ove r  citizens are either concerned or skeptical abou t  announcements o f  “reform”, with 
some advocating abol i t ion o f  the word from the publ ic  po l i cy  lexicon. “By casting their agendas as 
reforms, po l i t ica l  advocates don’t aim to stimulate debate a n d  dscussion. T h e y  a i m  to suppress it. T h e y  
a im to stigmatize adversaries as nasty, wrong-headed, selfish or mis in formed.  T h e  t rouble i s  that as a 
society, w e  need  debates ove r  principles and  practicality. All re fo rms  are not desirable, a t  least not to 
everyone.”l79 
T h e  corol lary i s  that pub l i c  support d only b d d  i f  there are visible, tangible results from the  changes 
w h c h  are advocated. T h e  key i s  “show me”. 
I t  certainly can he lp  to show opinion leaders that these changes have been affected in other  countries. 
T h e  fo rma t ion  of the famous F rench  R ive r  Basin management system in the 1960s was strongly 
influenced by the successful experience o f  the Ruhrverband, established in neighbor ing Germany  in 
1916. And the  pol i t ica l  leaders of the water r e f o r m  process in Braz i l  ascribe high impor tance to a 
study tour o f  M e x i c o  a n d  Colorado at  a crit ical t ime. But there i s  nothing l i ke  demonstrat ion on h o m e  
territory. And since changes are always dif f icult ,  i t  i s  imperative to start changes where condit ions are 
propitious - where there i s  a rea l  demand for change, where there are champions, and  where i t i s  
possible to show results. For example, there were real gains from the  organization o f  Wate r  User  
Associations in A n d h r a  Pradesh in recent years, gains w h i c h  were appreciated by visiting Haryana 
farmers who found in the AP “success’’ some inspi ra t ion for s d a r  efforts in their h o m e  statelgo. 
On the central but complex issue of water entit lements the  embryonic  experience in Chennai  (Box 2) 
was a relatively “low hanging fruit”. So too would the use o f  water entit lements to resolve the water 
confl icts a f f l ic t ing the Bharatpur  Bird Sanctuary. I f  and  w h e n  these a n d  other  “easy cases” mature, 
t hen  they will p rov ide  a beacon for tackhng the bigger a n d  m o r e  d i f f icu l t  challenges of water 
entitlements. 
Almost any progress i s  progress worth making, whether  or not it measures up to some abstract g lobal  
notion o f  “excellent”. T h e  idea that practice can go from terr ible to per fect  in one fe l l  swoop i s  one  
that i s  attractive to outsiders a n d  i s  sometimes adopted by financial agencies (so-called Volvo instead 
of Volkswagen standards181). But i t  f i t s  poorly with the one-step-at-a-time gradualism w h i c h  
characterizes water reforms, everywhere. 
Consider the case of subsides for electricity for groundwater. T h e r e  i s  no doubt that this i s  a p r o b l e m  
w h c h  must b e  addressed, a n d  that  the longer it takes to address the deeper the groundwater, the 
greater the subsides and  the m o r e  d i f f icu l t  i t  will b e  to find a way back. But the fact i s  that farmers are 
now so heavi ly dependent on electricity subsides that drastic e h n a t i o n  o f  these would simply put 
m a n y  farmers out o f  business (see F igure 62), and, for this reason, b e  pol i t ical ly infeasible. T h e  task 
must b e  to address this issue on mu l t i p le  fronts, w h i c h  in this case would inc lude an  improvemen t  in 
the  quali ty o f  electricity, the appropriate p r i c ing  of the low-opportunity-cost electricity w h i c h  farmers 
use, a n d  the i n t roduc t i on  o f  a set of “virtuous subsid~es” (as was done in Mexico, for example, in 
refurb ish ing inef f ic ient  equipment and  for adopt ion of water-efficient technologies) as electricity 
subsides are reduced. 
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Figure 62: Impact o f  eliminating electricity subsidies on marginal farmers 
in Haryana I 
Source: Bhatia 2005 
A good example o f  the “the best i s  the enemy of the  good” ru le  at  work i s  the justly-famous Indus 
Treaty, w h i c h  has, since i t s  inception, h a d  i t s  detractors in both I n d a  and  Pahs tan  as “not fair”182. 
Confronting the Pali lstani detractors of the Treaty  Ayub K h a n  gave advice w h i c h  i s  relevant for a l l  
would-be water reformers: “..very o f t e n  the best i s  the enemy o f  the good a n d  in this case w e  have 
accepted the good after careful a n d  realistic appreciat ion o f  our entire overal l  situation.. ... the  basis of 
this agreement i s  real ism and  pragmatism.. ..”I83 
T h e  challenges w h i c h  I n d a  faces in water management are environmentally, socially, a n d  technically 
complex. There  i s  a justifiable, h u m a n  fantasy that  there i s  a single “silver bul let” w h i c h  will “solve 
the problem”. In some parts of the I n d a  water  establishment today there i s  s d l  fa i th  that  the old 
remedy  - m o r e  dams, and  variants o f  this - will solve a l l  water problems a n d  should b e  g v e n  near- 
exclusive priority. In situations where this remedy  i s  patently impractical, t hen  there are a host of 
o the r  “supply side” solutions ranging from high-tech (cloud seedmg and  desalination) to low-tech 
(rainwater harvesting and  desi l t ing of ancient tanks), most o f  w h i c h  have an  impor tan t  n iche but are 
falsely marke ted  as “the solution”. 
Take  the case of ‘‘restoration o f  tradit ional water bodes”. The re  i s  a great attract ion to the notion 
that  redscovery  of “Dying Wisdom” (the t i t le o f  a book184 by And Aganval  a n d  Sunita N a r a i n  of the 
D e l h i  Centre for Science a n d  the Env i ronmen t )  will p rov ide  the cures to the water IUS that aff l ict 
m o d e r n  India. There  i s  a large a n d  active movement  w h i c h  sees commun i t y  “rainwater harvesting” as 
the solution, everywhere a n d  for a l l  prob lems (almost). Deeper  investigations show that  i t  isn’ t  quite 
so. D a v i d  Mosse’s detailed anthropological investigation1*5 into the social ecology of the tanks of 
southern I n d i a  d r a w  a m u c h  m o r e  complex picture, showing that the tanks were in steep decline long 
be fo re  the advent of canal i r r igat ion (the ostensible cause o f  the loss of tradit ional wisdom) and  that 
they were a so lut ion we l l  suited to a particular demographic and  social si tuation w h i c h  has long gone. 
S d a r l y ,  objective evaluations (described earlier) o f  watershed management efforts in I n d i a  show 
some, but rather  h t e d ,  success. Applying the power fu l  words of Judith Tender186 from another 
context  (the analysis o f  Social Funds) “The reason for (their) popularity . . .relates to their effectiveness 
as a p o w e r f u l  “development narrative”. In environments with great ambigui ty  as to cause a n d  effect, 
such narratives o f fe r  conv inc ing a n d  simple explanations for the causes of certain problems and  
p rov ide  appealingly straightforward blueprints for action. Because o f  their p o w e r  as narrative, these 
accounts are rather invulnerable to empir ical evidence that challenges their accuracy”. 
T h e  point i s  not that these community-based efforts have no ro le  to play - they do, a n d  an  impor tan t  
one  at that in some circumstances. T h e  point here i s  that they can never  b e  a “silver bullet” in a n  
increasingly urbanized a n d  indust r ia l  society w h i c h  needs a host o f  d i f ferent  kinds of actions. 
W h a t  i s  clear i s  that  the most effect ive responses to the water challenges in I n d i a  are going to vary very 
widely  and  are going to require a host of interventions, of a l l  d i f ferent  scales. As suggested by the 
“Stages of water development” in Figure 1, the ma jo r  inst rument  i s  not going to b e  infrastructure 
alone, but management suppor ted by both old and  n e w  types o f  infrastructure. “Management” i s  
going to mean  systemic sets o f  legislation, capacity building, organizational change a n d  the use of 
entit lement, p r i c ing  a n d  regulatory instruments. And it i s  not going to b e  the task o f  government  
alone, but concerted and  re in fo rc ing  actions by a host o f  stakeholders. But that there were a silver 
bul let!  
A corol lary o f  the previous ru le  i s  that  there i s  a tendency w h e n  the silver bu l le t  does not work (mixing 
metaphors badly) to throw the baby  out with the bathwater. D a m s  (or rainwater harvesting or tank 
restoration) are propagated with missionary zeal, a n d  w h e n  they do not del iver communi t ies to the 
p romised  land, they are st igmatized a n d  i t argued that they should no longer  b e  pa r t  o f  the “toolkit”. 
Take  the example of dams. T h e r e  i s  an  energetic a n d  resourceful anti-dam lobby in I d a .  Spurred by 
legitimate issues of inadequate resettlement, these groups - with their message magn i f i ed  by Arundha t i  
Roy’s power fu l  prose187 -- have iden t i f i ed  dams as one o f  the u l t imate evils on the world. There  is, in 
their minds, no d a m  w h i c h  ever should have been built in I n d i a  -- even Bhakral88, w h i c h  as described 
earlier, has been shown to have brought such massive benefits to the peop le  o f  no r thwes t  I n d i a  and  
beyond. 
Take  another example, that  of Wate r  Users’ Associations. T h e  idea o f  W U A s  t ransforming i r r igat ion 
services has been a n d  is, a p o w e r f u l  a n d  persistent one, despite mounting a n d  long-standing evidence 
that  reality i s  a bit m o r e  complicated. T h e  Vaidyanathan Commission of  1991, for example, reports 
that  “there i s  a general consensus that e f for ts  to actually organize farmers’ groups a n d  make  t h e m  
part icipate have  not really made m u c h  of an  impact”. Sinular evidence from around  the world 
notwithstanding, the idea has h a d  remarkable staying power  in the g lobal  water community, again, 
“because o f  the i r  p o w e r  as narrative, these accounts are rather invulnerable to empir ical evidence”. 
For some the case i s  clear: the idea o f  WUAs i s  part ly a cruel  t r ick  played so that the m o r e  d i f f icu l t  
issues - of rea l  r e f o r m  of the i r r igat ion agencies - can b e  avoided. But the fact i s  that organized 
farmers & play a r o l e  in al l  successful i r r igat ion schemes throughout the world, but only as a pa r t  of a 
set of re in fo rc ing  instruments, w h i c h  always include water entit lements and  accountable service 
delivery agencies. T h e  W A S  should not b e  thrown out with the bathwater but propagated as pa r t  o f  
a n  overal l  r e f o r m  package. T h e  dist inct ion between necessary and  suff icient condit ions for progress i s  
a v i t a l  one. 
Pol i t ic ians m a y  not b e  the most revered figures in I n d i a  (or elsewhere), but i t  i s  they who are “in the 
game”, who are elected to make  crucial tradeoffs, and  who have the  cri t ical ro le  as judges and  
champions o f  re fo rm.  A discussion with polit icians who have l e d  water-related reforms throughout 
the world189 found general agreement in a “rule” articulated by D igv i j ay  Singh, then-Chief Min is ter  o f  
Madhya  Pradesh: “If i t  i s  to work, water r e f o r m  must b e  good polit ics”. The re  i s  evidence that this 
was, indeed, the  case for community-based watershed management projects for Mr. Singh in Madhya  
Pradesh. And the intensive fo rma t ion  of W‘As in A n d h r a  Pradesh was certainly pol i t ical ly usefu l  to 
Mr. Chandrababu Naidu in A n d h r a  Pradesh, because farmers perceived this to b e  a r e f o r m  w h i c h  
m o v e d  in the right h e c t i o n .  
T h e  bottom l ine  i s  that  an  essential element o f  any r e f o r m  p r o g r a m  i s  that  i t  must b e  v iewed as a 
“good thing” by suff icient numbers o f  people that they will consider voting for the pol i t ic ian who 
championed the  reform. 
There  are two i m p o r t a n t  riders to this “rule”. First, it i s  o f t e n  quite d i f f i cu l t  to judge how actions 
relat ing to water are be ing  received by citizens. For example, anyone reading the English language 
newspapers o f  I n d i a  would perceive that the Sardar Sarovar Pro ject  on the Narmada  R ive r  i s  almost 
universally opposed. H o w e v e r  a detailed analysis of press coverage by Sussex University190 showed 
that  the p ic ture was considerably m o r e  nuanced. “Envi ronmenta l  debate in I n d i a  i s  governed by the 
language in w h i c h  i t  i s  presented a n d  understood. T h e  message c o m i n g  out of India, most l ikely to b e  
heard by the developed world, comes out of i t s  English language media, representing j u s t  2% of the 
populat ion. This elite group has adapted a pro-env i ronment  stance a n d  i s  m o r e  l ikely to protest  
against n e w  dams .... But inside India, the far bigger loca l  language media representing the vast 
major i ty  and  poore r  sections of society are expressing the heart-felt c r y  for development” 
Second and  related, i s  the fact that on any r e f o r m  proposal  there wlll b e  a cacophony o f  voices. 
M o n t e k  Ahluwalialgl has described this well: “Sometimes I feel as i f  there’s a completely false 
assumption that i f  only you talk to everybody you will get a n  agreement . Only on a very boring issue 
or in a very boring coun t ry  would you find that. To my mind the debate . . .. D o e s  not eliminate the 
need for poli t ical r isk . .  . At the e n d  the government  has to take the risk . . ..” In short, wh i l e  a l l  voices 
must b e  heard, m u c h  greater weight  must b e  given to the voices of those who have responsibhty  and  
face the voters, a n d  less we igh t  to those who are self-appointed or who represent small  special 
interests. 
T h e  World B a n k  has been invo lved  in the water sector in I n d i a  for 50 years a n d  has l en t  about  $14 
bdllon for water  projects in India192. T h e  very f i r s t  Bank-f inanced project, the D a m o d a r  Valley 
Project, app roved  in 1954, was inspi red by the TVA model, and  aimed at  building water  infrastructure 
a n d  inst i tu t ions w h i c h  would p rov ide  a springboard for economic growth a n d  pove r t y  reduct ion in a 
poor region. 
From the Bank‘s perceptive this was (and would b e  today) an  ideal pro ject  - i t  was a vehicle for 
bringing the best ideas from other  countries a n d  adapting t h e m  to India; i t  was a comb ina t ion  o f  
infrastructure a n d  inst i tut ional developments. 
T h e r e  were ve ry  clear benefits. T h e  pro ject  did finance infrastructure w h i c h  has p r o v i d e d  power, flood 
pro tec t i on  a n d  i r r igat ion services to the r e g o n .  And the pro ject  was instrumental in the  fo rma t ion  of 
the  D a m o d a r  Val ley Corporat ion in the 1950s. 
But there were  failures, too. T h e  DVC tu rned  out to b e  qui te  d i f ferent  from the TVA, with states 
c lawing back  m a j o r  activities a n d  the DVC ending up as basically a p o w e r  generation company  with 
l i t t le  responsibhty  for water managementl”. And there was no demonstrat ion effect, with no other 
r i ve r  basin organizations following the DVC model. (In fact not a single r iver  basin author i ty  has been 
established under  the 1956 R ive r  Boards Act.) 
In m a n y  ways the D a m o d a r  Valley Pro ject  presaged h a l f  a century of B a n k  experience with water 
development  a n d  management in India, a n  experience in w h i c h  the def in ing quality i s  t he  contrast 
between lofty aspirations and  modes t  achievements. 
Paraphrasing A k h t e r  H a m e e d  Khan,  the great Pahs tan i  reformer194, i t  might b e  said that  the Bank‘s 
i nvo l vemen t  in water in I n d i a  has been o n e  in w h i c h  the B a n k  “has chased the r a i n b o w  of well- 
f unc t i on ing  institutions and  dreaded the n ightmare o f  fur ther  inst i tut ional decay.. .. a n d  that  only the 
boldest  a m o n g  u s  can say that w e  m a y  not b e  s d a r l y  engaged tomorrow”. 
O v e r  the last f ive years there have been two m a j o r  reviews, one  by the B a n k  in the context  o f  the n e w  
Wate r  Strategy1g5 a n d  one  by the Operat ions Eva lua t i on  Depar tment .  In both cases the reviews 
inc luded m a j o r  consultations with a w i d e  variety of stakeholders in India. Since these earlier reports 
are published, a n d  the results presented in detai l  in the background paper by Malik, in this R e p o r t  i t  i s  
necessary only to summarize the m a i n  messages a n d  lessons. 
First, there are dif ferent perspectives abou t  the in f luence of the World B a n k  on the water  sector in 
India. On the one h a n d  there i s  the v i e w  that  since the B a n k  accounts for only between 6% (Sekhar, 
background paper) and  lOYO196 o f  w h a t  i s  spent in the water  sector in India, the B a n k  i s  a minor actor. 
On the other  hand, since most o f  water expenditure by the Union and  State governments in I n d i a  i s  
for f i xed  costs (especially personnel) t he  B a n k  funds a m u c h  larger portion o f  discretionary 
expenditure and  of n e w  investments. And the  B a n k  has been, and  continues to be, by far t he  biggest 
external donor, accounting for 72% of donor lend ing  a n d  grants for water’”. Where  there i s  general 
agreement i s  that, as i t  should be, the Union a n d  State Governmen ts  are the ones who determine w h a t  
will happen and  how i t  d happen. T h e  Bank’s r o l e  i s  necessarily a n d  p roper l y  one o f  trying to put 
ideas on the table, to b e  a par tner  to ef for ts  a t  improving performance. This i s  an  i m p o r t a n t  ro le  but 
necessarily a n d  proper ly  c o n t r o l  i s  in the hands o f  the elected governments at  the nat ional  a n d  state 
levels. 
Second, mirroring a s d a r  pat tern for World B a n k  lendmg worldwide'", there was a sharp decline 
(Figure 63) in the proportion of lending going to water projects - from 25% in the early 1990s to 
abou t  h a l f  that  amoun t  over  the last f ive years. 
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Figure 63: The decline and changing composition of World Bank 
lending fo r  water in India 
There  was also a marked  shift in B a n k  lending (see F igure 63) out of complex areas w h i c h  were 
perceived to b e  "reputationally risky" for the B a n k  (especially in the light o f  the  controversies 
surroundmg the Bank's engagement with the Sardar Sarovar Project). The re  was no lendmg for 
hyd ropower  (with the last pro ject  f inanced by the B a n k  be ing  approved in 1987, the 1500 mw run of  
the r iver  N a t h p a  Jhakri Pro ject  on the Sutlej River). The re  were sharp reductions in lendtng for 
irrigation, u rban  water supply a n d  stand-alone water resources project, with the only increases being in 
the uncontentious area o f  ru ra l  water supply. There  was great dissatisfaction a m o n g  government  
officials in I n d l a  who believed, as &d developing countries throughout the  world199, that  the B a n k  was 
walk ing away from the area where the needs were great (infrastructure) a n d  where the B a n k  h a d  a 
strong comparative advantage, namely in addressing complex, d f f i c u l t  issues such as water  resources 
development and  management. A subsequent ma jo r  "global poll" of opinion-makers throughout the 
world reaf f i rmed - see Figure 64 for South As ia  - that  this i s  where countr ies perceived the greatest 
need, and  the strongest case for World B a n k  involvement. 
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Figure 64: The "global poll" results fo r  South Asia, showing tha t  
infrastructure and education were the two areas which were of high 
Third, these reviews, earlier m a j o r  analytic assessments by the World B a n k  in 1991200 a n d  1998201 a n d  
the assessment in the twelve background papers by eminent  I n d i a n  professionals have concluded that 
the infrastructure constructed with B a n k  funding has made  m a j o r  contr ibutions to India's food 
security, energy p roduc t i on  a n d  u rban  development, but that  all efforts a t  improving insti tut ional 
per formance have been only modest ly  successful, a t  best. A f e w  quotes from the latest OED repor t  
give the f lavor: 
a) of persistent inst i tu t ional  shortcomings 
". . . per formance o f  completed B a n k  water projects has been unsatisfactory because of 
over-optimist ic appraisal" 
". . . the states' unwill ingness to tackle institutional a n d  financial reform.." 
" . . .Much s t d l  remains to b e  done  on developing sustainable mechanisms for water 
al location and  management.. ." 
". . .sooner or later state governments must address subsidy issues and  right-size pub l i c  
sector agencies to increase efficiency". 
"For fiscal r e f o r m  to succeed, sooner or later state governments must address reducing 
the size of pub l i c  sector agencies and  ensuring good governance that allows the private 
sector, i nc lud ing  users' groups, to take a greater stake in water p lanning and  
management . " 
Of recommendations by the B a n k  that  specified large numbers of priori t ies a n d  &d not focus 
on a practical r e f o r m  path: 
"The Bank's 1998 rev iew lays out a very ambit ious a n d  detailed agenda that ... contains 
m o r e  than  80 nat ional  and  intersectoral recommendations a imed at the central and  state 
governments, a n d  m o r e  than 170 for the main subsectors. 
"institutions a n d  practices that  have remained unchanged for decades are to b e  tackled 
a n d  changed quick ly  - a n  approach to inst i tu t ional  re fo rms  that f i e s  in the face o f  
inst i tu t ional  realities a n d  the pol i t ica l  wdl such as they exist in I n d i a  today." 
b) 
0 “The Bank risks spreadmg i t s  resources too thinly to b e  effective. A m o r e  selective a n d  
incremental approach to key po l i cy  a n d  inst i tut ional re forms might b e  m o r e  productive.” 
of a slow m o v e m e n t  away from a normat ive approach to one w h i c h  focuses on incentives a n d  
the pol i t ica l  economy of change: 
0 “The 1998 rev iew  found that  l i t t le h a d  changed since 1991: “in recent years there has been 
realization and  pol icy  pronouncements regarding the need to address these problems; 
however  the policies have not been translated into action.” 
“There has been headway on r e f o r m  of water institutions in the f e w  reformist  states 
where there i s  po l i t ica l  d to change after decades o f  malaise - but in some the reforms 
appear to b e  cosmetic.” 
“The missing element i s  how to ident i fy  a n d  p r o m o t e  incentives that  d lead to 
sustainable and  effective reform.  Only then  can the crit ical nex t  step b e  achieved: agreeing 
on the three to f ive short to m e d m m - t e r m  priorit ies on w h i c h  to focus efforts.” 
c) 
0 
The Bank”s, new Water S4mtekgy 
In paral lel with these reviews of World B a n k  engagement in water in India, and  in f luenced by them, 
the World B a n k  developed a n e w  Water  Strategy, w h i c h  was approved by the Board of the B a n k  in 
2003, a n d  set a n e w  duec t ion  for B a n k  engagement in water throughout the world. T h e  m a i n  
messages o f  the 2003 Water  Strategy are: 
Water  resources management a n d  development i s  central to sustainable growth a n d  pove r t y  
reduct ion a n d  therefore o f  central impor tance to the m i s s i o n  of the World B a n k  
Most developing countries need to b e  active both in management AND development  o f  water 
resources infrastructure. 
T h e  main management challenge i s  not a vision of integrated water resources management but a 
“pragmatic but principled” approach that  respects principles of efficiency, equity a n d  sustainabhty, 
but recognizes that water resources management i s  intensely political, and  that r e f o r m  requires the 
art iculat ion of priorit ized, sequenced, practical a n d  patient interventions. 
T h e  World B a n k  needs to assist countr ies in developing a n d  mainta in ing appropriate stocks of 
wel l -per forming hydraul ic infrastructure a n d  in mobhing publ ic  a n d  pr ivate financing, wh i l e  
meet ing env i ronmenta l  a n d  social standards. 
the World B a n k  d re-engage with high-reward/high-r isk hydraul ic infrastructure, using a m o r e  
effective business model. 
T h e  Bank‘s water assistance must b e  tai lored to coun t ry  circumstances a n d  b e  consistent with the 
overarching Country Assistance Strategies. 
T h e  World B a n k  has recently commiss ioned m a j o r  surveys of opinion leaders to he lp  identi fy areas 
w h i c h  were o f  high development priority a n d  where the B a n k  was perceived as hav ing  a comparative 
advantage. Confuming the results of the  “global poll” discussed earlier, these surveys (Figure 65 
shows the South Asian poll o f  2005; the I n d i a n  poll o f  2004 p roduced  very s d a r  results) again 
showed the areas associated with water to b e  of high priority and  high B a n k  effectiveness. 
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In September 2004, the 
Government of Ind ia  
a n d  the World Bank 
finalized a Country 
Assistance Strategy, the 
"contract" w h i c h  spells 
out indicative Bank 
lendmg for the period 
2004-2008. The C A S  
represents a dramatic 
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Figure 66: World Bank re-engagement with water in India 
B a n k  expecting to sharply increase i r r igat ion and  water resources lending, and  re-engaging with large 
hyd ropower  projects. 
T h e  2004 CAS makes two other  impor tan t  strategic shifts w h i c h  affect water. In the last CAS per iod  
the B a n k  focused heavily on “reforming states” w h i c h  were mostly in the south and  mostly among  the 
bet ter -of f  a n d  better-governed. (In this per iod  about  50% of B a n k  water l endmg w e n t  to the southern 
states, who conta in  only 20% of  the population.) Now the Governmen t  and  the B a n k  have agreed 
that  the B a n k  WLLl re-engage m o r e  intensively with the poore r  states (where needs are greater but 
governance i s  also worse). This adjustment i s  understandable, but i t  also implies even greater 
dif f icult ies for the inst i tut ional r e f o r m  agenda w h i c h  lies at the heart of B a n k  engagement. This i s  so 
because i t  i s  unrealistic to expect water governance to b e  good w h e n  overal l  governance i s  poor; and  
thus i t  i s  l ike ly  that  the already-diff icult task o f  re fo rm ing  water governance ( w h c h  has not been very 
successful even in the “advanced states”) wdl become m o r e  d i f f icu l t  s d .  In the current CAS, then  
“rules o f  engagement” for d i f ferent  sectors have replaced “focused states” as the p r imary  f i l ter w h i c h  
will determine whether  or not the B a n k  engages. T h e  “rules of engagement” for the various water- 
related sectors are as follows: 
I r r i ga t i on  - de- l inkmg irr igation services and  water resources management, r e f o r m  o f  
i r r igat ion agencies, strengthening cost recovery, regulation, beneficiary participation, increased 
p roduc t i v i t y  of water, water entit lements. 
U r b a n  water a n d  sanitation: Utlllty Reform,  improving Services to the poor, and  private 
sector participation; 
R u r a l  water a n d  sanitation: Cont inue demand responsive approach, moving from pilots to 
scale through Central ly Funded  Schemes (SWAPS); 
H y d r o p o w e r  - O n e  element in an  overal l  energy program; B a n k  will engage with hydro that 
has h t e d  env i ronmenta l  a n d  social impacts; 
Wate r  Resources - Deve lop ing  i n fo rma t ion  systems, rehabil i tat ing and  modern iz ing m a j o r  
infrastructure, watershed management, water rights, capacity building. 
T h e  analysis in this R e p o r t  suggests that these “filters” are generally appropriate, with minor 
adjustments. T h e  fest  adjustment would b e  to de-emphasise some o f  the recommendations on 
organizational form (such as d e - l i n h n g  agencies responsible for i r r igat ion and  water resources 
management) and  putting greater emphasis on (a) instruments, i nc lud ing  entitlements, contracts 
between prov iders a n d  users, transparent monitoring a n d  benchmarhng,  and  regulat ion and  (b) on 
char t ing sequenced, pr ior i t ized paths for m a h n g  pragmatic improvements.  
As par t  o f  the process i nvo l ved  in developing this report,  the M i n i s t r y  of Water  Resources h e l d  two 
m a j o r  consultat ion with the Ministry o f  Finance and  other  Union Ministries, a n d  with State 
Governments, to discuss the evolv ing r o l e  o f  the Bank.  T h e  second of these consultations cu lminated 
in a set of agreed “recommendations”202. T h e r e  was strong endorsement of the re-engagement o f  the 
B a n k  in the full range o f  water-related issues, i nc ludmg the big a n d  the complex. There  was 
agreement that the government  needed to comp lemen t  i t s  tradit ional focus on infrastructure with a 
growing emphasis on management. I t  was agreed that  the B a n k  needed to continue to emphasize 
inst i tu t ional  re form,  a n d  m u c h  discussion (and d i f fer ing views) of some of the key instruments such as 
water entit lements a n d  user charges. I t  was agreed that  the B a n k  would consider a variety o f  capital 
investments (in flood control,  tank rehabil itation, comp le t i on  of i r r igat ion projects, recharge etc.) in the  
context  o f  state projects, with the crit ical test be ing  the  economic and  social returns to such 
investments. 
Finally, two comments by senior Governmen t  o f  I n d i a  officials at recent consultations h e l d  by the 
G o v e r n m e n t  of I n d i a  capture m u c h  of the essence o f  this Report.  
T h e  M e m b e r  of the P lann ing  Commission responsible for water and  energy stated: "when w e  do 
address management problems w e  s t i l l  think only in terms of instruments of c o m m a n d  a n d  control, 
not in terms of incentives that affect the behavior o f  uses, and  the instruments - usufructory  rights, 
prices, compensation - that affect this behavior."203 
And the  Secretary o f  Finance s tated "the government  will request B a n k  involvement  only where the 
B a n k  adds value by bringng n e w  knowledge and  contr ibut ing to r e f o r m  processes" 
These senior Governmen t  o f  I n d i a  officials captured we l l  the essence of this R e p o r t  - o f  the 
challenges which face In&a as it faces a n  uncertain water future, a n d  the World B a n k  as it tries to b e  
the best par tner  that i t  can be. 
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